[EM] Consensus threshold

[Michael Allan]

> The psychological value of this method is that it appeals to our
> natural community spirit which includes a willingness to go along
> with the group consensus when the consensus is strong enough, as
> long as there is no hope for a better consensus, and as long as it
> isn't a candidate that we would rate at zero.
> 
> Comments?

I think there is a general williness to *consider* a consensus, but
not a general willingness to follow it blindly.  The popularity of a
candidate is a recommendation to look more closely at that candidate
given the fact of his/her popularity.  Here popularity directly serves
only to arouse my curiosity, "Why is this candidate more popular?
What do others know that I don't know?"

On learning the answer, I decide whether to follow the consensus.

The proposed method differs in asking me to make the same decision,
but without knowing the reason for the candidate's popularity.  It
invites me to act irrationally and enshrines that action as normal
human behaviour.

As a counter-proposal, consider a broader rationalization of the
electoral design.  Rather than overloading a single election with
expectations it cannot fulfil, factor it into two elections: (1) a
continuous, advisory primary to flush out consensus and dissensus, to
give people time to talk things over, and decide what to do; followed
by (2) a decisive election in which they express the decision.  This
solves the problem of systematic irrationality by allowing for a real
consensus in the primary, one with reasons behind it, the validity of
which can be discussed and debated before making a decision.

-- 
Michael Allan

Toronto, +1 416-699-9528
http://zelea.com/


Forest Simmons said:
> Jobst has suggested that ballots be used to elicit voter's "consensus
> thresholds" for the various candidates.
> 
> If your consensus threshold for candidate X is 80 percent, that means that
> you would be willing to support candidate X if more than 80 percent of the
> other voters were also willing to support candidate X, but would forbid
> your vote from counting towards the election of X if the total support for
> X would end up short of 80 percent.
> 
> The higher the threshold that you give to X the more reluctant you are to
> join in a consensus, but as long as your threshold t for X is less than
> than 100 percent, a sufficiently large consensus (i.e. larger than t
> percent) would garner your support, as long as it it is the largest
> consensus that qualifies for your support.
> 
> A threshold of zero signifies that you are willing to support X no matter
> how small the consensus, as long as no larger consensus qualifies for your
> support.
> 
> I suggest that we use score ballots on a scale of 0 to 100 with the
> convention that the score and the threshold for a candidate are related by
> s+t=100.
> 
> So given the score ballots, here's how the method is counted:
> 
> For each candidate X let p(X) be the largest number p between 0 and 100
> such that p(X) ballots award a score strictly greater than 100-p to
> candidate X.
> 
> The candidate X with the largest value of p(X) wins the election.
> 
> If there are two or more candidates that share this maximum value of p,
> then choose from the tied set the candidate ranked the highest in the
> following order:
> 
> Candidate X precedes candidate Y if X is scored above zero on more ballots
> than Y.  If this doesn't break the tie, then X precedes Y if X is scored
> above one on more ballots than Y.  If that still doesn't break the tie,
> then X precedes Y if X is scored above two on more ballots than Y, etc.
> 
> In the unlikely event that the tie isn't broken before you get to 100,
> choose the winner from the remaining tied candidates by random ballot.
> 
> The psychological value of this method is that it appeals to our natural
> community spirit which includes a willingness to go along with the group
> consensus when the consensus is strong enough, as long as there is no hope
> for a better consensus, and as long as it isn't a candidate that we would
> rate at zero.
> 
> Comments?
> 
> Forest