[EM] Article: Answers to some traditional Condorcet arguments

Tue Oct 30 16:45:50 PDT 2012

As long as Michael has mistakenly posted this DM article on the forum, 
I'll use this opportunity to say to Adrian that I have stopped reading 
Michael's articles at Democracy Chronicles for the reasons below.  (And 
often I delete his posts here without reading them.)

His DM articles go off into a world of his own, including his own 
terminology (e.g. TUC and ICT).  Also there are too many sentences for 
which his intended meaning is unclear (e.g. sentence #2 here).  Also the 
topics jump around so quickly that it's dizzying.  Most importantly he 
avoids explaining some very important voting-method concepts, yet makes 
indirect references to those concepts (e.g. none of the DM articles have 
yet described the concept of Condorcet compliance [and its advantage], 
yet he refers to disadvantages of Condorcet methods).

I'm just wanting to keep things real, and let you know that he does not 
represent the views of at least some election-method experts.

Richard

On 10/30/2012 3:58 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
> Hi Adrian--
>
> It's important to answer arguments from people who claim that other
> voting systems are better, or that other criteria are more important.
> That's why I invited traditional unimproved Condorcet (TUC) advocates
> at the election-methods mailing list to tell what mitigating
> advantages TUC has, to outweigh the disadvantages that I described.
>
> I've gotten a few answers at the mailing-list, and I feel that I
> should answer them in an article. This article interrupts the
> procedure of this Properties article-series, but it can be considered
> part of the series, because it's about arguments regarding properties
> and their importance. I feel that this article supports the claims
> that I make in the other articles of this series. It's important that
> I be willing to support my claims, and answer objections. That's the
> purpose of this article.
>
> After this article (Properties, Part 4:  Answers Re: Some Criteria) ,
> I'll resume the intended procedure of the Properties series. There
> will be one more article (#5) about a method (Properties, Part 5:
> Majority Judgment), and then, after that, (#6)  (Properties, part 6:
> Table of Properties and Criterion-Compliances), summarizing, in a
> table, what I've been saying about properties and criterion
> compliances. So this, and the next two, will be #4, #5, and #6 of this
> article series.
>
> In fact, what I've said here will make a good introduction to that
> article. So it will be repeated in the article itself.
>
> Here is the article:
>
> Properties, Part 4: Answers Re: Some Criteria:
>
> It's important to answer arguments from people who claim that other
> voting systems are better, or that other criteria are more important.
> That's why I invited traditional unimproved Condorcet (TUC) advocates
> at the election-methods mailing list to tell what mitigating
> advantages TUC has, to outweigh the disadvantages that I described.
>
> One reason why voting-system discussion doesn't get anywhere is
> because people are only trying to justify their pre-existing
> positions. Speaking for myself, I don't want to be like that. That
> isn't genuine discussion.
>
> I've gotten a few answers at the mailing-list, and I feel that I
> should answer them in an article. This article interrupts the
> procedure of this Properties article-series, but it can be considered
> part of the series, because it's about arguments regarding properties
> and their importance. I feel that this article supports the claims
> that I make in the other articles of this series. It's important that
> I be willing to support my claims, and answer objections. That's the
> purpose of this article.
>
> After this article (Properties, Part 4:  Answers Re: Some Criteria) ,
> I'll resume the intended procedure of the Properties series. There
> will be one more article (#5) about a method (Properties, Part 5:
> Majority Judgment), and then, after that, (#6)  (Properties, part 6:
> Table of Properties and Criterion-Compliances), summarizing, in a
> table, what I've been saying about properties and criterion
> compliances. So this, and the next two, will be #4, #5, and #6 of this
> article series.
>
> Traditional unimproved Condorcet (TUC) is popular these days. Its most
> popular version is a method called "Beatpath".
>
> As I've said, the TUC methods fail FBC and CD, and don't meet any form
> of LNHe. That results in drastic strategy-need that Approval, Score,
> ICT and Symmetrical ICT don't have. In particular, failure of FBC
> makes TUC a strategic mess.
>
> TUC advocates like to claim that people will rank sincerely in TUC.
> But American voters firmly hold cerain beliefs about candidate
> winnability. They get their beliefs from the mass media, and seem to
> believe whatever they hear from their tv. Voters here nearly all
> believe that no one can win except for the Democrat and the
> Republican. They firmly believe that the winner must be a Democrat or
> a Republican. Furthermore, people who want something better than the
> Republican, including all progressives, including the millions of
> people who's prefer something better than the Democrat too--those
> people regard the Republican as unacceptable. They think that that the
> Democrat is acceptable (largely because of what their tv says), and
> feel that it's all-important that the Democrat win instead of the
> Republican. They've expressed and demonstrated their willingness to
> bury their favorite, in order to help the Democrat.
>
> It's easily shown that, in TUC, given the beliefs described in the
> previous paragraph, the optimal strategy would be to rank the Democrat
> alone in 1st place. And, according to those beliefs, if the Democrat
> isn't one's favorite, then one should rank one's favorite _below_ the
> Democrat.
>
> I, myself, would favorite-bury in a TUC election, if there were only
> one acceptable candidate who could win. (But that wouldn't be a
> Democrat. I don't regard Democrats as acceptable--I consider the
> Greens acceptable).
>
> The belief, on the part of TUC advocates, that people would rank
> sincerely in TUC elections, is unwarranted wishful thinking.
>
> Anyway, as I was saying, I asked TUC advocates at the election-methods
> mailing list what mitigating advantages they think that TUC has.
> Eventually I got a few answers. Someone cited Clone-Independence and
> Reverse-Symmetry.
>
> My previous article gave a complete answer regarding Reverse-Symmetry.
> I'd like to say a little more about Clone-lndependence. Relevant to
> the methods that I recommend, Clone-Independence says that when some
> new candidates are added, who are nearly identical to the winning
> candidate (in the clone sense described in the previous article),
> then, if people vote sincerely, the winner should either be the
> previous winner, or one of the new clones of him/her.
>
> Adding those clones doesn't cause a problem in the methods that I
> propose. If it's a u/a election (defined in previous articles), as I
> claim all of our official public elections are, then one should
> approve or top-rank the acceptables, but none of the unacceptables.
> Addition of clones causes no dilemma or question about how to vote.
> But, in any case, in spite of clones, there won't be a split vote
> problem if people approve or top-rank all the best candidates, all of
> the good ones  that they might need. The objector at election-methods
> didn't like that strategy-need, but remember that these are _clones_,
> and therefore probably of very similar merit. So how bad can it really
> be to have strategic reason to approve or top-rank them all, if you'd
> approve or top-rank one of them?
>
> Instead of naming the objector at election-methods, I'll just call him
> "Objector".
>
> Sure, the clone-independent properties of such methods as Beatpath
> have some value, and, for fairness, one should look at what would have
> to be traded in order to get such properties as Clone-Independence,
> MMC, etc.  Then, it would desirable to compare, without prejudice, the
> desirability of what would be lost in the trade to what would be
> gained in the trade.
>
> In fairness, it could be worth considering whether it would be worthwhile, for
> example, to trade CD for Clone-Independence. Would it be a good trade?
>
> Objector's arguments should be considered. He doesn't like the
> Approval-like strategy that a non-clone-independent method can have in a
> clone situation.
>
>
> What Objector is saying is that, when ICT doesn't improve on
> Approval, it has Approval strategy. If so, then ICT can be called an
> improvement on Approval.
>
> That's more than can be said for TUC, given its strategy situation.
>
> He says that if, in non-clone-independent methods, there's strategic
> need to approve or top-rank all of the clones, that looks to him like
> Approval strategy, which he doesn't like.
>
> Sure, the clone-independent properties of such methods as Beatpath
> have some value, and, for fairness, one should look at what would have
> to be traded in order to get such properties as Clone-Independence,
> MMC, etc.  Then, it would desirable to compare, without prejudice, the
> desirability of what would be lost in the trade to what would be
> gained in the trade.
>
> Objector's arguments should be considered. He doesn't like the
> Approval strategy that a non-clone-independent method can have in a
> clone situation. He called it "manual DSV" and recommended actual DSV
> instead.
>
> What Objector is saying is that, when ICT doesn't improve on
> Approval, it has Approval strategy. If so, then ICT can be called an
> improvement on Approval.
>
> That's more than can be said of TUC, with its strategy situation.
>
> Improving on Approval is easier said than done. Objector would like
> to get rid of Approval's strategy need. The problem is that, when we
> do that, we tend to get worse strategy needs.
>
> If CD can be gained, without making anything worse than Approval, then
> we have a net gain. ICT and Symmetrical ICT achieve that.
>
> TUC does not.
>
> It could be argued that, in my chicken dilemma examples, the old
> Approval bad-example, if A and C are cloned, and the A voters and C
> voters split their vote among the clones, then, ICT won't benefit from
> its CD compliance, and the B voters can successfully defect. Yes, but
> they'd still have to know that B has the most top-votes (regardless of
> whether that's because of clones and split vote among the A voters and
> the C voters).
>
> Likewise, for successful burial strategy, the B voters would need to
> know that too.
>
> So I suggest that ICT retains uniquely powerful deterrence against
> defection and burial.
>
> If we compare ICT to ordinary Beatpath, the difference is between, at
> worst, Approval strategy, and the more drastic strategy-need of
> Beatpath. But I was discussing the trade of CD for Clone-Independence.
>
> But I suggest that the chicken dilemma is worse than ordinary Approval
> strategy. That suggests that the trade is unfavorable.
>
> So far, I haven't been limiting the discussion to u/a elections. When
> we specifically discuss u/a elections, the conclusions become more
> obvious and clear-cut:
>
> I suggest that our official public elections, at least for state and
> national office, are always u/a elections.
>
> Let me repeat the u/a strategy of the methods we're discussing:
>
> Approval:
>
> Approve all of the acceptables, and none of the unacceptables.
>
> Score:
>
> Top-rate all of the acceptables. Bottom-rate all of the unacceptables.
>
> ICT:
>
> Top-rank the acceptables. Rank the unacceptables below top, in reverse
> order of winnability.
>
> Beatpath:
>
> Beatpath bottom-end: Rank the unacceptables below the acceptables, in
> reverse order of winnability.
>
> Beatpath top-end: Unknown. I guess try to top-rank the acceptables
> most likely to win, and rank the other unacceptables below top.
>
> Symmetrical ICT:
>
> Top-rank the acceptables. Bottom-rank the unacceptables.
>
> (That's like Approval strategy. Approval strategy is the best that you
> can get, except for gaining CD compliance)
>
> Symmetrical IC-Beatpath:
>
> Maybe the same as Symmetrical ICT, if FBC isn't lost. But CD is lost,
> and the chicken dilemma is retained. That looks like a net loss, in
> comparison to SICT.
>
> Since the best you can get is Approval strategy anyway, the Approval
> strategy that non-clone-independent methods can have in clone
> situations isn't a loss.
>
> Mike Ossipoff
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>
>