[EM] Brief comparison of Approval and IRV

[Michael Ossipoff]

For Green scenario conditions, they're both excellent methods, for
quite different reasons.

(Under current conditions, only Approval can be called excellent. IRV
isn't even adequate under current conditions, due to is FBC failure,
and its poorer ability to elect CWs, in comparison to Approval)

They couldn't be more different and opposite.

Approval is considerably more easily counted.

IRV seems to resonate more with people. People get more enthusiastic
about IRV, and rank-balloting in general. People want the luxury of an
easy strategy-free choice among their preferred candidates, even while
protecting the win of that whole preferred set of candidates. Who can
blame them--I'd like that too. That's why I, too, like IRV.

In Approval, you can protect that preferred set, but can't choose among them.

And the remarkable thing about IRV, and people's liking of it, is that
it _delivers_ on that rank-balloting ideal of an easy strategy-free,
sincere-rankings, choice among all the candidates. It does so
completely, and that is unmatched by any other method.

Sure, IRV's advantage is only available to a mutual majority (MM). But
there's nothing wrong with giving the win to a cohesive majority.
There nothing wrong with a cohesive majority having better
strategy-conditions.

But, suppose a CW gets eliminated. and hir votes are transferred to
one wing (That wing, plus the CW's preferrers, are a MM).

The disfavored wing, plus the CW-preferrers, are a majority who prefer
the CW to the favored wing. In Approval, the members of that majority
can enforce majority rule by all approving the CW. They all can do so
while fullly supporting their favorite. In IRV, the
disfavored-wing-members might have to insincerely rank the CW in 1st
place. That strategy disadvantage for the disfavored wing is the price
of easy strategy-free, sincere-ranking choice, for the MM.

Favorite burial need for non-MM voters--but an assured win, and
unmatched complete strategy-freeness for the MM.

A MM is mutual because their candidates and parties offer very similar
platforms. So, it's a majority who favor a set of very similar
candidates and parties. You can't say that there's anything wrong with
their being assured a win. If that gives them easier strategy, that
isn't surprising or unfair.

Approval's stability, and FBC for everyone, vs IRV's unmatched
strategy-freeness for a MM.

I like both methods, and, because they're so different, it's difficult
to choose between them.

But IRV would be fine with me (under Green scenario conditions).

If the Greens are elected, and the government in their platform is
enacted, then IRV will be the voting system. Due to the Greens'
popularity, and IRV's popularity, IRV is likely to win any
voting-system referendum or initiative in that new Green government.
Then IRV will be the method used for candidate elections. That would
be fine with me.

...even though my vote and advocacy, in that voting-system referendum
or initiative would depend on how sure it is that the progressives
have a MM that will be voted as such.

Michael Ossipoff