[EM] 1037

[Michael Ossipoff]

I'd said:

> In your ICT Clone-Independence failure example, half of the A
> preferrers, when A2 is introduces as a clone of A, rank A2 in first
> place, and demote A to 2nd place. But, you know, they don't have to do
> that.
>
> If they want to play it safe, in Approval, Score, ICT or Symmetrical
> ICT, those voters can approve or top-rank _both_ A and A2. So doing,
> they'd be no worse off than before A2 was introduced. Their
> expectation, when approving or top-ranking both A and A2 would be
> higher than it was before the introduction of A2. Especially if A2 is
> so good that it almost tempts them to not approve or top-rank A. In
> fact, it's the raising of their expectation by the introduction of A2
> that creates that temptation.
>
> The fact that A2 could be so good as to raise A-preferrers expectation
> enough to make optimal a gamble for big improvement, approving or
> top-ranking A2 but not A, can hardly be called a problem. As problems
> go, it isn't a problem.
>
> The A-preferrers needn't be any worse off than before, because they
> can approve or top-rank both A and A2.
>
> So much for ICT's "clone problem".

You replied:

Let me try that:

"In other words, I'd asked you to show a clone problem for Plurality.

You didn't do that.

Of course there isn't a clone problem for Plurality.

In your Plurality Clone-Independence failure example, half of the A
preferrers, when A2 is introduces [sic] as a clone of A, rank A2 in
first place, and demote A to 2nd place. But you know, they don't have to
do that.

[endquote]

Plurality doesn't have rankings.

You continued:

If they want to play it safe, in Plurality, they hold a primary and find
out which A to support. Then they vote only for him."

[endquote]

Plurality has a notorious clone problem. It's difficult for voters to
organize to determine and agree on which one of the clones (other
other favorites among a set of acceptable candidates) they should
combine their Plurality votes on.

Your effort to liken ICT to Plurality in that regard is ridiculous.

In my previous post, I agreed that the voters who prefer A to A2 have
their expectation and situation worsened by the addition of A2, but it
should be emphasized that the voters who prefer A2 to A have their
situation and expectation improved by the addition of A2. Their only
dilemma is about whether or not to try for even more, by the gamble of
not top-ranking A. As I said, that hardly qualifies as a problem.

You said:

See how easy it is to say that method X doesn't fail criterion Y if you
apply some procedure external to the method itself to fix the problem?

[endquote]

All methods, including TUC, and even including the methods that I
recommend, have strategy problems worse than that of the initial
A-preferrers who now prefer A2 to A.

After you defined Clone Independence, I didn't claim that ICT doesn't
fail it. But criterion failures differ in their importance, in the
seriousness of the resulting strategy dilemmas or problems.

You need to remember that TUC is far from strategy-free.

You said:

the A-voters might be
Nader/Gore voters and would prefer Nader to win above Gore, and thus
have to walk the tightrope between certainly getting Gore, or possibly
getting Nader, possibly Bush - and they could get that tightrope walk wrong.

[endquote]

Nader and Gore weren't clones, as you defined clones.
Clone-Independence wouldn't avoid the lesser-of-2-evils
favorite-burial problem.

You said:

(And if you think "hold a primary" is cheating because it occurs outside
the voting booth, replace it with "then they vote for the candidate with
a last name closest to the start of the alphabet". No action outside the
voting booth required!

[endquote]

Wrong. Agreement on that solution would have to take place outside the
voting booth. The problem doesn't have that easy a solution in
Plurality, because getting agreement on that would be difficult. Sure,
if voters knew what they were doing, then they could find a way to get
good results, even in Plurality.

In the 2012 presidential election here, I claim that the problem was
solved when the GPUS announced their nomination. Now, for all
progressives, Jill Stein is obviously the most winnable acceptable
candidate. Plurality's u/a strategy is to vote for the most winnable
acceptable candidate. Now it's obvious that that is Jill Stein.  I
urge every progressive U.S. voter to vote for Jill Stein. Voters
should read the platforms. If you prefer the GPUS platform proposals
to the known conduct of the Democrats and Republicans, then vote for
Jill Stein in November. (Yes, Kristofer, I know that you don't vote in
this country, and so you know that I was speaking to a broader "you"
in that sentence.)

You said:

What's all this about strategy? I don't want to play manual DSV.

[endquote]

If you still think that TUC doesn't have strategy-need, then nothing I
say will help, and it's time to just agree to disagree.

You continued:

Isn't
then a method with complex strategy a *benefit?* If you have to be
Kasparov to effectively strategize

[endquote]

I didn't say that even Kasparov would know what to do in TUC, even in
a u/a election.


You continued:

, and strategy's otherwise a
minefield, not a whole lot of people will.

[endquote]

Oh of course they will. People guess about their best strategy.

You continued:

Another barrier to being
strategic means increased chance of honesty.

[endquote]

Incorrect. Difficult strategy just means more guessing.

Ok, I take that back: It really means that people will take the tv's
word for it regarding how they should vote.

The more people don't know what to do, the more they'll obey their tv.

Yes, I understand that the belief that difficult or unknown strategy
will make people rank sincerely is the creed of TUC advocates. We've
expressed our comments on that matter, and I suggest that it's time to
agree to dissagree.

I'd said:

> About Reversal-Symmetry:
>
> You seem to be speaking of it as applying only to ranking methods.
> That's ok for right now.

Nope. I have never claimed that Range fails reversal symmetry. But Range
isn't the subject of discussion. ICT is.

[endquote]

Well, I'd also asked TUC advocates to explain what TUC advantages are
important enough to outweigh TUC's considerable disadvantages in
comparison to Approval and Score (formerly known as "Range").
.

It's [Reversal Symmetry] an agrees-with-itself criterion. If a method
agrees that a
candidate is its choice in an election for best as well as its choice in
an election for worst...

[endquote]

Whoa. You're assuming without justification that reversing the
rankings amounts to an election for worst.

But thanks for clarifying how you justify Reversal Symmetry.





Appealing to the internal weights of the method - saying "because method
X favors this particular category in the ballot, it doesn't matter" - is
like IRV advocates claiming that through its elimination logic, it is
obviously fair because it simulates an actual exhaustive runoff, and so
criterion compliance doesn't matter either.

And of course, it would be very easy for me to use the same kind of
argument against Consistency. Something like... "Obviously, in any
positional method, combining two ballot sets where X wins must lead to a
ballot set where X wins.  ... It is well known that only positional
systems can pass Consistency ... Advocates or users of this criterion,
then, seem to be saying that all methods should be positional methods
.. Why?"

Does that mean if you disregard reversal symmetry, you also have to
disregard consistency?

> Users of Reversal Symmetry don't agree. But they can't legitimately
> impose their personal preferences as a requirement for all methods.

Nor can advocates of FBC legitimately impose their personal preferences
in such a manner.