[EM] Instead of Top 2

[Forest Simmons]

Methods that choose between top 2 Approval, top 2 Plurality, Top 2 Bucklin,
etc. have problems that we are all familiar with, in particular clones mess
them up.

But what if our method elects the pairwise preference between
the method A winner and the method B winner?  If the two winners are the
same, then the common winner is elected.  This idea seems to avoid the
problems associated with top2 methods.

What would you suggest for methods A and B?

I would suggest MJ type grade ballots.  Then some good possibilities for
Method A or B would be MJ itself, XA (chiastic approval), Approval with
various possibilities for approval cutoff level, etc.

My personal favorite version is to elect the pairwise preferred of the XA
winner and the candidate with the fewest F's.

Forest
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