[EM] Default MMV meaning, for MMV without qualifying designations

Michael Ossipoff email9648742 at gmail.com
Wed Dec 11 06:31:36 PST 2013

On Wed, Dec 11, 2013 at 8:54 AM, Markus Schulze
<Markus.Schulze at alumni.tu-berlin.de> wrote:
> Dear Mike Ossipoff,
> your last definition of MMV sounds rather like the Schulze method
> than like Tideman's ranked pairs method.


I'm glad that there's good agreement and similarity among the ideal
majoritarian methods, RP (in all its versions, including MAM and MMV)
and CSSD/Beatpath.

I have nothing against CSSD/Beatpath, and have no criticism of it, for
ideal majoritarian conditions.

I don't mean for it to be Tideman's RP version.

I use Ranked-Pairs (RP) to designate  broad category of methods based on:

Keep every defeat that doesn't contradict a set of stronger defeats.

MMV is a deterministic version of RP.

I have nothing against Beatpath. RP and CSSD/Beatpath are the ideal
majoitarian methods, and each has its advantages and disadvantages in
comparison to the other.

Some of RP's advantages seeem compelling:

In Eppley's simulations, in the vast majority of instances where MAM
and Beatpath give different outcomes, the voters collectively prefer
RP's outcome to Beatpath's outcome.

The above-stated RP definition is far, far briefer than Beatpath's definition.

RP and CSSD both have natural definitions, but RP's definition is a
lot briefer, plainer, simpler.

How would Beatpath deal with equally strong beatpaths between two alternatives?

If CSSD encounters two equally weakest defeats in the current Schwartz
set, does it drop both together?

In the implementation that you offer, how do you deal with tied outcomes?

Beatpath/CSSD always chooses from the Schwartz set. Desirable, not
compelling or necessary. if the voters vote that a candidate is as
good a a Schwartz set member, then how bad can s/he be?

When I told Eppley about my concerns regarding chicken-dilemma, and
disinformational-media-induced favorite-burial, he pointed out that
with the followng two options, such strategy problems could be
eliminated, at least enough to make ideal majoritarian methods safely
usable, even in current conditions. I refer to the following two

1. Candidate-Withdrawal Option:

After the count is done, and the results publicized, any candidate(s)
can withdraw from the election, calling for a re-count in which
they're deleted from the ballots.

The candidates may meet and negotiate among eachother regarding their
withdrawals, and policy concessions.

2. Vote-for-Publicized-Ranking (VPR):

Parties may publicize their recommended rankings. Voters have the
option to easily and conveniently mark a party's recomended ranking,
on their ballot, avoiding the need to make their own ranking.

Maybe with those two options, the favorite-burial problem and the
chicken dilemma problem would no longer be problems, allowing ideal
majoritarian methods such as RP (in versions such as MAM & MMV) and
CSSD/Beatpath to be safely used.

Current conditions have chicken-dilemma and
disinformational-media-induced favorite-burial (perceived) need.

Approval, Score, and ICT would avoid the former. ICT would avoid both.

Greens scenario conditions no longer have the media-deception problem,
and don't need FBC, but still have chicken dilemma.

Benham, Woodall, and IRV meet Mutual Majority and have no chicken
dilemma. Benham and Woodall are better because they meet the Condorcet

When I speak of the above-named strategy problems, I'm speaking of
them as problems here and now, and I make no claims about their being
problems elsewhere, or under better conditions here.

But, as I said, Eppley suggested that VPR & candidate-withdrawal
option could avoid those problems, allowing the use of ideal
majoritarian conditions even under current conditions (if it were
possible to get voting system reform under current conditions.

Michael Ossipoff

Michael Ossipoff

> Markus Schulze
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

More information about the Election-Methods mailing list