[EM] Cloneproofing Random Pair and Random Candidate?

[Jameson Quinn]

2013/4/4 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <abd at lomaxdesign.com>

> At 02:24 AM 4/3/2013, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
>
>> However, there is a rated method that is also strategy-proof. It is
>> called Hay voting. Some time ago, I stumbled across
>> http://www.panix.com/~tehom/**essays/hay-extended.html<http://www.panix.com/~tehom/essays/hay-extended.html>, which seems to be a proposal to make Hay voting cloneproof. I haven't
>> really understood the details yet, but I'm wondering if this could be used
>> to also make the two Random methods cloneproof.
>>
>
> Hay voting, as described, is a multiple-round system, it appears.


Only virtually so, as with IRV.

I agree that this virtual-multiround Hay is excessively complex for
questionable benefits. The multiround stuff breaks the provable
strategy-proofness, and what remains is largely handwaving. Even if that
handwaving is in some deeper sense "correct" that strategy is ineffective,
it could still fail to matter if people *believe* that strategy will pay
off somehow. So the benefits are dubious; indeed, I very much doubt that
they're worth the complexity.


> Now, why would this complex system be superior to standard Robert Rules
> elections, i.e., vote for one, repeated ballot if no majority, no
> eliminations with only voluntary withdrawals -- or shifts in voter
> preferences -- , in an Assembly able to change rules, effectively, by
> agreement?
>
> I have argued that the standard process could be improved by using
> Approval similarity, instead of vote-for-one, and other advanced voting
> systems could also be used, but it would be essential that members of the
> assembly *understand* the system!
>
> A coin toss used to decide between two candidates when a certain regional
> organization is selecting a delegate to a world conference, and when no
> candidate could get a 2/3 vote after a substantial series of ballots. The
> choice, then, after such a series, was from the top two.
>
> The thinking is that, if this impasse develops, there is a minority
> faction with strong opinions, and for organizational unity, they want that
> faction represented at the Conference. (Where consensus is sought, and,
> again, "consensus" is minimally a 2/3 vote -- and it's all advisory, in
> effect, the World Conference has no control over local groups.)
>
> This kind of process can be made more efficient using Range Voting, but
> Approval is simple enough and functions similarly to Range, particularly
> if, in the first ballot, voters simply vote for one. I'd still allow voting
> for more than one in the first ballot, because if a voter has difficulty
> deciding which of two candidates to prefer, they should be able to just
> vote them equally.
>
> I.e., Bucklin-ER simulates a series of these rounds, and could simply be
> continued until it finds a majority. The voters will figure it out.
>
> In the world of voting systems, the power of repeated ballot has often
> been neglected. With a repeated ballot, no eliminations, each ballot is a
> new election (independent nominations, not restricted to the original set
> or a subset of it), the method is *extremely powerful.* It should not be
> abandoned, in particular, in favor of systems that promise completion with
> a single ballot, and Robert's Rules of Order specifically suggests
> otherwise. The do suggest the use of some system of preferential voting,
> but note that if voters don't fully rank, the election may have to be
> completed anyway (what they describe is critically different from IRV, in
> spite of what FairVote has claimed for years), *and* the method can fail to
> choose a "compromise winner." I.e., it suffers from center squeeze.
>  ----
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