[EM] The Green scenario, and IRV in the Green scenario, is a new topic here. Hence these additional comments. Clarification of position and why.

[Peter Zbornik]

Being a green party member (although a Czech one and not US), I would
advocate only the top-two-run-off
variant of IRV, i.e. elimination of the candidates and transfer of
votes until two remain, no quota for election (or quota=100%) except
for the case where one candidate has more than 50% of first
preferences.

The top two candidates would meet in a second round in IRV.
A candidate would be elected if he/she would get more than 50% of the votes.

Empty votes would count as  valid votes in both first and second round.

If no candidate would be elected in second round new elections would take place.

The advantages of the proposed election system are
1) the voters are given a chance to concentrate only on two candidates
in the second round, and are thus allowed to change their preferences.
2) blank votes together with IRV might make the candidates less
polarized, as, given a large number of blank votes, the candidate with
the highest number of votes in the second round would have to rely on
the second preferences of the voters for the opposing candidate in
order to get 50%+ votes.

PZ

2013/1/31 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>:
> The reason why I'm posting these comments separately, instead of in
> one complete message is that it's about a new topic, one that we
> haven't discussed.
>
> As I said, we've been talking about methods for current conditions.
> Methods for a different electorate haven't been our topic. In
> particular, that's true regarding conditions that are being worked for
> by alternative political parties, like GPUS. The electorate that would
> elect GPUS by Plurality might or might not come into being, but that
> "Green scenario", whether or not it will happen, is worth discussing,
> because the GPUS is working on it, and because (I claim) it would
> happen if people looked at platforms and voted in their best interest.
>
> Anyway, these additional comments, instead of just one complete
> message, are because this topic is new to all of us.
>
> What I want to say now is that IRV would be perfectly good, perfectly
> ok, in he Green scenario.
>
> It isn't what I'd choose, but it would be ok. If IRV became the voting
> system, then, maybe for some of us (in a mutual majority) the voting
> situation would be ideal, or maybe (if the mutuality isn't assured)
> the situation could take on a confrontational brinksmanship character.
> And for those not in a mutual majority (MM), there'd be
> favorite-burial need. But that isn't unfair or wrong, because it's
> widely accepted that the win is for the majority.
>
> I wouldn't choose IRV, because I just want to approve all of the
> progressive candidates.
>
> Every method that gives you a finer choice among your preferred set of
> candidates, always comes with a drawback. That luxury always comes at
> a price. That's why I've long been saying that improving on Approval
> is easier said than done.
>
> In the case of IRV, the drawback occurs if you aren't in a majority,
> or your majority isn't mutual, or if the mutuality is in some way
> jeopardized.
>
> For example, suppose that there were a progressive party that felt
> that it had media-acceptance-strategy incentive to tell its voters to
> rank the Democrat in 2nd place. That would clearly jeopardize the
> progressive mutual majority. It would create a dangerous brinksmanship
> game. I don't want that. As I said above, I just want to approve all
> of the progressives.
>
> If that were the situation, and if we had IRV, that party would surely
> realize that sincere ranking is assumed in IRV--especially in a mutual
> majority, where sincere ranking is optimal. If the situation should be
> a mutual majority, but might not be voted as such, might some people
> insist on voting as if it were? Might not the defecting party know
> that? That's why I said it would be a brinksmanship game.
>
> That's why, even though IRV would be perfectly good in the Green
> scenario, it isn't what I'd choose. I'd choose Approval or Score, for
> the reasons stated above.
>
> But IRV will be the next voting system unless we can tell to the GPUS
> platform committee, some convincing reasons why they don't want IRV. I
> described some of those reasons in an earlier post. Maybe other people
> here don't want to bother. Ok, then IRV is likely to be the next
> voting system.
>
> Michael Ossipoff
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