[EM] Kristofer, April 3, '12, Approval vs Condorcet

[Michael Ossipoff]

> Or dither if you want to, but don't blame it on the voting system.

I think you have misunderstood some key concepts I have been using. 

[endquote]

I assumed that you meant "dither" by its usual meaning: "Stop dithering and
make your choice!"

That's the meaning that I use in this posting.


 (although there can be elements of that in Approval strategy)

[endquote]

For you yes, because that is your inclination.

As I've said, it isn't that Condordet doesn't require strategy. It's just
that you usually won't know what its expectation-maximizing strategy is.


. I was instead making an analogy, which I think was quite appropriate, to
the "dithering" of the graphics world. 
This is why I also referred to grayscale and black-and-white.
Furthermore, since the analogy shows that one's moving quite a bit from the
"front end" (the actual voting method) into the "back end" (which may
involve polls), it seems that if one's very concerned with strategy, as you
are, one should also consider strategy in the back-end. For instance, if I'm
a Bush voter in a three-way race, I might report that I'm voting Nader
alone. This will make it seem that Nader has sufficient support to win, so
the Nader-voters vote for Nader alone. But they've been had, because now
Gore lacks the Nader+Gore votes to get past Bush, and Bush wins.

[endquote]

Polls are a bit questionable, but things that we hear from others provide
some information, as will results of previous Approval elections.

Polls by the usual pollsters are basically worthless.


 

The above could be formalized by making a DSV version of Approval. If that
DSV method is ranked, then one of two things will happen: Either it fails
criteria like FBC or monotonicity, which means that 
Approval+back-end might not be as good as you think, or it doesn't,
which means DSV Approval would be a good ranked method on its own. If
Approval is good even when people play the strategic game, why not have the
method itself play the game for them?

[endquote]

1. You want to evaluate Approval's strategy based on the effects on a
distant iterative equilibrium. But voters are interested in instrumental
strategy. Look that word up.

If voters were interested in distant equilibrium, then they'd vote sincerely
in Plurality. They strategize instrumentally, only interested in the current
election. Current experience with voters, how they vote, what they say,
contradicts the assumption that your above remark depends on.

2. And, aside from that, you demonstrated that iterated Approval would have
the problems you speak of. Of course I don't advocate iterated Approval. You
can feel free to do so if you wish, however.


Your analogy with noise, signals and information, though fashionable, is
pseudo-technical pretense.

Okay. The second concept I think you misunderstood was "half-empty" vs
"half-full" and "noise". I'll first explain the first distinction, and then
the second.

I'll use another analogy here for Condorcet vs Approval. Approval is like an
analog TV signal. If you add uncertainty, it degrades a little. 
Add more noise, and it degrades more until, if the voters have absolutely no
idea what they're doing and vote randomly, you have snow.

[endquote]

Approval's 0-info strategy is to vote for all of the above-mean candidates.
...for all of the candidates whose merit, for you, is above the mean.

That's been well-established and has been common knowledge for a long time.
Kristofer, you really need to check the accuracy of what you're saying
before you post.


Range is like Approval in this respect, and MJ is like Condorcet*. When I
refer to your "half-empty" view, I refer to that you seem to think that
voters (alone, i.e. not coordinated by party central) will add strategy into
Condorcet even when they're on the side of the break point where nothing
happen

[endquote]

I told you of my conversations and observations. No, I'm not going to repeat
it again for you.

I'll give an example first of all. Say you have a three-way 1D election with
the Greens to the left, Democrats to the right, and Republicans a little
further to the right. The median voter is somewhat to the left of the
midpoint between the Greens and the Democrats. Then, for each voter in an
Approval election, there is some probability that he gets the "Nader only or
Nader+Gore" decision wrong. Say that he "gets it wrong" 

[endquote]

You're dithering again. See above. Re-read some of my previous postings
about this. 

No one knows exactly what way of voting will give the best result for you
and your faction. But in Approval there are known strategies that maximize
expectation. That won't usually be so for Condorcet.

Instead of dithering, just approve whom you like, or use one of the simple
expectation-maximizing strategies.




if he votes differently than he would after n-> inf iterations of complete
information of others' votes in the last round (i.e. the equilibrium which
would probably consist of voting Nader alone).
Then if enough people get it wrong, the winner will be Gore instead of
Nader, and since each voter has some probability of getting it wrong, then
there is also some probability of enough people getting it wrong to swing
the election to Gore rather than Nader. If the election is three-way and
close, that probability could be significant***; and if it swings the wrong
way, then I think the voters who voted the wrong way would get very annoyed.
At least I would. I would go "so this method burdens me with a quantization
decision and if I happen to decide wrongly, possibly through no fault of my
own, it punishes me? Is this a joke?".

[endquote]

See above.

To be continued...

Mike Ossipoff