[EM] Possibly more stable consensus government

[Kristofer Munsterhjelm]

On 11/29/2012 01:51 AM, Raph Frank wrote:
> Sorry, hit "reply" instead of
>
> - reply All, then move EM to "to" field and delete Kristofer Munsterhjelm
>
> Gmail really hates the system EM uses.
>

You can use gmail with an ordinary mail client, just like I use lavabit, 
which is also a webmail system, with Thunderbird. Mail clients tend to 
be well behaved with regards to quoting. See 
http://support.google.com/mail/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=77695 for more 
information.

Also, I think that if you do a Reply to All and keep my address in 
there, EM will automatically not send a second copy to me.

Anyway, on to the subject!

-

On 11/27/2012 01:25 AM, Raph Frank wrote:
 > On Sun, Nov 25, 2012 at 10:03 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
 > <km_elmet at lavabit.com>  wrote:
 >> Would that configuration weaken the consensus aspect of the system?
 >> Perhaps a government that happened to have a supermajority at one
 >> point "outstays their welcome" and gets increasingly unpopular until
 >> there's a sufficient supermajority in the other direction, then that
 >> government gets replaced by its opposite pole, and rinse and repeat.
 >
 > You could have a rule that the first government after an election just
 > needs a majority of the vote and then the new rule kicks in.  That is
 > more democratic.

Yes, but the point of consensus systems is to make a democracy for and 
by a larger group than just a majority. In isolation, a supermajority 
vote is aligned with that goal, because it keeps a "mere" majority from 
dictating over the minority.

However, if you need supermajority support for decisions, then you have 
to have something to put in place when the supermajority support isn't 
there. So a supermajority requirement upon forming the government and a 
minority for a vote of no confidence would be a recipe for instability 
(and probably rule by the bureaucracy).

The constructive vote of no confidence idea answers "what should we have 
in place as long while there is no agreement" with "whatever came 
before". On the one hand, that keeps the government stable until another 
consensus can be reached. On the other, it is unfair to new ideas 
because they suffer a penalty (the supermajority requirement) not borne 
on the government at the time in question. Each government only has to 
get in once, then it can stay until the consensus goes somewhere else.

Now, you could have a simple majority for the election. That would have 
changes happen more rapidly... but it would also mean the government 
loses some of its legitimacy, as it no longer has consensus backing. And 
if it no longer has consensus backing, why not just use a majority system?

So the inherent problem seems to be that consensus is hard. Since 
consensus is hard, it's not going to happen often. And thus you either 
have instability if you wait around without a government until there can 
be consensus, or a bias in one direction or other if you keep something 
in place until consensus forces a change.

I think Simmons had some ideas about this in a voting method context - 
basically, that the method would default to a lottery if the 
participants couldn't agree among themselves, and then every party would 
have an incentive to reach consensus because the lottery is ultimately 
unbiased, if providing poor results. But that might be a little too 
radical for parliamentary politics :-)

 > In coalition politics, it would create an incentive for betrayal.
 >
 > For example, if  there was one party with 45% of the seats, and one
 > with 20% of the seats, they could form a government.
 >
 > However, once the government is formed, the 20% group could be
 > betrayed.

Well, I'd like the imagined system to represent more than a majority. 
The betrayal incentives you mention would make it more responsive to 
change, but at the cost of representing less.

 > Also, it depends on what you mean by "government".
 >
 > It could mean that the assembly approves a Prime Minister by 60%.  The
 > Prime Minister would then have the right to decide cabinet members.
 >
 > You could require approval by 40/50/60 percent of the assembly.  If
 > you make it 40%, then he can instantly ditch the 25% party.
 >
 > Even without direct betrayal, the power of the smaller party would
 > collapse.

I think parliamentary rules tend to be that the party or coalition that 
wants to form a government submits a proposal with the composition of 
the entire government, and then it passes by majority support - and that 
negotiations happen outside of the assembly among members of the 
prospective coalition beforehand. I'm not sure about this, though.

 > Another thing about confidence is that it can be used as a stick by
 > the government too.  If the government wants a policy passed, they can
 > tie it to a motion of no confidence.  Wayward members of the party
 > might support it because they don't want to trigger an election.

Right, that's a good point. Party discipline tends to be very strong 
here, so I didn't think of that.