[EM] Two completely different kinds of voting reforms. ICT vs Condorcet.

Michael Ossipoff email9648742 at gmail.com
Tue May 22 15:18:11 PDT 2012


There are two completely different kinds of voting system reforms:

1. A completely different and new voting system
2. A minimal obvious fix to the current voting system

Our Condorcetists at EM don't seem to get that distinction.

The proposal to repeal Plurality's forced falsification rule follows
obviously from an examination of what's wrong with Plurality, what
Plurality's problem is. It's a type #2 reform, a minimal obvious fix to the
current voting system.

Which of those two kinds of reform proposals do you think would have a
shorter expected enactment time? 

Which one could be considered as a voting-rights case?

Condorcetists keep implying that they don't think that Approval would bring
enough benefit, if I'm correctly guessing what they mean.

I've told of the societal benefits that Approval would bring. I've told why
that is. Anyone should feel free to tell why they believe that isn't so.

But, for now, I'll just add that Myerson & Weber have shown that Approval
would quickly home in on the voter median, and then stay there.

Do Condorcetists feel that electing candidates at the voter-median position
isn't good enough? 

Plurality's problem, which causes it to keep on electing, at voting
equilibrium, two unliked parties, will be gone when its forced falsification
rule is repealed.

ICT vs Condorcet:

Voting instructions for ICT can correctly say:

1. There absolutely cannot be any reason or need to vote someone over your
favorite. There can be no benefit from doing so.

2. Defection in the ABE is always a losing strategy. Support a mutual
majority that you need to beat someone whom you want to beat. Just counting
on their supporting your favorite, without mutuality, won't be enough, won't
work. Since other voters know this, you can feel safe in supporting that
mutual majority.

3. Offensive burial usually won't work.

Condorcet cannot promise #1 and #2.

Approval meets FBC, Intermediate FBC, and Strong FBC.
ICT meets FBC and Intermediate FBC.
Condorcet fails all three of those criteria.

Mike Ossipoff













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