[EM] Associated Student Government at Northwestern University uses Schulze Method
Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km_elmet at lavabit.com
Sun Apr 21 01:16:08 PDT 2013
On 04/20/2013 10:32 PM, rbj at audioimagination.com wrote:
>
> From: "Kevin Venzke" <stepjak at yahoo.fr>
>
> > It's true that *with the ballots as cast* any Condorcet-compliant
> method would have
> > worked identically.
>
> including no specific Condorcet method, since there was a CW.
>
> > What you don't know until you try it, is whether voters would
> > actually cast those ballots, given the incentives created by the method.
>
> well, when at first i (mistakenly) thought that there were only 3
> candidates (or candidate tickets, in this case), i could not see how
> there would be any different outcome at all because, even if there was a
> cycle, it would be a cycle with 3 in the Smith set.
I think his point was that the criterion compliances of the method might
induce certain behavior that would not be in place with another method.
As a very drastic example, consider a Condorcet election where the CW is
also the Plurality winner *given those ballots*. Strictly, one could
argue that Plurality would have sufficed and would have produced the
same winner - but the significant vote-splitting problems of Plurality
might have led to a lesser-of-two-evils thinking and so the winner would
have changed under the ballots that the voters would have submitted in
Plurality.
On the other hand, one could also argue that there's too little
difference between various Condorcet methods for this to happen. That
is, the overwhelming majority of Condorcet elections in practice end
with a CW, so the difference between Schulze and Copeland (or
Borda-elimination) is so small one should just pick whichever the
electorate will accept.
I don't know whether that is true or not - one would have to gather
evidence to say either way - but in the absence of such, I prefer
advanced Condorcet methods just to be on the safe side (or if the
electorate learns to make use of the safety provided by them, they can
comparably speaking be more expressive before being limited by the
method). But if the voters absolutely won't accept the advanced methods,
simple ones are better than Plurality.
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