[EM] Instead of Top 2

[Forest Simmons]

Suppose the two methods were IRV and Approval, and that each voter could
choose which of the two methods to vote on their strategic ballots, and
then rank the candidates non-strategically as well for the choice between
the two method winners.

We would learn something about the popularity of the two methods, which one
chose the final winner the most often, which one elicited the most order
reversals, etc.

The same experiment could be done with any two methods.


On Fri, Apr 19, 2013 at 12:56 PM, Forest Simmons <fsimmons at pcc.edu> wrote:

> Methods that choose between top 2 Approval, top 2 Plurality, Top 2
> Bucklin, etc. have problems that we are all familiar with, in particular
> clones mess them up.
>
> But what if our method elects the pairwise preference between
> the method A winner and the method B winner?  If the two winners are the
> same, then the common winner is elected.  This idea seems to avoid the
> problems associated with top2 methods.
>
> What would you suggest for methods A and B?
>
> I would suggest MJ type grade ballots.  Then some good possibilities for
> Method A or B would be MJ itself, XA (chiastic approval), Approval with
> various possibilities for approval cutoff level, etc.
>
> My personal favorite version is to elect the pairwise preferred of the XA
> winner and the candidate with the fewest F's.
>
> Forest
>
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