[EM] Smith-Top

[Michael Ossipoff]

I emphasize that I don't know if u/a FBC makes a satisfactory guarantee.

With it, FBC must be complied with only if the election is u/a to everyone.
So, someone wanting to
write a failure-example would have to devise an example in which, for
everyone, there are 2 sets of candidates such that hir preferences within
the sets are negligibly weak in comparison to hir preference between the
sets. And there must not be anything that positively rules out a win in the
less-preferred set.

I don't know if satisfying that criterion would guarantee that there
couldn't be societally-damaging favorite-burial incentive.

I don't know for sure if I could write a really precisely-worded u/a FBC,
because I haven't previously written criteria that refer to
preference-strength, or in which the
premise contains a stipulation that a win in a certain set not be
positively ruled out.

And I don't know if Smith-Top would pass that criterion.

But, as I said, the matter is of interest, because I consider FBC to be
important, because of the societal consequences of failing it. If a weaker
FBC
such as u/a FBC could be sufficient, then more methods would be acceptable.

Anyway, Smith-Top means what you'd expect it to mean: Elect the Smith set
member who is ranked in 1st place on the most ballots.

Smith-Top obviously meets Condorcet's Criterion.

Smith-Top would be a method in the spirit of Kristofer's Smith-Approval,
but attempting to copy ICT's defection-resistance.

Smith-Top is to Smith-Approval as ICT is to ICA.

I'm not proposing Smith-Top, for the reasons given above.

Kristofer: Let me know if you intended u/a FBC different from how I've
described it.

Mike Ossipoff
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