[EM] IC-Smith-T, IC-Schwartz-T, Double-Ended IC-Smith-T, Double-Ended IC-Schwartz-T

Michael Ossipoff email9648742 at gmail.com
Sun Jul 29 08:59:54 PDT 2012

I mentioned Double-Ended ICT as an enhancement of ICT. Here's another

If no one is unbeaten, then you could do the top-count for winner only
among the Smith set or the Schwartz set.

Someone asked me which criteria ICT meets, other than the properties
for which I value it. For one thing, that isn't important. I offer and
propose ICT because of FBC and defection-resistance. That's what makes
it valuable for polling, and that's what would make it uniquely good
for official public elections to choose office-holders or decide
multi-alternative issues.

(But of course I don't claim that it's my proposal. It's due to Kevin
Venzke and Chris Benham)

But would it be correct to say that ICT meets LNHa, and that
Double-Ended ICT meets LNHa and LNHe?

...And that the Smith and Schwartz versions of those methods meet
Condorcet-Loser and the Smith Criterion?

I don't think that ordinary ICT's violations of Smith or Condorcet
loser are important. A Condorcet loser who is the favorite of the most
people, or who is acceptable to the most people, is a very popular
Condorcet loser.

I wouldn't add the Smith or Schwartz complications to ICT, especially
for a first rank-method proposal.

But I like the way Double-Ended ICT simplifies the u/a strategy, and
makes it easier to ensure that you're doing all you can to keep the
winner from coming from some set of candidates that you don't like,
such as the unacceptables.

Double-Ended ICT, if it doesn't have an important problem or fault
that ordinary ICT doesn't have, would be my favorite rank-count
proposal then.

In a u/a election, with ICT, you should top-rank all of the
acceptables. With un-improved Condorcet, you typically won't know what
to do, because, if you top-rank all of the acceptables, one might beat
another, and thereby take away hir CW status, giving the election to
an unacceptable.

With ordinary ICT, you should probably rank the unacceptables in
reverse order of winnability. In Double-Ended ICT, you needn't do
that. Double-Ended ICT's u/a strategy is as simple as that of
Approval, it seems to me, and is the same as that of Approval.

As I said before, Double-Ended ICT, and the Smith and Schwartz
versions are tentative. I don't guarantee that they don't have some
disadvantage, drawback, problem or fault that I don't know of.

Mike Ossipoff

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