[EM] Instead of Top 2

[Forest Simmons]

On Sun, Apr 21, 2013 at 1:27 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <
km_elmet at lavabit.com> wrote:

> On 04/20/2013 12:09 AM, Forest Simmons wrote:
>
>> Suppose the two methods were IRV and Approval, and that each voter could
>> choose which of the two methods to vote on their strategic ballots, and
>> then rank the candidates non-strategically as well for the choice
>> between the two method winners.
>>
>> We would learn something about the popularity of the two methods, which
>> one chose the final winner the most often, which one elicited the most
>> order reversals, etc.
>>
>> The same experiment could be done with any two methods.
>>
>
> For that matter, the experiment could be done with ordinary runoff to
> check if the voters change their minds between the rounds of the runoff.
>
> The experiment would go like this: first round, the voters vote using the
> two methods in question, and also give a honest preference ordering for a
> virtual runoff. Second round, they vote in the actual runoff between the
> winner candidates (or some complex tiebreak if the winner is the same for
> both methods).


If the winner is the same for both methods, we're done.  In that case we
have to wait for another election to have a runoff.

But if one of the methods results in a tie, the other method is the natural
tie breaker.  Method A is the tie breaker for method B and vice versa.


> Then one compares the preference orderings with the runoff results. If the
> runoff is A vs B, A won, but the preference ordering says B should have
> won, there's your reversal.
>
> And I've mentioned it before, but I suppose I can do so again, since we're
> talking about two-method runoffs :-) From time to time I've thought about
> the idea of having a runoff using a strategy-resistant method and a method
> that provides good results under honesty. This could be useful in a society
> where people have become used to strategizing. If they strategize wildly,
> then the honest method fails but the resistant method keeps the result from
> being too bad; and if they don't, then the honest method's candidate wins
> the runoff and all is good.
>
> In that case MJ could be the strategy resistant method, and ordinary range
the method with good honesty results.  Range nominates the candidate with
the highest grade point average, while MJ nominates the candidate with the
highest median grade.

Here's another suggestion:

Use five slot ballots as in MJ for the strategic ballots.

The voters are allowed to choose their approval cutoffs.

Candidate A is the approval winner for all of the ballots that set the
cutoff somewhere strictly below the middle level.  Candidate B is the
approval  winner for all of the ballots that set the cutoff at C or above.

Use the sincere rankings to choose between candidates A and B.

A check box allows voters to indicate that their strategic and sincere
ratings are the same, thereby cutting their work in half if they feel no
need to strategize.











On Sun, Apr 21, 2013 at 1:27 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <
km_elmet at lavabit.com> wrote:

> On 04/20/2013 12:09 AM, Forest Simmons wrote:
>
>> Suppose the two methods were IRV and Approval, and that each voter could
>> choose which of the two methods to vote on their strategic ballots, and
>> then rank the candidates non-strategically as well for the choice
>> between the two method winners.
>>
>> We would learn something about the popularity of the two methods, which
>> one chose the final winner the most often, which one elicited the most
>> order reversals, etc.
>>
>> The same experiment could be done with any two methods.
>>
>
> For that matter, the experiment could be done with ordinary runoff to
> check if the voters change their minds between the rounds of the runoff.
>
> The experiment would go like this: first round, the voters vote using the
> two methods in question, and also give a honest preference ordering for a
> virtual runoff. Second round, they vote in the actual runoff between the
> winner candidates (or some complex tiebreak if the winner is the same for
> both methods). Then one compares the preference orderings with the runoff
> results. If the runoff is A vs B, A won, but the preference ordering says B
> should have won, there's your reversal.
>
> And I've mentioned it before, but I suppose I can do so again, since we're
> talking about two-method runoffs :-) From time to time I've thought about
> the idea of having a runoff using a strategy-resistant method and a method
> that provides good results under honesty. This could be useful in a society
> where people have become used to strategizing. If they strategize wildly,
> then the honest method fails but the resistant method keeps the result from
> being too bad; and if they don't, then the honest method's candidate wins
> the runoff and all is good.
>
>
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