[EM] correction

Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_elmet at lavabit.com
Fri Mar 9 10:42:11 PST 2012

On 03/09/2012 01:46 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
>     *De :* Kevin Venzke <stepjak at yahoo.fr>
>     *À :* election-methods <election-methods at electorama.com>
>     *Envoyé le :* Jeudi 8 mars 2012 18h36
>     *Objet :* Re: [EM] Obvious Approval advantages. SODA. Approval-Runoff.
>     Hi Mike,
>     I don't think Approval-Runoff can get off the ground since it's too
>     apparent that a party could nominate two candidates (signaling that one
>     is just a pawn to aid the other) and try to win by grabbing both of the
>     finalist positions. If this happened regularly it would be just an
>     expensive version of FPP.
> Actually, it would be an expensive version of Approval.
> Still, I am not sure why it would be any easier to propose an approval
> runoff vs. plain approval.

It could be better than Approval in one particular case. In a 
Gore/Nader/Bush situation where Nader's support is so close to Gore's 
that the Nader-voters don't know whether to approve one or two 
candidates, a runoff would let them approve of both with little fear, 
since the worst that can happen by overestimating is that both Nader and 
Gore go to the runoff, in which case Nader would win if he really had 
greater support.

However, that advantage is lost if the parties start cloning the 
candidates. To keep it, I think one would have to have an exhaustive 
runoff, and that would be very impractical.

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