[EM] To Condorcetists:

[Michael Ossipoff]

On 16.5.2012, at 0.21, Michael Ossipoff wrote:

> PR is fine, provided that there are sufficiently many seats per 
> district

That is typical. But it is also possible to count the correct proportions at
national level and then distribute the seats to the (few member) districts. 

[endquote]

...as in Germany and some Scandinavian countries, where the overall
nationally-proportional correct seat number is calculated for each party,
according to its share of the national party vote, and then the number of
seats that a party has won in the districts is added to, to bring it up to
its correct proportion based on the national party vote. A mixed-member
system.

I never felt that districts were very important in PR, but I must admit that
I've never lived where there is PR, district or otherwise. It seems to me
that I read that Holland doesn't use districts in their PR system, but that
might just be because the area isn't large enough to need them.

I liked Finland's elegant open list system when I read about it. 

But didn't I read that you use d'Hondt? That under-represents small parties.
Sainte-Lague is more perfectly proportional and more fair.
I could be wrong about which proportional formula Finland uses. It was a
long time ago when I read about that. Maybe Finland uses Sainte-Lague.

> I feel that any lack of perfection in the results of PR in Europe can 
> be attributed to small districts &/or theresholds.

I guess all countries have somewhat different systems and thereby also
somewhat different problems. The ones you mentioned are probably common.

[endquote]

The trouble with party-list PR with small districts or high threshold is
that there's a serious split-vote problem. STV avoids it, but at a cost in
proportional accuracy: STV and Largest-Remainder list PR share the same kind
of suboptimally-accurate proportionality formula. Sainte-Lague is the
genuinely proportional PR--provided that districts are small, and there
isn't a high threshold (best to have no artificial threshold). As you said
small districts are ok if there's a "mixed-member system" in which national
proportional results are used to top-up the parties' district seat totals.

Anyway, PR is unfeasible for the U.S. And anyway, as I said, I don't want
parties that aren't good enough to win in single-winner elections to have
Congressional seats.

Any PR would be better than Plurality single-winner elections. But we'd be
fine with just doing our single-winner elections by a better method, such as
Approval. For Congress in single-member districts, as well as for the
presidency.


> Electing each representative from the same winning party is what 
> happens now, regardless of what the single-winner method is. Of course 
> that was the intent.

I guess the idea is that the two dominat parties alternate in power. 

[endquote]

That most definitely is the idea here. But we'll see what's dominant when
everyone can really express what they really want.

But yes, single-member districts will give Congress to only the dominant
party or parties. But don't think that that will mean Republocrats. As I
said, Republocrats can't win without the Plurality voting system. Remember
that, with a good voting system "dominant parties" will mean "best liked and
most wanted parties".


You said:

This way we can get (two-party) proportionality in time. And the dividing
line between the two parties is supposed to represent the opinion of the
median voter.

[endquote]

If you're talking about Congressional single-member districts elected by
Approval, then I trust that you aren't referring to the Democrat and
Republican parties. I don't know how proportional it would be, but that
wouldn't be the goal. Electing the most wanted, the best liked, would be the
goal of single-member district Approval in Congress.

Yes, with Approval, the system would find and stay at the voter median.

You said:

Use of other methods than Plurality in the single-winner districts may break
these properties. That may be good or/and bad.

[endquote]

How could using Approval instead of Plurality in our single-member districts
be bad? I've talked about how Approval's results would differ from those of
Plurality.


> But PR isn't _necessary_ if we use a good single-winner method. PR 
> isn't the only way.

Right. A two-party system is another approach. 

[endquote]

It doesn't matter how many parties.  Remember that the "two party system" is
an artificat of Plurality. In Approval single-member districts, there would
likely still be two or three parties often winning. Or maybe, as people find
out things, or conditions change, different parties will be the main
dominant one. But the important thing is that, if two parties are usually
winning, under Approval, it's only because people genuinely like them best.
I don't care how many parties are winning in those single-member districts,
whether 1, 2, 3 or 4. It will be whatever the public like.

You said:

Proxy Direct Democracy could introduce another one. And there is also the
traditional direct democracy. I believe single-winner districts with
compromise seeking non-two-party single-winner methods have not been
discussed well enough yet to have a clear understanding of the properties of
the resulting political system.

[endquote]

For one thing, there's no guarantee that there won't be a two-party system
when our single-member district seats are elected by Approval. It will
depend only on what people like.

But Approval, of course, won't share Plurality's property of forcing an
_unliked_ 2-party system on us. You say that hasn't been discussed enough?
Ok, shall we discuss the properties of the political system that would
result from choosing what people actually like, when voters are free to
indicate all the candidates that they like? How would it differ from now?
How about this: It would be more liked.

If you're suggesting that there would be some drawback, disadvantage or bad
result that could happen because we elect candidates and parties that are
more liked than what Plurality elects, then please let's hear them.

You're saying what I've been saying people would say, "It needs more study".
"...and much discussion, because we lack a clear understanding". And I agree
that that argument would effectively stop Condorcet. But it won't work on
Approval, because of Approval's transparent simplicity. Tell us how it could
possibly be bad to no longer falsify ballots by indicating 0 points, when
the voter might not really choose to give 0 to that candidate. Tell us how
it would be bad to let voters top-rate whatever candidate(s) they want to.
Tell us why it might be bad to elect candidates and parties that are
more-liked than those elected by Plurality.

> But, for me, the ideal target would be Proxy DD.  As I said, it uses a 
> single-winner method for all decisionmaking.
> ...only if you disregard their favorite-burial incentive, and (for 
> most of
> them) their C/D problem.

I'm still not convinced that Condorcet methods would be unusable or worse
than others with respect to strategic vulnerability in typical real life
elections.

[endquote]

That's entirely understandable, because you haven't talked with American
favorite-buriers, and observed their voting, as I have.

And the favorite-burial problem isn't a matter of strategic _vulnerability_.
It's a problem of strategic need. But the C/D problem can be regarded as
strategic vulnerability. If you don't believe that Condorcet has that
vulnerability, then try Condorcet in the C/D examples that I've given--my
versions of the Approval bad-example (ABE).

And yes, I agree that Smith-Top, Schwartz-Top, and probably the CC/ABE
methods proposed by Kristofer, are defection-resistant while meeting the
Condorcet Criterion.
But they aren't what you usually mean when you say "Condorcet".

> Let's substitute "good single-winner method" for "Condorcet".  It 
> wouldn't have problems. In fact, though good PR would be fine too, I'd 
> rather elect Congress and state legislatures in single-member 
> districts via a good single-winner method such as Approval or ICT. 
> That's because, why have all the rejected parties as part of the Congress?

Ok, that sounds like a group of village elders (with no need to have party
affiliations). That may be a working approach for some needs.

[endquote]

I don't understand what you mean by that. Any political system could
conceivably work without parties if people's policy-preferences were all
similar enough. 
Any electoral system could elect village elders if that's what the voters
want. But there is nothing in what I'd said that implies village elders, or
lack of party affiliations.

Plato proposed a system ruled by a panel of philosopher kings who would
appoint their successors. But we aren't talking about that, because we're
talking about democracies that elect their leaders.

> No, with PR, some unpopular parties would be able to stay in Congress. 
> I wouldn't want that.

Interesting. That is of course against the principles of proportional
representation.

[endquote]

Yes.

You asked:

 But why not. 

[endquote]

Because parties that can't win a single-winner election are not what the
public want.

You continued:

Many political systems of today try to exclude extremist parties from the
system (e.g. using thresholds) and allow only mainstream parties to be
represented (e.g. two). 

[endquote]

I have no specific wish the limit government to two parties. I don't care
how many parties are winning in the Congressional single-member districts.
Two, three, four, whatever.

I don't want to exclude parties because I call them "extremist". It would be
undemocratic to try to exclude parties merely because they are extremely
different from what I prefer.
But, for instance, the Constitution could specifically exclude parties and
candidates with the Nazis' reprehensible attributes. 

All I'm saying is that there is no need or reason to include parties that
the public don't like--parties that can't win a single-winner election.

In PR, I don't like thresholds, because, in party-list PR, they cause a
split-vote problem.

You said:

Decisions should generally not be extreme. 

[endquote]

But don' t you see that your policy proposals and decisions will be called
"extreme" by anyone whose policy proposals are extremely different from
yours?

Decisions in an Approval-elected Congress will be maximally popular.

You continued:

But representation might include or not include all (also extremists).

[endquote]

PR's goal is to include all or nearly all. That's ok. Europe is proof of
that. PR would be incomparably better than Plurality.

I just see no need to seat in Congress parties that aren't liked enough to
win a seat in a single-seat Approval election.

But if we had a Yes/No election tomorrow, about whether or not to
immediately adopt all of the typically European policies, including PR, I'd
vote "Yes" on that proposal, without any hesitation.

> You said:
> 
> But that does not mean that the method would behave in some other 
> sensible way that would be easy to predict and easy to justify.
> 
> [endquote]
> 
> If you're referring to Approval, then in what way would it behave 
> unsensibly, unjusitifably or unpredictably? Of course any election can 
> be unpredictable.

E.g. the (theoretical) risk of electing all the representatives of the
Congress from one single small party. 

[endquote]

1. Plurality always elects all of the representatives from the Republocrat
party, because voters aren't allowed free choice in giving the 0 and 1
ratings to candidates.
So then, don't imply that electing all representatives from one party (or
two identical ones) would be something new with Approval.

2.  It isn't clear what you mean by "small". How "small" is a party that is
considered alright by the most people, and given an "Approved" rating by the
most people? A party that is hopefully-regarded by the most voters.

3. Or maybe you're saying that Approval would be worse than Plurality
because it wouldn't elect the most favorite party, as you think that
Plurality does. But Plurality doesn't elect the most favorite party, because
millions of voters aren't voting for their favorite in Plurality.

4. I don't care how many parties are winning in Congress, as long as they're
winning because they're the most liked--as they would in Approval.

Ok, but now I realize that your objection is against single-member districts
in general, rather than against Approval in particular.

Yes, single-member districts could elect all of Congress from one party.
That would be fine, if it's the most liked party (as it would be in
Approval). As I said, why waste seats and time on parties that aren't liked
enough to win an Approval election in a single-member district?

You continued:

Approval and other compromise seeking single winner methods do not respect
proportional representation

[endquote]

Of course not. PR is ok, but I've told why I prefer single-member districts
elected by Approval.

You continued:

...nor the alternating two-party principles. 

[endquote]

Ok, you actually _are_ trying to argue for Plurality vs Approval. 

What is this "alternating 2-party principle" that you advocate, and how do
you justify it?

Two parties chosen by corporate media and big money contributors, and able
to win because of Plurality's falsification of voter's candidate ratings?
Are you sure that you want to suggest that that might be better than
Approval? If you want to say that, then you need to tell why you think so.

And no, don't invoke your "alternating two party principle" as your reason,
because your "alternating two party principle", itself, needs justification.

Before you answer, remember that Approval can and will elect two parties to
Congress if the public like two parties. 


You continue:

I can't tell how e.g. the U.S. would react to the proposed changes in the
elections. 

[endquote]

I've only so far mentioned Approval to a few people who aren't already
familiar with voting systems, but they liked it. Some liked it a lot.

But, if you think that they might not, then you need to say what it is about
it that they might not like.


You continued:

Your "village elder" approach where there is no need to have party
affiliations could maybe work(?) (with this kind of single-winner districts)
if(!) things converge in that direction.

[endquote]

I have no idea what you mean by "village elder approach". What do village
elders have to do with using Approval in single-member districts for
Congressional elections?

There is no reason why candidates in Approval elections can't have party
affiliations. There is every reason to believe that most, all, or nearly all
of them would.


> You continued:
> 
> I don't know what would happen if some compromise candidate from a 
> minor centrist party would be elected as the next president
> 
> [endquote]
> 
> What do you mean by "minor"?  Receiving the most "Approved" ratings?  
> :-)

In Condorcet a small party that Democrats condider better than Republicans,
and Republicans consider better than Democrats, could win. Approval could do
the same if people approve that small party candidate in order to avoid
electing the worst candidate. It could still have only few first preference
supporters altough it got lots of defensive approvals.

[endquote]

...and so?

How is it bad to elect a party or candidate who is acceptable and adequate
for the most people?

Remember, Juho, that in an Approval election, no one is stopping you from
approving only your favorite. In fact that was what I did, when I was the
only voter in the presidential poll that I posted some months ago, in the
ordinary Approval portion of the ballot.

> ...would have to build the presidential machinery (government etc.)
> 
> [endquote]
> 
> Why would that be a problem, when the same single-winner method is 
> tending to elect the same kind of candidates, throughout Congress as 
> in the presidency?

In the IRV discussions people often talk about risk of electing "weak
candidates". 

[endquote]

You mean "weak candidates" who are liked by the most people? :-)

You continue:

In this case that could mean that the major parties do have lots of power
and people and already established machinery in Washington.

[endquote]

What is this machinery that you keep referring to? The parties that win the
Approval elections will become the major parties. Are you saying that things
In Washington are already set up for the Republicans and Democrats? Such as
the bribe arrangements? Lobbyists, etc.? And you're afraid that we'd lose
that, if we didn't elect the Democrats and Republicans? We'd lose those
bribe arrangements? Would that really be such a bad thing to lose? :-)

And if corporate lobbyists and bribe-arrangements aren't what you're
referring to, then what are you referring to?

You continued:

If you elect a competent nice professor from some university in Minnesota
(represening the professor party), how could he quickly establish all the
required connections and find all the right people to form a government and
fill the White House and nominate all the ambassadors etc. 

[endquote]

They do it every 4 years.

I take it that your'e saying that the nice professor has been elected
president. Presidents have plenty of time in which to choose their
cabinet-members, their top administration officials. Those officials, in
turn, can choose their employees. It happens every time the parties
alternate in the presidency. Yes, sometimes a Democrat president will keep
some cabinet official of the previous Republican administration. But they
don't do it because there isn't time to find anyone else :-)  They do it
because it's what they or their owners prefer. 

European countries likewise have to form new governments when the
parliamentary coalition changes.


> I also wonder how the minor party president and his single-party 
> government would cooperate with the Senate and House of Representatives.
> 
> [endquote]
> 
> I wonder what you mean by "minor party".  And why should the 
> president, senate and HR be too different to co-operate? Remember, 
> Congress would be elected by Approval too, and so they'd consist of 
> the same "minor party" or set of similar parties.

Today the president needs support e.g. from the Congress to be efficient.

[endquote]

Checks and balances. They work together. Justification was given for that
system, but a parliamentary system would be better.

But so what? With Approval, as with Purality, the same voters are voting in
the Congressional and presidential elections. Yes, in some regions, they
might elect parties or candidates who couldn't win the presidency. It
happens now too. With Approval's genuine voter freedom, there might be 3
parties in Congress instead of two. So what? It wouldn't be worse than PR's
many parties. The president would then have to co-operate with a broader
coalition of congressmembers. That's fine, because they were all liked
enough to win in their state or HR district. Remember that the president's
need to co-operate with Congressmembers from every diverse district is a
principle that is used as a justification for the presidential system. It is
in no way contrary to the intent of the presidential system.


You said:

 If the large parties in Congress hate the minor party of the president

[endquote]

Why would the president be hated by the Congressmembers elected by the same
population who elected the president? Some HR members from remote or unique
districts might not like the president, but they, not the president, would
be of a minority point of view.

Remember that, though voters might approve people who aren't their favorite,
they approve people whom they like, or at least strongly prefer enough to
give an Approval to.

Remote minority-point-of-view HR members would have to work with the larger
society, including their presidential choice.

> And, above, your objection is really an objection to the presidential 
> system, and is not an objection to Approval vs Plurality, or Approval 
> vs Condorcet.

You continued:

Just saying that the presidential election is not a clean cut single-winner
election but a somewhat more complex process. It is designed to work as part
of the two-party tradition. 

[endquote]

The Republicans and Democrats weren't the two parties when the Constitution
was written.

Maybe you're trying to claim that two unliked parties will work better than
one or three liked ones. If so, then why? And no, saying the presidential
system intended a two party system won't do. Specifically, what bad will
happen if there are one or three parties in Congress?

> I don't consider offensive burial to be Condorcet's biggest problem, 
> or even its 2nd biggest.  But what you say above doesn't address my 
> comments about many people's need to fully help the Democrat beat the 
> Republican, and the examples for the C/D problem in Condorcet.

I wrote also another mail where I addressed one of the voting scenarios that
you mentioned. The "need to fully help the Democrat beat the Republican" and
therefore bury as much as one can may be based on not understanding well
what strategies make sense and are likely to improve the outcome.

[endquote]

On the contrary, as I said before, in Condorcet, if it's a u/a election
(meaning that there are unacceptable candidates who could win), and if it
appears as if Compromise is the only acceptable who can beat the
unacceptable, then your best strategy is to bury your favorite by ranking
Compromise alone at top.

In any case, what evidence I've seen, for how today's favorite-buriers vote,
says that they'll favorite-bury in Condorcet too. And remember, as I said
above, favorite burial can be the optimal strategy. I'd do so myself, in
fact, under the above-specified conditions.  (contrary to what I've said in
the past).



> why should they stop advising
> lesser-of-2-evils favorite-burial.  "The only way to maximally help 
> Dem beat Repub is to rank Dem alone in 1st place. Don't spoil it for
Nader."

Since that may not make sense as a techincal or as a political strategy. 

[endquote]

It makes sense and is the technically optimal strategy under the conditions
that I specified above. It's commonly felt that the Democrat is the only
candidate who can beat the Republican. To many, the Republican is
unacceptable, and the Democrat is acceptable--the only acceptable who can
beat the Republican. The conditions that I specified above are met.

Mike Ossipoff