[EM] Stronger FBC met by Double-Ended ICT
Michael Ossipoff
email9648742 at gmail.com
Fri Jul 27 09:00:33 PDT 2012
Double-Ended ICT meets these stronger FBC versions:
FBC4:
Premise:
V is a set of voters who have the same preferences and vote in the
same way. Everyone but V has already voted. The only way that V can
keep Worst from winning is by making Compromise win instead. They have
a way of voting that would achieve that.
Requirement:
If V doesn't vote Worst over anyone, and doesn't vote anyone over
Compromise, then Worst won't win.
[end of FBC4 definition]
FBC5:
Premise:
V is a set of voters who have he same preferences and vote in the same
way. Everyone but V has already voted. Set A and Set B are disjoint
sets of candidates. The winner will come from Set A or Set B. V has a
way of voting that would ensure that the winner doesn't come from Set
B.
Requirement:
If V votes everyone not in Set B over all of the candidates in Set B,
and doesn't vote anyone over any of the candidates in Set A, then the
winner won't come from Set B.
[end of FBC5 definition]
I emphasize that Double-Ended ICT is new, and I can't say for sure
that it doesn't have some problem or fault. i can't even guarantee
that the statements in this post are correct. Though tentative, they
seem to be correct.
Mike Ossipoff
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