[EM] Election-Methods Digest, Vol 96, Issue 22

[Kevin Venzke]

Hi,

----- Mail original -----
> De : Nicholas Buckner <nlborlcl at gmail.com>
> À : election-methods at lists.electorama.com
> Cc : 
> Envoyé le : Mercredi 13 juin 2012 3h39
> Objet : Re: [EM] Election-Methods Digest, Vol 96, Issue 22
> 
> Actually, on a weird second thought, wouldn't a method that refused to
> identify a winner in a three-way tie (Condorcet paradox) be compatible
> with both? It would be I guess case 5 (A, B, C, D, no winner). It
> wouldn't be a very practical method, as we need our voting methods to
> decide ties, but isn't deciding the tie what breaks the Participation
> criterion? My voting method only made the mistake of picking a winner
> in the first place (a mistake I'd happily do again).

Besides what Jameson said, criteria usually are (or should be) 
defined for some framework which includes a definition of what an 
election method is. I don't know of any use of a framework that
allows no winner, as I suppose it becomes unclear how the criteria
should work within it (related to Jameson's point).

If you declare a massive tie and resolve it randomly, you will get
the same problem, since Participation should at least say that the
win odds of the favorite should not decrease, yet Condorcet demands
100% win odds for its winner.

Kevin