[EM] Juho , 5/21/12, roughly 0800 UT

[Dave Ketchum]

Thanks Juho, for working to make this dialog more useful!
DWK

On May 21, 2012, at 7:36 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:

> [Note: Michael Ossipof's message was not a reply to a mail on this  
> list but to an offline discussion.]
>
> On 21.5.2012, at 23.13, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>
>> I don't know what you mean by "all regular voters".
>
> I requested strategy descriptions that would be intended for real  
> life elections and normal voters (not EM experts) in such elections.  
> That means that the strategy shall be clear enough so that normal  
> voters can implement it.
>
>> The above strategy is for voters who perceive the above-desecribed  
>> conditions.
>> If you want a general strategy for Condorcet, none is known.
>
> Also strategies that do work only under specific conditions are ok.  
> You just have to write the strategy description so that a regular  
> voter can see when that strategy can be applied and when not. I  
> don't require that a "general" strategy should be used (=modify your  
> vote) in every election. It is enough if there is a strategy that  
> can be applied reasonably often, and that will clearly improve the  
> outcome from that voter's point of view. I encourage you to rewrite  
> the strategy so that it clearly indicates when a voter should use it  
> and how the vote should be modified. A working strategy for public  
> elections must be such that regular voters can successfully  
> implement it (or get strategic guidance e.g. from his party and  
> implement that strategy).
>
>> I have no idea what examples you're referring to.
>
> You identified two of your examples by giving their "characteristic  
> numbers", 27,24,49 and 33,32,34. I found and commented the latter  
> one in a mail (http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2012-May/030400.html 
> ).
>
>> If you want to say that one of them isn't good enough, then you  
>> need to clearly specify it, and then tell what's wrong with it, and  
>> why you think so.
>
> I hope the mail was clear enough. Maybe you did not notice that mail  
> since you did not comment it yet.
>
>> Juho says:
>>
>> That would make the strategy a working strategy (although not  
>> necessarily a strategy that would work often).
>>
>> [endquote]
>>
>> Then it wouldn't be a general strategy, would it.
>
> I used term "general" just to indicate that the voter can refer to  
> that strategy description in all elections and check what it says,  
> not that it would always lead to a modified vote.
>
>> Ok, but which Approval article?
>>
>> [endquote]
>>
>> The one that I posted to EM. The one that is at Democracy Chronicles.
>
> Google gave me this: http://www.democracychronicles.com/2012/05/06/problems-current-voting-system-plurality-voting/ 
> . It seems to be the correct one since it talks about Approval  
> strategies at the end.
>
>> Do you mean that you only want your favorite to win? Then, in  
>> Approval, approve hir only.
>
> This doesn't sound like a good strategy. You know well that there  
> are better Approval strategies.
>
>> If you want to maximize your expection, I've told Approval strategy  
>> for that purpose.
>
> What I'm missing is a description of the strategy in an exact format  
> that can be used by regular voters. (But I think I got one for  
> Approval at least towards the end of this mail. Only Condorcet  
> strategy still missing.)
>
>> But if you're questioning the assumption that people wouldn't  
>> strategize in Approval, I merely suggest voting for all whom you  
>> like. If you want to, you can strategize. Suit yourself.
>
> Yes, that is what I meant. And I'm still confused with your idea  
> that people would choose between those two options in a competitive  
> election.
>
> “Would I rather appoint him/her to office than hold the election?”
>
>> What should I provide? I'm willing to be more concrete if you tell  
>> me what you want.
>>
>> [endquote]
>>
>> In general, what you should provide is the specifics of what you  
>> mean. You never do that, and no doubt you never will. That's why  
>> talking to you is a waste of time.
>>
>> In particular, in this instance, you speak of focusing on concrete  
>> practical strategic vulnerabilities. I suggested that you specify  
>> and focus on one.
>
> You say that Condorcet is vulnerable to strategies. I say that it is  
> not enough to sow that in theory some modification in the votes  
> would give a better winner to the strategists to prove a practical  
> vulnerability. I say that in order to prove that there is a  
> practical vulnerability one must be able to give practical  
> guidelines on how some strategy can be applied successfully in real  
> life elections when the voters have some poll information available.  
> You can pick any vulnerability type that you think is easiest to  
> take benefit of. If I'd pick one strategy that would be a limitation  
> to you.
>
> On the Approval side you say that Approval works fine. I say that  
> there are situations where Approval fails in the sense that the  
> voters don't have any reasonable strategies. You should pick the  
> strategy that works in all situations. I'm to point out the  
> vulnerabilities based on that given strategy, e.g. by providing  
> examples of situations where that strategy does not work well enough.
>
> I provided at least one problematic Approval example to you although  
> I did not yet get yet any exact definition of a recommended Approval  
> strategy that voters could use when planning how to vote.
>
>>> The direct implementation of better-than-expectation could just  
>>> consist of approving the candidates who are better than (or maybe  
>>> exactly as good as) the result-merit that you expect from the  
>>> election.
>
>> I said "(or maybe exactly as good as)" because approving a  
>> candidate who is exactly as good as your expectation doesn't affect  
>> your expectatation. It doesn't matter whether or not you approve a  
>> candidate who is exactly as good as your expectation. You can flip  
>> a coin, or yes, go by how you feel that day.
>
> Ok. Random or free choice in the case of a "tie".
>
>> Juho says:
>>
>> Does "result-merit that you expect" mean the value of the (single)  
>> guessed winner or maybe the weighted average of potential winners?
>>
>> [endquote]
>>
>> Answer to both questions: Yes, if that's what you feel that you  
>> know, or have a perception or feel about.
>>
>> People are not going to determine their expectation in the election  
>> by multiplying the win probability of each candidate by hir  
>> utility, and summing the products. But you can do that if you want  
>> to.
>>
>>
>> But you know how good a result you expect from the election.
>
> I take that to mean that voters are expected to estimate (at some  
> level) the value of each candidate and the probability of each  
> candidate to win, and then estimate what the value of the outcome is  
> likely to be. They need not do that mathematically. It is enough if  
> their "general feeling" to some extent approximates the mathematical  
> formula. (Actually I think that the equation is more detailed since  
> people have different weights e.g. for uncertainty and risks. But  
> let's forget that for now and consider this to be a good enough  
> equation.)
>
>> Juho says:
>>
>> Does the expectation refer to the sincere opinions or does it  
>> include the expected strategic voting too (much more complicated  
>> and cyclic)?
>>
>> [endquote]
>>
>> ...if you want it to.
>
> Ok. I take that to mean, if the voters take that into account in  
> their considerations.
>
> It seems that this is finally an exact definition of an Approval  
> strategy. It is not quite user friendly since I don't expect normal  
> voters to understand much about expectation values. Actually the  
> article (see above) contained one classical definition of Approval  
> strategy that says pretty much the same thing and that voters might  
> understand better (although you had your doubts about it too). It  
> was “Would I rather appoint him/her to office than hold the  
> election?”. Also this may be too difficult for many voters, which is  
> not good for Approval (many voters will not follow the strategy).  
> But I'll take this strategy (with either definition) as your  
> recommended strategy for voters in competitive elections. I think  
> I'll come back to that in another mail to see how well this strategy  
> works.
>
> If you have a similar exact strategy description available for  
> taking benefit of the claimed Condorcet vulnerabilities, that would  
> be welcome, and actually needed to make the strategy credible.
>
> Juho


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