[EM] Cloneproofing Random Pair and Random Candidate?

[Kristofer Munsterhjelm]

On 04/04/2013 08:02 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> At 02:24 AM 4/3/2013, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
>> However, there is a rated method that is also strategy-proof. It is
>> called Hay voting. Some time ago, I stumbled across
>> http://www.panix.com/~tehom/essays/hay-extended.html , which seems to
>> be a proposal to make Hay voting cloneproof. I haven't really
>> understood the details yet, but I'm wondering if this could be used to
>> also make the two Random methods cloneproof.
>
> Hay voting, as described, is a multiple-round system, it appears. Now,
> why would this complex system be superior to standard Robert Rules
> elections, i.e., vote for one, repeated ballot if no majority, no
> eliminations with only voluntary withdrawals -- or shifts in voter
> preferences -- , in an Assembly able to change rules, effectively, by
> agreement?

Not as I understood the description. Ordinary (not Extended) Hay voting 
consists of voters submitting the rated ballots, and the Hay method 
probabilistically picks a candidate. The method is designed so that the 
optimal thing to do is for each voter to report ratings proportional to 
their real utilities.

The "multiple" rounds of Extended Hay (again, if I understood it right) 
don't actually happen. They're like the multiple rounds of IRV: the 
algorithm goes through multiple stages, between which the effective 
ratings change according to the logic of the algorithm itself, but each 
voter only has to submit a single ballot.

Thus, I don't think your comments about organizational unity and 
deliberation apply to this method. And yes, repeated ballot may be more 
effective than single ballot, but that's not what extended Hay is about.