[EM] MJ: Worse Chicken Dilemma than Approval or Score, elaborate bylaws, computation-intensive count.

Michael Ossipoff email9648742 at gmail.com
Fri Sep 7 20:33:19 PDT 2012

> And I just explained the tiebreaker in that popular proposal, as put forth
> in the book Majority Judgment. You apparently had never even heard of that
> tiebreaker, so I don't see why you think you're qualified to say anything
> about MJ.

Well, what you've just said qualifies me to say that MJ has
unnecessarily (because Score and Approval don't need them) elaborate

I've never claimed to know MJ's bylaws.

Of course that means that (as you point out) I don't know what MJ will
do in a tie. But you might notice that, of the situations that we
discussed, the one that involves a tie was the one in which both
factions are trusting and trustworthy. My successful defection
examples didn't involve a tie, and therefore didn't require
information about the tiebreaker.

> I could continue to point out how you're wrong in what follows. For
> instance, you apparently think that "probabilistic SFR" means everyone gives
> the higher grade. But it's basically a waste of time.

You're revealing a complete misunderstanding of what probabilistic
voting is. It isn't that every A voter approves B. Every A voter is
asked to approve B _with a certain probability_. If all of the A
voters use that strategy, some will approve B and some won't. If there
are a large number of voters in the election, and therefore a large
number of A voters, then the fraction of the A voters who approve B
will be equal to the probability with which any particular A voter
approves B.

Mike Ossipoff

More information about the Election-Methods mailing list