[EM] To Condorcetists:
Michael Ossipoff
email9648742 at gmail.com
Fri May 18 21:25:10 PDT 2012
Juho:
Would the governments be minority governments or coalition governments?
[endquote]
They'd be popular governments. If it consisted of only one party, I don't
know if it would be the favorite of more than half of the voters. My guess
is that it usually will.
But yes, there could be several parties winning seats, and so that a
government might then be a coalition government. With single-member
districts, there wouldn't be the diversity of less-liked parties. So there
it wouldn't be like a PR body. Probably not as many parties in government,
only the most liked ones.
You continue:
I mean that there could be need for further reforms.
[endquote]
You like to speculate. Speculations aren't really answerable. To what needs
are you referring, in particular?
Certainly advocates of rank methods would want to propose them, and that
would be fine. Maybe some would say that their methods are _needed_. That's
ok to, though it I claim that it wouldn't be so. And if you want to say that
something else will be needed, then you need to say why.
At that time, if others are advocating Condorcet or IRV, or whatever, I'll
mention ICT and tell of its advantages.
But, under those circumstances, I'll also offer the possibility of merely
adding voting options to Approval. The ones that I've already discussed a
lot here in recent months.
But you know, it's a bit premature to worry about that now.
You said:
.
The problems of Approval with three or more potential winners might irritate
people and change their voting behaviour.
[endquote]
You like to refer to "problems" without specifying them. As I said earlier
in this reply, I've answered claims about problems, various ones. We have no
way of knowing what problems you're referring to. If you're referring to
"problems" that I've answered about, then say so, and say what part of my
answer you disagree with, and why.
In particular, you have never answered my question about what problem
Approval will have that Plurality doesn't have.
Will people's voting behavior change with Approval? Most definitely. As I've
said many time, those who feel a need to compromise on a lesser-evil will be
able to vote for their favorites too. That will certainly "irritate" the
lesser-evils who won in Plurality :-)
You said:
I'm not sure what would happen
[endquote]
I'm not sure what you're talking about. I told you what would happen. If you
think something else would happen, or might happen, don't forget to tell us
what and why.
You said:
, but I expect this system to be at least in the beginning less predictable
[endquote]
I've made some reliable predictions. If you disagree with them, then share
with us your reasons. No one can predict exactly what the changes would be.
But they'd definitely be improvements. Why? Read my article and all of my
posts on this subject, including the one that you're supposedly replying to.
You said:
than the old well tested approaches.
[endquote]
The results of Plurality have been very well tested, and found to be odious
to everyone.
You said:
I'm not saying that this system should not be tried.
[endquote]
Oh thank you thank you :-)
You said:
I'm just saying that you might get surprises too
[endquote]
You will most definitely get surprises, Juho. And you might not like them.
But people who live here will like them. Why? Because, unlike now, they'll
be supporting what they like. Because they're the result of voters having
more freedom regarding the marks that they give, the 1 point ratings and the
0 point ratings. The freedom to give 1 point to every candidate whom they
like. No, you won't like that. But people who live here will like the
results.
You said:
, and that the reform process might continue
[endquote]
Of course it might. As I've said many times now, there mere fact of the
Approval balloting results will show that things aren't as our televisions
have been telling us. Public wishes, the genuine mainstream and middle,
those aren't what we were told. Rapidly media will be more open, and the
climate will be good for additional reforms of various kinds. Those wanting
additional electoral reforms will be in a better position than now to ask
for them. Rank balloting advocates will try their proposals. Maybe a good
one will win. Discussion will be open, and so I think it's likely that
anything that wins will be good.
You said:
(or return back as in Burlington).
[endquote]
I get tired of asking you why people would want to go back to Plurality.
This discussion isn't productive.
> you haven't talked with American
> favorite-buriers, and observed their voting, as I have.
I didn't observe any strong burial tendency in Burlington when I analyzed
those votes.
[endquot]
It was a municipal election.
Did your analysis include looking at the labels on the ballots that told
what the voter really likes best? Oh way, the ballots don't have such
labels, do they :-)
As someone who is actually here, I've observed a strong favorite-burial
tendency in a limited sample. But even in that sample, the consistency
suggests that it won't be rare.
Juho now says:
Normal voters do not know what FBC means
[endquote]
They know what "lesser-evil" "wasting your vote", and "don't split the vote"
mean.
You know what, I'm still only halfway through this post. Do I really have to
wade through the rest of it? Not if the rest is anything like what I've been
replying to so far. Maybe I'll resume later, but, if so, I'll reply only to
a few things that are relatively deserving of reply.
Before I quite I'll comment on this:
Juho says:
A small party between Democrats and Republicans could get lots of approvals
since it is considered better than the "worst alternative".
A small party between the Republicans and Democrats might get some approvals
from those who either like the Republicans and Democrats (from what people
say, there aren't terribly many of those) and from people who think they
need the Dem as a lesser-evil. But why is that important to Juho? Some who
approve Dem as lesser-evil might similarly approvel Inbetween, for the same
reason. The relevant thing is that they'll also approve those whom they
really like. Juho seem sure that the winner will be the Dem, the Repub, or
someone inbetween them. People have a quite low opinion of the Republocrat
politicians. But Juho, so far away, has no way of knowing that. Guess what:
Republocrats (and candidates inbetween them) might not keep winning.
You said:
> parties chosen by corporate media and big money contributors
I'd say this problem is for the most part independent of the used election
method.
[endquote]
You'd say that because you aren't paying attention. Big corruption,
disgusting to all, here can keep winning only because of a Myerson-Weber
equilibrium peculiar to Plurality.
Two unliked parties can keep winning forever, because the results (victory
for one of them) seems to confirm people's belief that they're the only
winnable parties. With Plurality, it goes on and on, self-confirming.
No that is not independent of the election method. It depends on Plurality.
You asked:
Could you point out a concrete example [of favorite-burial being optimal
strategy in Condorcet] with sincere preferences and strategic votes, so I
can check if it is likely to work in a real life election. (The one example
that I analyzed in the other mail didn't seem to be a threat in real life
elections.)
[endquote]
For one thing, the other posting didn't have a numerical example of that.
For another thing, the matter has been much discussed on EM, and it is well
established that Condorcet fails FBC.
It was established here that if you want to maximally help Compromise win
instead of Worse, then you should rank Compromise alone at top.
And if Compromise is the only acceptable deemed likely to beat Worse, and
Worse is an unacceptable, then you ranking Compromise alone at top is
optimal.
If you want a numerical example, I'll post one when I get a chance, within
the next few days probably.
Mike Ossipoff
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