[EM] 3 reasons why mutual majorities would be voted, in the Green scenario
Michael Ossipoff
email9648742 at gmail.com
Wed Feb 6 06:06:21 PST 2013
My concern had been that, in IRV, a party, in order to gain
media-support, might instruct its voters to rank, in 2nd place, a
media-promoted party's candidate.
But there are several reasons why that shouldn't be a problem in the
Green scenario.
1. With the open media offered in the Green platform, there wouldn't
be corporate control of media, or a media agenda to promote
corporate-owned parties, or any particular parties. Therefore there
wouldn't be pressure, need or incentive for a party, to please the
media, to recommend voting against preference.
2. With that more open media, and especially if the non-CW-preferring
wing of the mutual majority (MM) could be large enough to eliminate
the CW, then voters would have heard, via the media, about its
platform policy proposals, and, would be well-aware of the great
similarity of policies within the MM.
3. If that wing might be large enough to eliminate the CW, then, in
the event that it isn't quite that large, and it gets eliminated
first, the CW would very much want its transfer votes, and so there
would be incentive to not offend that wing whose support could be
important.
For those reasons, I suggest that there is little reason to doubt that
a progressive mutually majority would be voted as such, in IRV, in the
Green scenario.
Michael Ossipoff
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