[EM] Another reason why Greens won't vote Dem due to previous count results.

[Michael Ossipoff]

Dave:

You wrote:

> I say again, the academic argument does not meet the real-world. My vote
is
> not going to be influenced by these arguments, and since I'm the only
voter in
> my district likely to read them, they are not likely to match real-world
voter
> experience.

Anyone wanting to optimize hir outcome will use expectation-maximizing
strategy, consciously or otherwise. Many, most, or nearly all voters will
vote by one of the ways that I've described. Remember that my main
suggestion was to just vote for those whom you like, trust, and consider
deserving of your support.

> 
> NOBODY's "expectation" is really a "sum over" anything. That's just a an
> analytical tool to try to attach a number to how we form our votes.

Quite so. But it's useful, as you suggested, for guessing whom people will
approve in examples.


> 
> >>> On EM, it's been shown by at least three people, in at least two
> >>> ways,
> that the expectation-maximizing strategy of Approval is to approve the
above-
> expectation candidates.<<<
> 
> It has been shown in my district that nobody except me reads the EM list.
So
> most vote without ever having encountered a phrase such as " the
expectation-
> maximizing strategy." 

...but of course that doesn't mean that they aren't and won't be using one.
For example, they are now, aren't they, in Plurality. Consistent with their
media-distorted notion of winnabilities, people are now voting in a way
consistent with attempted expectation-maximization.

>Americans in general aren't interested in any message that
> requires more than an eighth-grade education.

My Approval voting suggestions, in my article, aren't complicated. People
will vote in one of those ways even if they don't hear or read any
suggestion to do so.

> No offense, but until the part of the EM community that is advocating
> something dis-entangles their advocacy from the study of EMs in general,
> advocates for one EM or another are, as we say in the American South,
pissing
> into the wind.

Well said, and I quite agree. That's why I keep referring to EM as purely a
debate-club.

If we want to be effective, then we should start talking (as I have) about
what is the most feasible reform effort. What voting system reform would
have the shortest expected enactment time, or the best chance of ever being
enacted at all?  I suggest again that that would be Approval, for the
reasons that I've stated so many times.

Or join or form an organization for enactment of the method you want to
advocate, and devote some of your time to that, instead of too just arguing
about which rank method is the best. And stop wasting your time criticizing
other methods, or debating which is best.

Yes, I know that many here, at the debating club, would like rank balloting.
In general, they're saying that they'd like more than Approval offers. So
would I, in the sense that I'd prefer ICT. But the relevant question is, "Do
you want something better than Plurality or not?". I claim, and I've
supported my claim, that even the simple and minimal reform of Approval
would bring tremendous improvement over Plurality, and would bring as much
societal improvement as the fanciest Condorcet version.

Mike Ossipoff



> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: election-methods-bounces at lists.electorama.com
> [mailto:election-methods-bounces at lists.electorama.com] On Behalf Of
> Michael Ossipoff
> Sent: Thursday, May 31, 2012 9:39 PM
> To: election-methods at electorama.com
> Subject: [EM] Another reason why Greens won't vote Dem, due to previous
> count results.
> 
> As I was saying in a recent previous post about this, Approval's count
results will
> tell Green-preferrers whether or not they need Dem to protect against
Repub.
> 
> And I gave a reason why that is: Preferrers of the middle of 3 parties
have no
> reason to approve either extreme. I told of a reason why that is.
> 
> Now I'd like to tell of another:
> 
> On EM, it's been shown by at least three people, in at least two ways,
that the
> expectation-maximizing strategy of Approval is to approve the above-
> expectation candidates.
> 
> It's obvious why that's so: Your expectation is the sum, over all of the
> candidates, of the product of a candidate's win-probability and hir
utility.
> It's obvious that when you increase the win-probability of a candidate who
is
> better than your expectation (you do that when you approve hir), that will
raise
> your expectation.
> 
> Well, suppose you're a Democrat-preferrer (if there really are any). Say
it's
> Green, Dem, Repub. If it's certain that some particular candidate will
win, then
> your expectation is the utility of that candidate. Otherwise your
expectation is
> somewhere between the utility of the Green and the Dem, or somewhere
> between the utility of the Repub and the Dem.
> 
> Say it's somewhere between the Green and the Dem. As I said above, your
best
> expectation-maximizing strategy is to approve  (only) all of the above-
> expectation candidates. By assumption, the Green is farther from you than
is the
> point representing the utility equal to your expectation. So you don't
approve
> the Green.
> 
> What would it take to make your expectation worse than the Green? No, even
if
> it were almost certain that the Repub would win, that wouldn't do it,
because
> Dem and Repub are so close that you couldn't squeeze an amoeba between
> them. The expected utility for you would have to be a candidate farther
away
> from you than the Green and the Repub. And that would be impossible with
just
> 3 candidates.
> 
> So then, what if there were more candidates? Maybe there's a candidate
who,
> as seen by you (a Dem-preferrer) is beyond the Green, in the same
direction.
> Maybe the it looks as if someone that far away from you, in that
direction, will
> win. Well, if that's so, then we can forget all about the Repub as a
threat, can't
> we. In that case, the Green preferrers certainly have no reason to approve
Dem.
> 
> So, if there are any Democrat-preferrers, they aren't going to vote for
the
> Green, except under conditions that would make the Rep is so unwinnable
that
> the Dems aren't needed as a compromise.
> 
> And with the Dems not approving in either direction, the count totals of
Greens
> and Repubs will be a good estimate of their preferrers' numbers. And when
the
> Green shows as bigger than the Repub (as s/he immediately will) it will be
> obvious that Green can beat Repub, and that Green preferrers don't need to
> approve Dem.
> 
> As I was saying, in fact, I suggest that, in the 1st Approval election,
the Repubs
> count-total will be so low the suggestion of Dem as a necessary compromise
> would be quite out of the question.
> 
> Aside from all this, remember that, when non-Republocrats are seen as
viable,
> there will be statisticians and (honest) poll-takers who are very
interested in
> finding out about the relative numbers of preferrers of the various
parties.
> 
> Mike Ossipoff
> 
> 
> 
> 
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