[EM] To Condorcetists:

[Michael Ossipoff]

Juho says:

 

Maybe the number one on the list of the still unanswered questions is the
following one.

 

 

[example+question starts here]

 

26: A > B >> C
26: B > A >> C
24: C >> A > B
24: C >> B > A
- A and B are Democrats and C is a Republican

How should voters vote after seeing these (quite reliable) poll results if
they follow the "better than expectation" strategy? Should A and B be seen
as the expected winners with 50% winning chance both? Maybe 50% of the
voters should guess that A wins and 50% that B wins (?).

 

[endquote]

 

You don't say how good a result the various voters expect from the election.
You don't say if it's u/a. You show higher magnitude dislike for C, among
the A and B voters. Should we infer that you mean that it's u/a, and that,
to the A and B voters, A and B are acceptable and B is unacceptable? .that
{A,B} and {C} are sets such that the merit differences within the sets are
negligible in comparison to the merit differences between the sets? If so,
then the Approval's u/a strategy would call for the A and B voters to
approve A and B.

 

But there's the co-operation/defection problem, isn't there. I've discussed
it. I've described some solutions to it, in a post in recent days. I'll
re-post my list of 5 solutions.

 

But remember that Condorcet equally has the co-operation/defection problem
too.

 

What about ICT in your example? The A voters should vote A>B. The B voters
should vote B>A.

 

 

Mike Ossipoff

 

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20120522/359eb49b/attachment-0004.htm>