[EM] Dave: Approval-objection answers

[Jameson Quinn]

2012/3/23 MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkklrp at hotmail.com>

>
> Dave:
>
> You wrote:
>
> On Mar 22, 2012, at 4:09 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
>
> > On 03/22/2012 07:57 PM, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
> >> There are plenty of voters who report having to "hold their nose" and
>
> >> vote only for someone they don't like. They'd all like to be able to
> >> vote for better candidates to, including their favorites. Even if one
> >> only counts the Democrat voters who say that they're strategically
>
> >> forced
> >> to vote only for someone they don't really like, amounts to a lot of
> >> people who'd see the improvement brought by Approval.
>
> If there is no one acceptable to vote for, the voters have not done
>
> their job:
> .     Could happen occasionally such as failures in doing
> nominations.  Write-ins can help recover for this.
>
> [endquote]
>
> There could be elections in which there's no one acceptable to vote for, but, as you
>
> said, even then, there should be write-ins.
>
> But, even with the difficulty of getting non-big-2 parties on the ballot, and especially
> after the way Approval will open things up, there will usually be someone reasonably
>
> acceptable on the ballot. Even now, ballots often have a wide variety of candidates
> and parties.
>
> You continued:
>
> "strategically forced" should not be doable for how a particular voter
> voted
>
> [endquote]
>
> It's doable because many voters are so resigned and cowed that it doesn't
> take much to force them to do giveaway compromise strategy, without any
> reliable information to justify that strategy. I refer to the progressive people
>
> who think they strategically need to vote for the Democrat.
>
> You continued:
>
> (but no one voted for the supposedly forced choice
>
> [endquote]
>
> Regrettably, millions vote for that "choice", because it's billed as one of "the two choices".
>
> You continued:
>
> -  why force
> such a hated choice?
>
> [endquote]
>
> To keep voters from voting for someone whom they genuinely prefer. What the public,
> including the voters, would like isn't the same as what is most profitable to those who
>
> own the media that tell us about "the two choices". Everyone believes that only they
> have the preferences that they have, because that's how it looks in the media.
>
> Notice that all politicians routinely promise change. That's because they know
>
> that the public wants change. So the politicians are adamant about change. They're
> mad as hell and they want to do something about it, and give us change. Amazingly, that
> pretense continues to reliably work, every time.
>
>
> You continued:
>
> OMOV may inspire some - many of us have to argue against it having
> value because we back, as better, methods this thought argues about -
> such as Condorcet, Score, and even IRV.
>
> [endquote]
>
> OMOV is easily answered by pointing out that Approval let's everyone rate each
> candidate as approved or unapproved.
>
> You continued:
>
> Part of the chicken dilemma difficulty is that it depends on what some
>
> voters will do without any compulsion, and what others will do after
> making promises to cooperate
>
> [endquote]
>
> The chicken dilemma is very difficult to get rid of. I don't know of anyone
> proposing a FBC-complying method that really gets rid of that problem.
>
> The methods that I call "defection-resistant" do much to alleviate that problem,
> but don't eliminate it. They just push it to a secondary level, where defection strategy is more
> complicated and counterintuitive, and therefore less likely to be used.
>
> A party whose members might defect by not support your party in Approval isn't likely
> to engage in the Machiavellianly bizarre strategy of conditionally approving Democrats,
> Republicans, Libertarians and Nazis in order to gain some mutual conditional approvals. Not
>
> if ethical reputation counts for anything.
>
> I've said that methods that don't get rid of that problem don't significantly
> improve on ordinary Approval. All that can be said for the defection-resistant methods
>
> is that they might improve a little on Approval, in a way.
>
> In other words, the improvement is questionable at best. And, for most methods trying
> to improve on Approval, the improvement is outright illusory.
>
>
> I'd say that Approval can't be improved on, other than questionably or doubtfully.
>
>
I'd counter that SODA is a clear improvement for those who want to
delegate, and no worse for those who don't.

Jameson

>
>
> Mike Ossipoff
>
>
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>
>
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