[EM] Concerns of KM & RF. Approval, Condorcet & ICT strategy. Reform schedule.

Wed May 16 23:09:19 PDT 2012

Kristofer:

You expressed concern about uncertainty about how to vote in Approval. Let
me re-word what I was trying to say about that:

First, for simplicity let's say that you belong to a faction that all prefer
and vote as you do. What you object to is that, in Approval, you don't know
the way of voting by

which your faction can get the best result possible. But what you _do_ know
(if you like and choose strategic voting) is the way of voting that will
maximize your expectation, based on what your expectation already is. (I've
already said much about the better-than-expectation strategy of Approval)

That's good enough. You can't expect to know exactly what ballot marks will
give the best outcome for you.

I emphasize that, in Condorcet, you don't know either of those things, _even
if it's a u/a election_. Especially if it's a u/a election.

And do you really think that our elections don't have unacceptable
candidates who could win? .or two sets of candidates such that the merit
differences within

the sets are negligible compared to the merit difference between the sets?

In contrast, Approval's u/a strategy (as is its non-u/a strategy) is not
only known, but is the simplest there is: Approve (only) all the
acceptables.

Yes, Condorcet has the consolation or compensation that, if the election
isn't u/a, and if you don't much care about the results, then you can rank
the candidates at as many rank positions as you want to. But sincere ranking
would be a big mistake in a u/a election. And often in a non-u/a election
too, if the result matters. Condorcet's supposed strategy-free-ness is only
a sometimes, maybe, thing. And when it isn't that "sometime", then you
_really_ don't know what to do. Approval voting is incomparably easier and
simpler.

Richard expressed the concern that, if Approval were enacted, then maybe
people wouldn't be willing to later change to something else, and those who
would like to go to something better wouldn't have the opportunity. In other
words, if you don't enact Condorcet instead of Approval, before Approval,
then you'll never get an opportunity to enact Condorcet.

A valid concern. Valid to ask about, but not valid to be concerned about. 

Forgive me for repeating this: If Approval were enacted, there would be
changes in government and society, such that the media would be incomparably
more free and open. Campaign laws and ballot-access laws would be more fair.
Political debates would be more inclusive. These things would result from a
government that is more what the voters want. Also, for one thing, after the
results of the first Approval election, it would no longer be as easy to
exclude non-Republocrats from ballots, debates, editorial letters, articles,
news coverage, airtime, etc. 

And it would be well-established that voting system improvement is possible,
because it would be an observed fact. People would be open to it. People
would know the subject of voting systems better than they do now. 

The environment would be _much_ more favorable to rank-balloting than it now
is.

Now, make no mistake: Condorcet, or rank-methods in general won't be easy,
any time. But if they're ever do-able at all, then it will be when Approval
has started the improvement and shown that there is such a thing as good
voting system reform.   .and shown the numerical importance of
non-Republocrat candidates, voters and parties.

So no, getting a fancier method won't be harder after Approval. That's when
it will be possible, if it ever will.

Any improvement would be a step. That's the spirit of the Declaration.
That's why none of us should oppose eachother's proposals in any publication
or forum other than here at EM. Fighting eachother and opposing eachother's
proposals in public would be counterproductive, a ruinous hindrance to
reform.

Does it sound self-serving when I say that Approval should be the first
step, the first proposal? I've told many times why Approval is so much more
proposable,  acceptable, enactable. Approval is literally the minimal change
from Plurality that will get rid of Plurality's big fault. Approval is
nothing more than the repeal of Plurality's ridiculous rule, the rule that
makes Plurality a blatantly, bizarrely undemocratic points rating system.

The desirability of that change is so obvious, as is the fact that it's an
improvement and nothing other than an improvement, that Approval  might even
be enacted (Plurality's funny rule repealed) via a voting rights court
ruling. 

Even if you think that Condorcet is enactable, you must agree that
Approval's expected enactment time is much less than that of Condorcet. Do
you really think that there's a reason to do without reform for a longer
time?

You want something more than Approval. So do I. I've been saying that all
along. I want defection-resistance. It can be had in ICT, and probably in
Kristofer's CC/ABE method proposals (but of course they don't meet FBC, but
ICT does).

So, when Approval has made genuine open discussion possible, you can propose
Condorcet, and I'll propose ICT. You don't seem me proposing ICT now, do
you? It would be something to ask for later. Though I'd prefer ICT, I'm now
only suggesting to propose Approval, because that's what's do-able.

When someone said that  favorite-burial isn't a technically-valid strategy
in Condorcet, I replied that favorite-burial is indeed a technically optimal
strategy in Condorcet, if it's a u/a election, and if it seems like
Condorcet is the only acceptable who can beat the unacceptables. 

If you have no idea which acceptable can beat the unacceptables, then
top-rank them all. 

If it's somewhere in between, as will usually be the case, then you don't
know what to do. You don't know what ballot ranking would give your faction
its best result. You don't even know what ballot ranking would maximize your
expectation. No one knows, in Condorcet.

What about ICT? Completely different ballgame. There is no strategic need
for favorite-burial, in u/a or non-u/a. Therefore you won't be wondering
whether your best u/a strategy is Compromise alone at top, or all
acceptables at top.  Vote all of the acceptables at top. 

Ok, I admit that I don't know whether there's advantage, in a u/a election,
to rank the unacceptables with the more winnable ones nearest the bottom. I
would expect that your treatment of the unacceptables should be either that,
or not ranking them at all.  Are rank methods complicated contraptions or
what! But I still like ICT.

But, in any case, you won't have the lack of known strategy that you'd have
in Condorcet.

I've always said that you can't really discuss voting systems in a vacuum.
But I'll call the candidates in this example, A, B, C, D, E, and F.   But,
fill in, for yourself, _actual_ candidates for them to represent, so that
these situations aren't being discussed in a vacuum.

F is the unacceptable. There could be more, but it's simpler, and just as
good, to have just one.

A , B, C, D, and E are the acceptables. A is your favorite. But you like B,
C, D and E a lot too.

Oh, one other thing, you don't like E as much as B, C, and D.  E has some
very good policy proposals, but is also somewhat lacking. Just to give you
an example, E's platform says that we should adequately fund NPR (National
Public Radio) because of its excellent news and commentary  :-|   :-)

But I'm not naming any names.

So, it's u/a. How would you vote in Approval? Of course you'd approve A, B,
C, D, and E.

But maybe that could be complicated by a C/D problem. Maybe the E people
aren't as co-operative as you are, and maybe everything that they've said
indicates that they will not vote for anyone but E, because they want E to
win instead of A, B, C, or D.

I should look up and re-post my 5 suggestions for dealing with C/D in
Approval. It needn't be a problem. For now, I'll just say that some of those
5 solutions might call for not approving E, depending on the circumstances.

C/D is solvable in Approval, but it definitely involves strategy  (as it
would in Condorcet too).

What if the method is ICT? If there isn't any C/D problem, then I suggest
that the optimal u/a strategy is to vote as in Approval. As I said, that
makes ICT voting a lot simpler and easier than Condorcet voting. Just
top-rank A, B, C, D, and E. 

Since F is the only unacceptable, you're done with your ranking.

(If there's been more than one unacceptable, then maybe you should rank them
below top, in reverse order of their (guessed) ability to beat an
acceptable).

But what if there's a C/D situation? Rank E in second place, instead of at
top. Because of ICT's defection-resistance, it's pretty safe to do that.

But of course, in a u/a election, it's really bad strategy to not top-rate
all of the acceptables. And the strategy I've suggested here is to downrank
E. That constitutes a little bit of a C/D problem. I'll call it a u/a C/D
problem. It's much less than Approval's or Condorcet's C/D problem, because
it's unlikely that F will win because you ranked E in second place.

ICT's  u/a C/D problem is a minor one.

Mike Ossipoff

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