[EM] Have completed voting-system project. Final posting. Recommendations summary.

[Michael Ossipoff]

I've now completed the voting-systems project that

I was doing. I've done what I set out to do.



My purpose at these forums has been to thoroughly discuss:



Criteria, voting-systems and voting strategy for:



1. Official public elections, under:

...a) current conditions

...b) Green scenario conditions

......1. satisfying only mutual majorities

......2. with insistence on satisfing all majorities



2. Organizations, clubs,meetings, conventions,

...committees, and families, with:

......a) Full co-operativeness and sincerity

......b) not "a)",  but approval's socal optimizations
.........more important than majority rule & strategy.

......c) not "a)" or "b)", but organization is amicable

......d) not "a)", "b)" or "c)". Inimical organization.



(incidentally, all official public elections are inimical)



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Voting-system recommendations for the

above-listed applications:



1. Official public elections under:



a) current conditions (in order of preference):



Symmetrical ICT

ICT

Score

Approval



Score and Approval, but especially Approval, are

more proposable and feasible, and therefore are

the best proposals.



I emphasize that the choice of voting systems for

current conditions is a moot point, because voting

system reform isn't going to happen under current

conditions. Therefore Green scenario conditions are

much more relevant.



b) Green scenario conditions,

...1. satisfying only mutual majorities



Satisfying only mutual majorities is enough, because

that's the important kind of majority.



Some recommendations, in order of preference:



MM//Woodall

MM//Benham

IRV



...2. insistence on satisfying all majorities:



Condorcet Critreron compllying methods.



Woodall

Benham (Condorcet-IRV)

Schwartz Woodall

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Organizations, clubs, meetngs, conventions,

committees and families, with:



...a) full co-operativeness & sincerity:



Consensus from discussion

Score balloting, electing alternative with best
...worst rating

Score balloting, electing alternative with highest
...average rating (or summed ratings).



b) not "a)", but Approval's social optimizations

...more important than majority rule & strategy:



Approval or Score. Where accepability is the
...important thing,or where excellence or top-
...likedness is important, then Approval is best.



c) not "a)" or "b)", but organization is amicable:



Condorcet-complyiing method, such as:



Schwarz Woodal

Woodall

Benham

(But especially Schwartz Woodall)



...c) for show-of-hands voting, or with many

....alternatives, no count software, & little time:



....Sequential Pairwise



d) not "a)", "b)", or "c)". Organization is inimical:



The c) methods would be ok, but those listed

below might be preferable:



MM//Schwartz Woodall

MM//Benham

IRV



...d) for show-of-hands voting, or with many

...alternatives, no count software, & little time:



..."Exhaustive Balloting" ("Elimination-Voting")





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The above recommendations are based on the

need for FBC under current conditions, and on

the desirability of freedom from chicken dilemma

under all conditions where strategy matters, and on

the desirability of Mutual Majority Criterion compliance

when strategy matters.



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Though I've said this before, I'm posting for the record,

not just to communicate with current frequent posters,

and least of all to communicate with the more angry,

bigoted and rivalry-ridden current frequent posters.



I recognize that 1) Many interested people are not

frequent posters; and 2) forum readership & membership,

including frequent-posters, changes considerably over time.



Michael Ossipoff