[EM] To Condorcetists:

[Michael Ossipoff]

Juho:

You said:

I'm a "condorcetist" in the sense that I think that Condorcet methods are a
pretty good local optimum for some election types.

[endquote]

Condorcet-Criterion methods would be fine for EM. I doubt very much that EM
members would have any favorite-burial need, with
Condorcet, or Condorcet-Criterion methods. However, the
co-operation/defection problem can appear just as easily here on EM
as anywhere. Therefore, for EM voting, Smith-Top would be fine, in this
non-favorite-burying electorate that includes a fair number of
people who insist on Condorcet's Criterion (CC). Ideally, I'd still prefer
ITC, but Smith-Top would be fine.

In fact, for that EM electorate, with so few voters, there could even be an
argument for Schwartz-Top.

Myself, if EM were voting on political candidates, or on voting systems, I'd
consider it a u/a election. Therefore, on the Voter's Choice 2
ballot, I'd designate "Direct", meaning that my ballot would award points
directly ,according to my marks on my Approval ballot.

...And, for EM, I'd prefer Voter's Choice 2 to the single-designation
Voter's Choice. Maybe Voter's Choice (only allowing one method designation)
could have appeal for when
the public distrust all alternative methods. Then, single-designation
Voter's Choice might be an easier proposal.

But even single-designation  Voter's Choice should allow the "Direct"
designation. If the person wants to use it, it would mean giving one point
to one candidate, instead of being counted toward the points that a method
could bestow on its winner. 

If we were using single-designation Voter's  Choice in a poll on voting
systems, I'd designate "Direct", and give my point to Approval, as the only
acceptable in a u/a election.

But if that single-designation Voter's Choice poll were about political
candidates, and I wanted to help several, then I'd probably designate
Approval, ICT, Smith-Top or Schwartz-Top--whichever seemed more popular. Not
that I'd necessarily want to help several.

So, yes, Condorcet Criterion methods could have use in some electorates,
such as EM. Maybe some organizations too.

I'd said:
  
> You want to quibble forever about which rank-count is the best.

You replied:

No interest to quibble. 

[endquote]

Thank you. But of course that's what EM is all about. A debate-club, and not
a productive place for advocacy of actual practical reform.

You continued:

Unfortunately this problem exists. But it is not fatal. It could be seen
also as a large set of available options.

[endquote]

Make that "subset". And yes, as long as you keep the total set large, then
voting system reform advocates are their own worst opponents. 

>  
> You object that Approval doesn't let you help your 1st and 2nd choices 
> against your last choice, while still helping your 1st choice against your
2nd choice.

Approval ballots contain less information than ranked or full rated ballots.

[endquote]

I've already said that I have no quibble with the non-practical mathematical
study of ways of counting sincere rankings.
 


>  
> But the _big_ benefit starts when everyone can support their 1st and 2nd
choices at all.

Benefits depend on where you start from.

[endquote]

And guess where we're starting from here?...  :-)  We're starting with
Plurality. 
>  
> Do you have any idea how things would be if everyone could actually 
> support their favorites, and without having to try to guess on which one
the other similar voters would be combining their support?

I guess we are speaking about the U.S. elections here. Do you recommend
compromise seeking single-winner election methods like Approval or Condorcet
to be used in electing representative bodies from single-winner districts? 

[endquote]

Juho, I recommend that you look up, somewhere, what sort of elections we do
here. I'll  explain it. Other than some municipal elections all of our
elections are single-winner elections. We elect our state legislatures in
single-winner elections (though there have been just a few exceptions). We
elect the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives in single-winner
elections.

I'm not suggesting a complete change of the political system, such as
proportional representation or parliamentary government. Parliamentary govt
is fine, but it's too big
A change to ask for here, at least now. PR is likewise much too difficult to
ask for here, a big change. I'm asking only for the minimal change: For our
single-winner elections, for which we already use Plurality, I merely
suggest that we repeal Plurality's ridiculous forced falsification
requirement.

And yes, our Presidential elections are effectively by Plurality, at least
in the states, for the most part. Many would prefer one nationally-counted
presidential election. So would I, but I'd settle for Approval in the
states, first. But, first of all, Approval for Congress (HR and sentate),
and state legislatures.

You said:

I note that that would lead to an interesting political system that has
probably not been tested anywhere in the world yet.

[endquote]

Single winner elections have actually been tested!  And widely used, Juho! I
kid you not!  

(In the U.S., England and Canada, for instance. I recommend that you visit
the library and check for yourself.)

What would be somewhat new would be single-winner elections without
Plurality's forced falsification requirement. And yes, the lack of testing
and prior experience would be a problem for most reform proposals. But not
for Approval, because, as I said, that minimal change from Plurality is so
simple that it would be obvious that it would be an improvement, and nothing
other than an improvement.
  
> Do you understand the difference between "liked" and "unliked"? And 
> what would happen if everyone could support whom and what they actually
like best?

Do you recommend "sincere Approval" where people sincerely approve those
candidates that they "like", or "strategic Approval" where people are
supposed to find the best strategy for them and vote that way? 

[endquote]

You didn't read my article. I recommend Approval. How the person votes is up
to hir.

But, if you'd read the article, you'd know that my first recommendation is
to just approve whom you like, trust and consider deserving of your support.

But if you want to strategize, my first suggestion is that you can approve
the candidate for whom you'd vote in Plurality, and also everyone who is
better. Then
I discussed other _optional_ strategy suggestions that can be made for
Approval, due to its simplicity.

Short answer: I recommend voting for whom you like, trust and consider
deserving of your support. Strategize if you want to, that's ok too.

You said:

(The best strategy often includes approving the "lesser-evil" too.) 

[endquote]

...and for everyone who is better.  If you feel that you need such strategy.
Again, see my article, or what I wrote directly above.


You said:

My guess is that in public elections strategic approach to Approval would
dominate.

[endquote]

Fine. If people approve whom they'd vote for in Plurality, and also everyone
whom they like more, that would be just fine. They'd be approving,
supporting
their genuine favorites.
>  
> Do you want improvement or not? Or would you rather debate forever?

If this is a reference to the minor change in the electoral system to change
Plurality to Approval

[endquote]

...minor in procedural change. Immense in results-difference.


You said:

, then I agree that Approval has this benefit of being an easy change. I'm
not sure that I'd recommend Approval in the U.S. for presidential elections
or various representative bodies. 

[endquote]

Are you also not sure how you justify recommending against it?

If you're merely saying that you make no recommendation regarding voting
systems here, then that's fine. If you're saying that Approval is less
qualified for
recommendation, than that claim would call for justification.


You said:

That leaves open the posibility of moving later forwad for example to
Condorcet methods.

[endquote]

Fine. Plan for that later, because you realize that, right now, Approval's
_minimal_ change is what can be justified, and what people can be assured
won't worsen the
Results.

>  
> And, as for helping 1st choice over 2nd choice, while helping both over
last choice, free of strategy need:
>  
> You're in deinal about Gibbard-Satterthwaite.
>  
> You're in denial about Condorcet's blatant and full-magnitude
co-operation/defection problem.

I don't see any denial of Gibbard-Satterthwaite or other problems. My
understanding is that many people like Condorcet methods because they think
that their co-operation/defection problems are relatively small (although
they exist at least in theory).

[endquote]

Nonsense. Can you justify that claim? I've showed a whole range of numerical
examples, from the 27,24,49 example to the 33,32,34 example. I've told how
the problem would come about, in Condorcet, just as well as in Approval.
Condorcet is not strategy-free, or anything close to it.



To me the promise of Condorcet methods is in that in large real life
electons their vulnerabilities would be small and difficult to use, and as a
result people could vote sincerely 

[endquote]

See above.

(without strategic concerns and without strategic intent).

Dream on. That's the mythical promise of rank balloting. I believe that ICT
might actually come close to delivering on that promise. Condorcet does not.
I've abundantly told why. If you specifically disagree with something I've
said about that, then tell which statement you disagree with, and why, and
be specific.



>  
> And you're in denial about millions of voters' need to litterally
maximally help the Democrat beat the Republican.

I can see a potential problem of numerous voters voting D > all_others > R
or R > all_others > D in the first Condorcet elections just to make sure
that their worst competitors will not win. My hope is that they would soon
learn that there is no need and no sense to do so.

[endquote]

You see, that hope isn't good enough, unless it has some evidentiary
supporet.


 The promise of Condorcet is that sincere ranking is sufficient.

[endquote]

Wouldn't it be nice if all promises were kept.


>  
> And that's not even counting the good chance of successful offensive
burial strategy when there are more than 3 candidates.

In real life such strategies are not very easy to implement. I have asked
multiple times people to write down some guidelines for strategies in real
life Condorcet elections but I have not seen any yet. 

[endquote]

Then you haven't read my postings. Yes, Condorcet's strategy is far too
complicated to be known. But people will know that the Democrat can only be
maximally helped to beat the Republican by favorite-burial. And the
co-operation/defection problem will soon or immediately make itself obvious.


You said:

What kind of public voting recommendations should Demorats or their support
goups give to their own voters if the polls show that they are slightly
ahead of the Republicans at the moment, or slightly behind, and there are
also other parties in the election (maybe one right wing, one left wing, two
centrist parties and one in some unspecified direction)?

Should they say "let the best man win" or "let's use some strategy to take
the victory although people don't like us"? Could a party lose support (the
crucial 1%) if they adopt the latter message? I mean that sincerity may pay
off also this way.

[endquote]

No, I don't consider offensive burial to be Condorcet's worst problem. Maybe
its 3rd worst, after favorite-burial and co-operation/defection.


(I know that in Australia people vote in ranked elections as told by the
parties, and in a way that does not necessarily reflect the sincere opinion
of the individual voters. But without going to the details of the Australian
system and its problems, here I assume that voters will make independent
decisions on how to vote, maybe based on some guidance from the parties,
candidates and media, but not all voting in a fixed way as told by the
party. Maybe that is a fair assumption in the U.S. political environment.)

[endquote]

Or maybe not.

U.S. voters entirely trust and believe the corporate mass media. The media
tell them who "the two choices" are, and the voters all believe it. That's
why, in a beautiful and perfect Myerson-Weber equilibrium, two unliked
parties will keep on winning forever, or for as long as we keep Plurality.

Mike Ossipoff


Juho



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