[EM] Cloneproofing Random Pair and Random Candidate?

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 02:24 AM 4/3/2013, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
>However, there is a rated method that is also strategy-proof. It is 
>called Hay voting. Some time ago, I stumbled across 
>http://www.panix.com/~tehom/essays/hay-extended.html , which seems 
>to be a proposal to make Hay voting cloneproof. I haven't really 
>understood the details yet, but I'm wondering if this could be used 
>to also make the two Random methods cloneproof.

Hay voting, as described, is a multiple-round system, it appears. 
Now, why would this complex system be superior to standard Robert 
Rules elections, i.e., vote for one, repeated ballot if no majority, 
no eliminations with only voluntary withdrawals -- or shifts in voter 
preferences -- , in an Assembly able to change rules, effectively, by 
agreement?

I have argued that the standard process could be improved by using 
Approval similarity, instead of vote-for-one, and other advanced 
voting systems could also be used, but it would be essential that 
members of the assembly *understand* the system!

A coin toss used to decide between two candidates when a certain 
regional organization is selecting a delegate to a world conference, 
and when no candidate could get a 2/3 vote after a substantial series 
of ballots. The choice, then, after such a series, was from the top two.

The thinking is that, if this impasse develops, there is a minority 
faction with strong opinions, and for organizational unity, they want 
that faction represented at the Conference. (Where consensus is 
sought, and, again, "consensus" is minimally a 2/3 vote -- and it's 
all advisory, in effect, the World Conference has no control over 
local groups.)

This kind of process can be made more efficient using Range Voting, 
but Approval is simple enough and functions similarly to Range, 
particularly if, in the first ballot, voters simply vote for one. I'd 
still allow voting for more than one in the first ballot, because if 
a voter has difficulty deciding which of two candidates to prefer, 
they should be able to just vote them equally.

I.e., Bucklin-ER simulates a series of these rounds, and could simply 
be continued until it finds a majority. The voters will figure it out.

In the world of voting systems, the power of repeated ballot has 
often been neglected. With a repeated ballot, no eliminations, each 
ballot is a new election (independent nominations, not restricted to 
the original set or a subset of it), the method is *extremely 
powerful.* It should not be abandoned, in particular, in favor of 
systems that promise completion with a single ballot, and Robert's 
Rules of Order specifically suggests otherwise. The do suggest the 
use of some system of preferential voting, but note that if voters 
don't fully rank, the election may have to be completed anyway (what 
they describe is critically different from IRV, in spite of what 
FairVote has claimed for years), *and* the method can fail to choose 
a "compromise winner." I.e., it suffers from center squeeze.