[EM] Condorcet anti-CW offensive strategy in Condorcet-IRV?

[Michael Ossipoff]

Someone could argue that Condorcet-IRV would be vulnerable to, and give
incentive for, the familiar Condorcet offensive strategies.

But, for one thing, those strategies wouldn't be well rewarded, and would
tend to be deterred, in Condorcet-IRV.

...and, for another thing, even if they could work successfully and were
used successfully, we'd be no worse off than if we had ordinary IRV.

Why the Condorcet anti-CW offensive strategies aren't well rewarded in
Condorcet-IRV:

1. The members of the favored wing (the wing that is in the mutual
majority) might, at first, seem to benefit if they can keep the CW from
winning as CW. But, to do that, they need to help someone worse, against
the CW, or at least not help the CW against someone worse. That will count
in the ensuing IRV count as well, where the favored wing anti-CW
strategizers will be voting to elect someone from the opposite wing instead
of the CW.

2. Even if it could work, the anti-CW strategy by the favored wing would
almost surely result in it being the disfavored wing in the next election.

And, as I said above, even if the Condorcet anti-CW strategy could work to
the strategizers' benefit, and did, then we'd be no worse off than we'd be
with ordinary IRV.

Michael Ossipoff
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