[EM] 3 or more choices - Condorcet

[Kevin Venzke]

Hi Juho,


>Kevin Venzke wrote:
>>
>>"Margins, it seems to me, is DOA as a proposal due to the Plurality criterion.
>>That 35 A>B, 25 B, 40 C would elect A is too counter-intuitive."
>>
>>I agree. For those who don't know, the Plurality criterion says that if  X is ranked
>>strictly above all other candidates on more ballots than Y is ranked above any candidates,
>>then Y must not win. 
>
>
>Plurality criterion assumes implicit approval ("given any preference") of ranked
>candidates (definitions above have some differences). In that sense it adds something
>extra to pure ranking.

I don't believe the public needs to understand the terms "plurality criterion"
or "implicit approval" or even "strategy" to find the scenario problematic. 

That's why I see it as such a show-stopper.
>I wonder if the voters should be told about the Plurality criterion or if that
>should be hidden from them (to avoid them rankig only those candidates that 

>they approve / want to promote). In some startegies that information may be 

>useful to them. But losing information because of truncation (in an election 

>that has no meaningful strategy problems) is harmful.
Do you think that if you permit IRV voters to know that IRV satisfies
Plurality, they will truncate more often (assuming the rules allow them 

to)?

The thought that Plurality itself (satisfaction of it, or failures of it) 
can be exploited by voters is strange to me.

Kevin