[EM] Scoring (was Re: OpenSTV 2.1.0 released)

Michael Ossipoff email9648742 at gmail.com
Fri Sep 21 15:17:10 PDT 2012


Juho:

You said:

What kind of comparisons would you like me to make?

[endquote]

Whatever comparisons you think could favor unimproved Condorcet over
Symmetrical ICT.

I'll repeat my question: Do you claim that unimproved Condorcet can be
defended in a comparison with Symmetrical ICT, or ordinary ICT?

You said:

If we are talking about the "well enough" of other than Condorcet methods

[endquote]

ICT and Symmetrical ICT are not "other than Condorcet methods".
They're Condorcet methods.

I've told why they don't meaningfully fail the Condorcet
Criterion--why they pass the Condorcet Criterion when, for the purpose
of that criterion, "beats" is defined according to an interpretation
of equal-top-ranking that is consistent with the preferences, intent
and wishes of the equal-top-ranking voter.

You said:

, then we should focus on the most probable vulnerabilities of each
one of them (in the given environment).

[endquote]

Fine. Focus on them.

You said:

You already addressed the chicken dilemma in Approval. I think we
agree that in real life that may well be the most problematic one.
Same with Score.

[endquote]

Quite so. The Chicken Dilemma is the nearest thing to a problem that
Approval has (though it's so well dealt with in Approval that it isn't
really a problem).

Therefore, you don't significantly improve on Approval unless you get
rid of the Chicken Dilemma.

Unimproved Condorcet fully has the Chicken Dilemma.

ICT and Symmetrical ICT don't have the Chicken Dilemma.

So, I take it that the Chicken Dilemma is the standard by which you
compare unimproved Condorcet to ICT and Symmetrical ICT.

Mike Ossipoff



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