[EM] Juho: Different answers to your questions. You're right...

[Michael Ossipoff]

...about some things.

But first, regarding some of the other things:

1. You seem to imply that you think that there is a single, objective,
right ideal sincere winner. Of course you'll deny that, but you've
repeatedly fallaciously based on argument on that assumption.

Sometimes something is a matter of subjective, individual choice,
without a single objective right answer.

How do you think that you might go about proving that one particular
winner is the ideal right sincere winner? Proofs and conclusions have
to be based on some objective premise.

You're giving us an unsupported assumption.

2. You seem to assume that, if there is a single, objective, right
ideal sincere winner, then it must be found from rank-balloting.

Again, that's just your unsupported assumption.

3. You seem to think that, for any two desirable method-attributes,
one of them can only be achieved by something that spoils the other.
In other words, you think that any pair of desirable method-attributes
must be mutually incompatible.

...a pair of desirable attributes such as freedom from the worst
strategy needs, and choice of the unique, objective, right ideal
sincere winner...or maybe any desirable sincere winner.

In fact, it doesn't occur to you that free-ness from the worst
strategy needs can result from a result that would be desirable as the
sincere winner...or the best ideal sincere winner, if there is such a
thing.

I've told you why that, in fact is so (but without the assumption
about there being a single best ideal sincere winner).

Now: Something that you're right about:

It made sense to ask me if I prefer any sincere winners or ways of
choosing them. Yes I do.

For Official Public Elections:

Approval. (maybe Score too).

I've discussed Approval's unique optimizations. Approving someone is
actually quite relevant to choosing. I'm referring to procedural
approval, as in "Yes, I will approve that proposal." Choosing the
candidate for whom the most voters have chosen to say, "I approve this
candidate" is an important and valuable optimization.

It retains what's good in Plurality, without any of what's undesirable
about Plurality.

You can approve those whom you like or trust, or the candidates who
are acceptable to you.

Approval, then, is choosing the candidate who is either liked or
trusted by, or acceptable to, the most people.

Approval's optimal strategy, in all of its forms, amount to approving
the above-expectation candidates.

For that reason, Approval gives the result that will pleasantly
surprise the most voters (give them a result better than what they
expected of the election).

Approval's result confirms and rewards optimism.

Approving the above-expectation candidates can be regarded as voting
optimistically, and that optimism is reflected in Approval's result.

Informational Polling, To Inform Plurality Voting in a Subsequent
Official Public Election:

Symmetrical ICT, and its usual sincere choice, the CW (by which I mean
the legitimately-defined CW).

As you may know, I advocate only Approval, and maybe Score, for
official public elections.

But the CW has special relevance and important for informational
polling to inform Plurality voting. When there's a CW, that's the best
candidate that you can get a majority for.

And, because of its strategic properties, SICT will encourage the
sincere voting that is needed to ensure the usefulness of that
informational poll.

But I'll make this admission: If there's any likelihood of chicken
dilemma (in Approval), then (if all of the rank-method disadvantages
and problems were to somehow go away) I might prefer SICT for official
public elections too, because SICT avoids Approval's chicken dilemma
nuisance. (_possible_ nuisance, if and when it happens. A nuisance,
not a problem)
.
But there's no reason to believe that rank-balloting will lose its
problems, at least not anytime soon.

I refer to the count-fraud-vulnerability resulting from
labor-intensive count, and especially resulting from the need for
machine balloting and computerized count; and to the apparent
impossibility of agreement on any one particular of the infinitely
many rank-counts, for proposal, adoption and enactment; and to the
fact that it could be difficult (impossible) to demonstrate a rank
method's FBC compliance to people. Approval's simplicity makes it easy
to show that there's no need to not approve Favorite.

So there are sincere winners that are favorite to me.

By the way, are you trying to say that the chicken dilemma won't be a
problem? Good, because I say that too. I've been saying it for quite
some time.


The chicken dilemma isn't a problem. It's a nuisance.

I've made it clear that the chicken dilemma is the thing that comes
nearest to being a problem in Approval. Therefore, you don't
significantly improve on Approval unless you get rid of the chicken
dilemma. Therefore, don't bother with any rank method that doesn't get
rid of the chicken dilemma.

Regarding my 75,51,100 chicken-dilemma example for Dodgson and MinMax(margins):

You say that both sides should co-operate. That doesn't mean they
will. The chicken dilemma is quite common in the animal kingdom. You
flatter voters too much  you believe that they won't have it too.

You say that both sides would have the same amount of defection. Why?

For one thing, the point of the example was to show that defectors can
easily take advantage of co-operators in Dodgson and MinMax(margins).
The example shows that.

You say that real national elections are more complicated. No sh*t !  :-)

Perhaps you hadn't heard that examples are necessarily
simplifications, for the purpose of showing that something can happen.

No one claims that an example is really the exact party, candidate,
and faction configuration of an actual presidential election :-)

You think that both factions would have the same number of defectors.
But voters who prefer policies that are more violent, and less humane,
ethical--voters who are more likely to tolerate, or even applaud,
criminality in their political leaders--Do you really think that those
voters will be just as conscientious, honest, co-operative and
responsible as voters who are not like them?

...and likewise their party organizations and campaign organizations?

Will the chicken dilemma situation always occur? Will it always occur
on a scale sufficient to change the outcome?  Of course not. You're
right.

Remember that I've long been saying that the chicken dilemma is a
nuisance, not a problem. It's a nuisance that often won't happen (I've
several times posted a list of reasons why it usually won't be a
problem). And can be easily dealt with if it does happen, via SFR.

But that doesn't excuse Dodgson and MinMax(margins) from failing to
get rid of that nuisance that can easily be avoided with a good rank
method.

You're still saying that choosing the candidate who can be made into
CW adding (or disregarding, or reversing) the fewest pairwise votes is
MinMax(margins), and not Dodgson.  Fine.

I've explained that to you already. If you still remain confused about
the difference between Dodgson and MinMax(margins), then I',m not
going to repeat the explanation for you.

Some people would look those two method names up, at electowiki or a
search-engine, instead of just continuing to repeat their belief--but
not you.

Oh yes, the definition of "pairwise vote":

A pairwise vote for X over Y is an instance of someone ranking X over Y.

Mike Ossipoff