[EM] proportional constraints - help needed

[Jameson Quinn]

2013/2/11 Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at lavabit.com>

> On 02/09/2013 09:41 PM, Richard Fobes wrote:
>
>>  > 2013/2/6 Richard Fobes<ElectionMethods@**votefair.org<ElectionMethods at votefair.org>
>> >:
>>  >> How many candidates would/could compete for the five (open)
>>  >> party-list positions?
>> On 2/6/2013 3:12 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
>>  > Say twenty, for instance.
>>
>> To: Peter Zbornik
>>
>> After considerable thinking about your request, I've come up with a
>> recommended election method for your situation.
>>
>> The method has these advantages:
>>
>> * Uses open-source software that is already available.
>>
>> * Does not require any modification of the software.
>>
>> * Provides proportional results for the five seats.
>>
>> * Provides quota-based representation for women -- which, as I
>> understand it, you specified as requiring a woman in one of the top two
>> positions, and another woman in the next three positions.
>>
>> * Is very resistant to strategic voting.
>>
>> * Produces better representation compared to using STV (single
>> transferable vote).
>>
>> The method consists of running VoteFair _representation_ ranking
>> calculations. Five levels of representation would be requested. As a
>> part of that calculation, VoteFair _popularity_ ranking results are also
>> calculated for all twenty or thirty candidates.
>>
>
> Although what I'm going to say may be a bit offtopic, I think I should say
> it. I think it could be useful to quantify exactly what is meant by
> quoted-in proportionality in the sense that the Czech Green Party desires
> it. Then one may make a "quota proportionality criterion" and design
> methods from the ground up that pass it.
>
> It's very easy to otherwise come up with something that sounds nice (hey,
> I did it myself) but that doesn't pass the idea of quota proportionality as
> envisioned.
>
> (Also, speaking of criteria: if I had enough time, I would try to find a
> monotone variant of Schulze STV. I think one can make monotone
> Droop-proportional multiwinner methods, since I made a Bucklin hack that
> seemed to be both monotone and Droop-proportional. However, I have no
> mathematical proof that the method obeys both criteria.)


What does monotone even mean for PR? You can make something that's
sequentially monotone, but it's (I think) impossible to avoid situations
where AB were winning but changing C>A>B to A>B>C causes B to lose (or
variants of this kind of problem). That's still technically "monotone", but
from a voters perspective, it's not usefully so.
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20130211/4ada9ecb/attachment-0002.htm>