[EM] Sociological issues of elections

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 08:24 AM 8/31/2013, Vidar Wahlberg wrote:
>This may be a bit outside what is usually discussed here, but I'll give
>it a shot and if someone know of some resources I should check up on
>then please let me know.

Others who know me might expect me to respond to this ....

>I've not followed this list for a long time, but my impression is that
>the main focus is on the technical or mathematical properties, and less
>on the sociological issues.

Usually, yes.

>For instance, when voting for persons then candidates with high
>popularity and charisma are likely to win more votes than less
>charismatic candidates, despite the less charismatic candidates being
>far more suited for the task (more knowledge, experience, talent, etc.).

The "task" is undefined here. Yeah, if one is hiring a technician, 
sure, perhaps. However, suppose the community is hiring someone to 
*represent them.* For that task, the character of the candidate, the 
popularity of the candidate, become quite relevant. What's the task?

Someone who is "more suited" for the task of represenative would very 
likely have the skills to generate popularity.

>In the Norwegian system where we got multiple parties, but two blocks
>(left and right), we also see that some people vote for their second
>preference rather than the first, because the first is in the wrong
>block or intend to cooperate with another party which the voter dislike
>the most.

Then that person is not their first preference. There is an internal 
contradiction in what is asserted. It assmes that "first preference" 
is a simple decision. Indeed, it assumes *popularity* as the 
standard, rather than, say, expected behavior in cooperating with 
that nasty other party.

As is common with those who stumble across the problem, it hasn't 
been analyzed deeply. Instead, there is a focus on symptoms. It's not 
surprising; when I began to study the general problem, over twenty 
years ago, I found that the study of democratic *systems* was in a 
primitive state. Political scientists freqently made pronouncements 
that depended on unstated assumptions. Common opinions, to be sure, 
but we do expect a bit more from scientists. At least I do.

"The problem of scale in democracy is insoluble." [Follows a proof 
that is based on assumptions about what is possible in "democracy," 
that ignores what is *actual practice* in some areas of society.] 
With that conclusion as a basis, then, the scientist suggested poor 
compromises as the best that can be done. After all, human nature, blah, blah.

Yes, whatever we do, if we are to be effective, must work with 
people-as-we-are. But what is possible for real people? My sense is 
that much more is possible than we normally see, because what we 
normally see is conditioned by present circumstances, and we tend to 
assume that those circumstances will continue. Hence natural human 
responses will continue, etc.

>If it is within the scope of this list, what are your thoughts on the
>subject?

It's been discussed before. I'll give some thoughts below.

>Alternatively:
>Assuming the perfect election system where voting any different than
>your real preference would only hurt your preference,

That's quite an assumption! It incorporates a very strange concept 
that is, however, common. I'm referring to the concept of "hurting 
your preference." That assumes that if the preference is not chosen, 
the preference has been *harmed.*

Yes, we imagine that an ideal system would encourage sincere 
expression of preference, but we usually then set this up within 
complex systems, where complex preferences are expressed. But notice 
this: ordinary human conversation, where neighbors have some decision 
to make, may involve expression of preferences. If I prefer that we 
have white fences, indicating that I might accept yellow fences could 
lead rapidly to a compromise of yellow. Have I "hurt" my first preference?

Yes, I have, though it is a weird expression, assuming that my 
primary goal is to get along with my neighbors, and that the color of 
fence is a lesser goal. If I want white, end of topic, everyone can 
go to hell if they don't accept my white fence, well, then, I 
wouldn't express "yellow," because my preference is *strong*. A great 
deal of confusion is generated by not considering *real preference strength.*

Instead, it is assumed that there is some absolute preference 
strength, and people either vote that sincerely, in a method that 
allows preference strength expression (i.e., range voting), or they 
are "insincere.* But in real life, our preference strengths, the 
vigor with which we pursue a preference, is interactive with what we 
believe is possible! We make very complex assessments. It appears 
that there is no such thing as "absolute preference strength." 
However, again in real life, we may bid in an auction, and such bids 
may represent some kind of sincerity!


>  how would you
>design a form of government that is elected by the people, but is
>resistant to sociological issues that can't be prevented by the election
>method (such as the examples mentioned above)?

My answer: don't start with "government." Start with systems designed 
to encourage communication, cooperation, and coordination, on a large 
scale. If you can solve *that problem*, you do have a possible 
solution to the problem of government.

Don't start with an assumption that "sociological issues" are Bad. To 
be "Prevented." "Resisted." Rather, understand that what you are 
calling sociological issues are part and parcel of the defacto 
systems that evolved for collective decision-making. Don't try to 
"get rid of them"! You are, if you do this, likely to end up with 
something *worse*.

*Use* what exists, and supply what is missing. This is a general 
approach that does not just apply to the problem of government!

Now, some ideas.

I could approach this in the general case, and words would multiply.

Instead, I will focus on the problem of creating an assembly that 
*fully represents* an electorate. I am not trying to reinvent the 
entire deliberative process, so let's assume that this assembly 
operates traditionally, i.e., it uses standard democratic process, 
developed over centuries. It only makes decisions by majority vote: 
no majority, no decision.

It may also develop traditions of seeking more than a mere majority, 
where it can accomplish this. I point that out because people 
sometimes react to "majority rule" negatively. Rather, the traditions 
actually prevent *minority rule,* where the status quo favors a 
minority. A society that is making all its decisions by a slight 
majority, over strong opposition by a large minority, is 
dysfunctional and will be highly inefficient. Besides being 
dangerous. And people usually understand that.

The general method for full representation that I'll present was 
developed out of a suggestion by Lewis Carroll, what came to be 
called Asset Voting. He was looking at STV, and realized that 
preferential voting depended upon the ability of voters to order 
preferences, to make not just a decent first preference choice, but 
then to make lower preference choices, and his opinion was that the 
common voter did not generally have the information to do that. This 
is pretty obvious, and is addressed by party-list systems, where what 
one is really voting for is the favorite *party*. That, however, begs 
the question: how does the *party* order its list? If that is done by 
the people through elections, then how is *that* election conducted? 
Commonly, though parties are run by activists who develop a certain 
conflict of interest. This is expressed in the Iron Law of Oligarchy, 
which should be understood.

Anyway, Carroll (Charles Dodgson) suggested that when a ballot was 
exhausted, the vote would become the "property", as it were, of the 
Favorite, to be redistributed at will; the favored candidate is then 
empowered and is able to make choices, creating a quota of votes to 
determine winners. These winners, then, represent the voter directly 
*or indirectly*, having been chosen by, presumably, the most 
*trusted* candidate.

Asset was proposed within STV, but what I noticed was my own 
preference: I don't know the candidates well, I imagine. I only know 
my Favorite, and, in fact, my favorite is someone I can talk with.

(We *assume* that there is a large scale, that the Favorite would be 
so popular that the Favorite cannot talk with most supporters. 
However, this assumption comes out of voting systems where votes for 
a little-known candidate are *useless*, wasted. Asset Voting actually 
assigns power to the Favorite, unconditionally. The vote isn't wasted 
unless the Favorite actually wastes it!

With Asset Voting, *full representation* becomes possible. That is, a 
large number of people can be reduced to a small number of people, by 
comparison, the small number *fully representing* the large. Not by 
position on issues, necessarily, though that will follow naturally. 
*By choice.* That is, every seat will have been chosen directly by a 
quota of voters, or indirectly by what I call "electors" chosen by the voters.

The election creates an "electoral college," a collection of *public 
voters.* The size of this college might be very large. I have 
recommended the use of the Hare quota, with certain measures to 
handle what may inevitably be a certain level of nonrepresentation; 
the goal is that voting power in the Assembly is directly 
proportional to the actual support of the candidate, with excess 
voting power being redistributed to other seats.

I.e., if a candidate has more than the quota, the candidate has 
excess votes to reassign. Seats have a certain direct voting power, 
no more than that. However, because of the creation of the electoral 
college, a set of *public voters*, direct/representative democracy 
becomes possible.

I won't go into more detail.

Under Asset, the voter has a simple task, whom, out of the universe 
of those registered as electors, does the voter most trust to make 
decisions in their absence?

That decision will be made on a complex basis; one factor, for me, 
would be whether or not I have *direct access to communication* with 
the candidate. If I don't, it doesn't matter how much I trust the 
person, unless I really am going to disappear and be unavailable for 
communication. If I'm voting for someone who is *not going to serve 
directly*, which will be so for the vast majority of electors, then 
important to me would be this person's communication skills, and 
their ability to assess other candidates. Their position on issues is 
only a piece of this. I assume there will be similarities, and differences.

(I concluded long ago that if I identified the *perfect person* in 
terms of understanding of issues and social goals, *I would disagree 
with this person on some issues.* Because I'm not perfect! So, for 
me, the general issue is overall trust. Is the person as likely as me 
to make a decent decision, or better than I would? That's what I 
would look for. Some people might look for a "Yes-Man." Someone who 
will appear to agree with them on everything. They may get what they 
deserve. But, overall, I expect that an Asset system will improve the 
actual trustworthiness of representatives, statistically.)

Asset requires no complex compromises on the part of the voter. 
Compromises are worked out through individual negotations by trusted 
representatives. It is entirely possible, with direct/representative 
Asset -- that allows electors to directly vote on issues -- that any 
errors can be fixed, misplaced trust may be redirected, etc.

And we would have, for the first time, true and complete 
representation of the People.

Without *contested elections.* Every vote counts, and has an effect 
that is visible. I've suggested that electors may reassign votes in 
blocks based on precinct totals. If votes from a precinct are totally 
-- or mostly -- reassigned as a block, the original voter will know 
*exactly* whom was elected by the voter's vote. They will have 
*their* representative actually sitting in the Assembly.

And they will have either direct access to the Seat -- if the Seat 
has time to talk with them, which can be a problem -- or indirect 
access through their elector. If an elector would not talk with me, 
within reason, I'd find another elector!

Notice that in this system, electors don't *need* votes. They don't 
need to attain any quota. They participate in the process as public 
voters, that's all. Being an elector would be a certain amount of 
work, but not an overwhelming amount. (If communication with 
constituents became a burden, a sane elector would suggest some 
reassignment of votes! "Vote for X, over there, she is a great 
communicator, and has time.")

Basically, we imagine the political process as some kind of combat, 
with winners and losers. That's unnecessary, if the goal is representation.