[EM] 3 or more choices - Condorcet

robert bristow-johnson rbj at audioimagination.com
Sun Sep 30 19:05:17 PDT 2012

On 9/30/12 6:13 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
> On 30.9.2012, at 15.41, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
>> On 09/30/2012 12:51 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
>>> i still think that a cycle with a Smith set bigger than
>>> 3 is soooo unlikely since i still believe that cycles themselves will be
>>> rare in practice.
> ...
>> Currently, single-winner elections very rarely have cycles and large 
>> Smith sets are even more rare.
> In typical political environments where people know the candidates or 
> at least the parties well, and where there often are also strong 
> established orders like teh left-right axis, cycles are indeed quite 
> rare, and cycles bigger than 3 are even more rare.
> ...
> But in typical political elections top cycles of 4 should be very rare.

and my understanding is that Schulze, RP, and Minmax all elect the same 
candidate for case of a simple 3-choice cycle and, of course, they all 
elect the same candidate when there is no cycle.  so, then wouldn't 
simplicity of description be the only salient difference, at least from 
a POV of the public?

>> As far as intrinsically Condorcet methods go, Ranked Pairs feels 
>> simple to me. The only tricky part is the indirect nature of the 
>> "unless it contradicts what you already affirmed" step.

yeah, it's not immediately obvious to me how i would code up Ranked Pairs.


r b-j                  rbj at audioimagination.com

"Imagination is more important than knowledge."

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