[EM] Cloneproofing Random Pair and Random Candidate?

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 12:12 PM 4/4/2013, Jameson Quinn wrote:

>2013/4/4 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <<mailto:abd at lomaxdesign.com>abd at lomaxdesign.com>
>At 02:24 AM 4/3/2013, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
>However, there is a rated method that is also strategy-proof. It is 
>called Hay voting. Some time ago, I stumbled across 
><http://www.panix.com/~tehom/essays/hay-extended.html>http://www.panix.com/~tehom/essays/hay-extended.html 
>, which seems to be a proposal to make Hay voting cloneproof. I 
>haven't really understood the details yet, but I'm wondering if this 
>could be used to also make the two Random methods cloneproof.
>
>
>Hay voting, as described, is a multiple-round system, it appears.
>
>
>Only virtually so, as with IRV.

Um, it's completely unclear. If it is not multi-round, then subslates 
are picked for analysis. The method then seems to assume full ranking.

But if I said I understand the method (or the original Hay voting), 
I'd be lying.

>I agree that this virtual-multiround Hay is excessively complex for 
>questionable benefits.

Even when an algorithm is clear, if the *effect* of the algorithm is 
not clear, it can lead to confusion and mistrust of a method.

Hay voting seems to have been invented to encourage the expression of 
sincere utilities, as distinct from von Neumann-Morgenstern 
utilities, and there is a whole practically knee-jerk assumption in 
voting system theory that "strategy" is "bad." In Range voting, 
strategic voting refers to something radically different from what 
was strategic voting in ranked systems: in the latter, it was 
reversal of preferences. That reversal occurs to me as radically 
unfair, that is, a system that encourages such reversals is unfair. 
But Approval and Range don't do that. I think there are some weird 
circumstances with multiple majorities in Bucklin that could lead a 
voter to think they should reverse preference, but ... that is a rare 
circumstance, difficult to anticipate, and of questionable value. 
Runoff Bucklin fixes or ameliorates possible problems on this.

(For starters, it would make multiple majorities rare, unless there 
*really are clear multiple approvals without strong preference 
between them,* and I usually write about this that "we should be so lucky.")

>The multiround stuff breaks the provable strategy-proofness, and 
>what remains is largely handwaving. Even if that handwaving is in 
>some deeper sense "correct" that strategy is ineffective, it could 
>still fail to matter if people believe that strategy will pay off 
>somehow. So the benefits are dubious; indeed, I very much doubt that 
>they're worth the complexity.

It's a long way to go to try to eliminate voters considering 
practicality when they choose how to vote.

What we want, I suggest, is to encourage sincere designation of 
favorites, when they are clear to the voter. That's considerate of 
voters. It is also considerate of voters to *allow* equal ranking at 
all ranks. And, then, it is simple and has utility benefit to not 
eliminate unexpressed ranks. I.e, Borda becomes Range if equal 
ranking and empty ranks is allowed. And why not do this? It reflects 
how voters actually think. There are *choices* to be made in this 
process, and those choices probably will reflect "strategic 
consideration," but if it's a zero-knowledge election, they will 
purely represent an estimate of preference strength.

Bottom line, a simple ballot design that collects preferences and 
preference strengths from voters is ... a Range ballot. If resolution 
is adequate, it can be voted as a ranked ballot -- and it might be so 
analyzed, for part of a system.

But that is the basic information.

I have argued that when voters shift their preference *strengths* 
away from what would be "purely sincere," it's because they *care* 
about the effectiveness of their vote. Often, we pretend that someone 
with a slight preference for A over B, in Approval, *should* approve 
both (or neither). Yet if it matters to them which is elected, they 
do not have a weak preference, they have a strong one. Maybe their 
strong preference is based, not on the candidate, per se, but on 
party affiliation. And that's important to them!

Essentially, voters make these choices based on their own preferences 
and judgements, and a good system will analyze the ballots and 
determine what candidate will maximize social utility, and if that's 
not clear, the system may refer the matter again to the voters.

When an explicit majority support for an election has not been 
obtained, it is *not clear* that the electorate would approve of that 
result. What we have are rules that have been designed to force a 
conclusion, that being considered "desirable." Yet this is what I 
call the past binding the future. By setting up such a rule, today, 
we are telling tomorrow's electorate what is best for them. Bad Idea.

However, in the real world, we also make certain compromises. 
Nevertheless, the goal of majority approval remains highly desirable. 
These highly abstracted and complex voting systems don't address us 
where we live.

We may use stochastic methods, on occasion, but generally only when 
we have narrowed options to a few, considered to be roughly equal in value.

However, Asset Voting bypasses the need for all these complex, 
a-priori fixed, methods. Terminally simple, yet *totally flexible,* 
once we understand that the Electoral Assembly that Asset creates 
could do whatever it decides, by majority vote, is needed. If it 
needs to toss a coin, it can agree to do that. Asset can also 
nominate new candidates in-process, whatever will find full 
representation in the Assembly to be elected. It also sets up 
benefits that are far broader than mere completion of an election.