[EM] Dave Ketchum: Repetition of previoius Approval discussion

[Dave Ketchum]

On Apr 28, 2012, at 12:56 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:

> First, my apologies to Paul Kislanko, whom I called by the wrong  
> name when I replied to his posting, a few minutes ago.
>
> _This_ reply is to Dave Ketchum:
>
> Dave:
>
> I'd said:
>
> > How to avoid this problem? Why not repeal the rule that makes >  
> Plurality so funny? Let people rate _every_ candidate with a 1 or >  
> a 0. Rate every candidate as "Approved" or "Unapproved". The >  
> candidate with the most "Approved" ratings wins. The result? Well, >  
> we'd be electing the most approved candidate, wouldn't we. Who can >  
> criticize that? >
>
> You replied:
>
> Anyone who realizes that there is more to wish for.

My next sentence was part of completing that thought:
> Here you can vote for both Favorite and Compromise to help defeat  
> Worse, but cannot vote for both without implying equal liking for  
> each - and thus risking unwanted election of Compromise.
>
> [endquote]
>
> Ah, "If wishes were horses..."  :-)
>
> Far be it for to tell you what you should or shouldn't wish for. But  
> you should keep the distinction
> between wishes, fantasy, and feasible possibilities.
>
> Anyway, as I explained to you when we had this same discussion a few  
> days ago, even you can't complain
> about changing from Plurality to Approval. (At least I assume that  
> you don't believe that you have an argument
> agains that change).

It being an improvement I did not, and do not, argue against changing  
from Plurality to Approval - the improvement is minor, but the effort  
is comparatively minor.

Going back to your thoughts when starting this series, Plurality does  
not allow voters to adequately express their desires.  They do not  
want Worse, so vote for Compromise as the best hope of accomplishing  
this major goal under Plurality - they feel that voting for Favorite  
may let Worse win.

Approval helps by letting them vote for both Favorite and Compromise.   
However this is only a partial correction since it says they have  
equal liking for each.

Thus I argue for using a stronger method, such as Condorcet, that will  
let voters more completely indicate which candidates they most prefer  
when voting for more than one:
.     It matters little whether Approval is used until we agree on  
something better - it is better than Plurality but very little  
different.
.     While I promote Condorcet, I do not here argue for or against  
varieties, even such as ICT that Mike talks of.
>
> You can say, "But I want something more complicated that I claim  
> will be better." But that isn't an argument against
> changing from Plurality to Approval. That change (from Plurality to  
> Approval) amounts to nothing more than repealing the ridiculous rule  
> that
> is Purality's problem.
>
> Now, as I've discussed, a proposal to change from Plurality to  
> Condorcet would be a whole other ballgame.If you want
> to try that, then feel free to. But don't say I told you to.
>
> You continued:
>
> Here you can vote for both Favorite and Compromise to help defeat
> Worse, but cannot vote for both without implying equal liking for each
>
> [endquote]
>
> In a u/a election (there are unacceptable candidates who could win)  
> your best strategy in Condorcet
> is to rank all of the acceptable candidates in 1st place, and not  
> rank any unacceptable candidates.
> Doing so doesn't imply that you equally like everyone whom you equal- 
> rank.

"1st place" puzzles.  Thinking of Favorite and Compromise, I likely  
want to vote for both in Condorcet, but to rank Favorite higher to  
indicate my preference.
>
> You continued:
>
> - and thus risking unwanted election of Compromise.
>
> [endquote]
>
> Sorry, but you do need to risk that, in Condorcet, in a u/a  
> election. But don't feel too bad, because "unwanted"
> has a whole other (and stronger) meaning when applied to the  
> unacceptable candidates.
>
> I'd said:
>
> If you have given 1 point to > Compromise, and 0 points to Worse,  
> then it’s obvious that also > giving a point to Favorite won’t  
> change the fact that you’ve fully > helped Compromise against Worse. >
>
> You say:
>
> The above sentence emphasizes what happens to Compromise vs Worse,
> ignoring that it destroys Favorite's desired advantage over  
> Compromise.
>
> [endquote]
>
> But, with Condorcet, you can't say what I said: Top-ranking Favorite  
> means that you aren't fully helpng Compromise against Worse.
> There are situations in which Worse will win instead of Compromise  
> because you top-ranked Favorite alongside Compromise.

The thinking is getting confused.  You are quoting what I said about  
Approval, and then incorrectly stating what this might do to Condorcet.

In Condorcet if I rank Compromise, but not Worse, that is as strong as  
I can be as to this pair.  If I also rank Favorite higher, that is as  
strong as I can be as to these.  Worse, being unranked, is shown as  
least liked among these.

As to top-ranking both Favorite and Compromise, that indicates liking  
them equally, but does not affect them vs unranked Worse.

Dave Ketchum
>
> Therefore, many people will be afraid to top-rank their favorite.
>
>   When Plurality’s falsification > problem is discussed, Plurality’s  
> inexplicable problem-causing > rule, then anyone trying to claim  
> that that problem should be kept > will be arguing an indefensible  
> position, and will be seen by all > for what he is. I’m not saying  
> that desperate arguments for keeping > Plurality’s problem won’t be  
> made. I’m saying that they won’t work. >
>
> You say:
>
> Agreed that Approval was an easy, but valuable, step up from  
> Plurality.
>
> [endquote]
>
> We agree that Approval should be the first step. Then what is your  
> complaint? I myself have said that I'd like to have
> the rank method ICT (if it could be assured that people will  
> understand or trust that it lets them safely
> vote their favorite in 1st place). But I was talking about what'd  
> feasible now. Let's not confuse immediate proposals
> with discussion of possible plans for the more distant future.
>
> You continued:
>
> But, Approval does not help us vote our preference for Favorite over
> Compromise.  I offer Condorcet as one easy step for this capability.
>
> [endquote]
>
> Sure it does, if that's what you want to do. No one's forcing you to  
> approve Compromise.
>
> But you're saying that you want to vote all of your preferences. You  
> want the relatively complicated sort of method that
> has that kind of balloting, and you want to not be able to give the  
> guaranteee that top-rating your favorite won't worsen your
> outcome. If tha's what you want to propose, feel free to.
>
> If you like rank balloting, you could have that with ICT, without  
> losing FBC. And you'd gain defection-resistance. But no rank
> method is a winnable proposal right now, though they make a great  
> topic for future speculation. But don't confuse fantasy
> with current feasibility.
>
> You continued:
>
> The negatives below suggest this is a difficult step.  Agreed, but its
> value says it is worth trying.
>
> [endquote]
>
> It would be better to try it later. It isn't winnable now.
>
> Condorcetists probably haven't discussed voting systems with members  
> of the public much. Or heard the objections that are made, regarding
> reform voting systems. To ignore those considerations is to live in  
> Fantasyland.
>
> That Condorcetists want to put their money on a sure-loser longshot,  
> is probably due to the fact that they really haven't looked at the
> changes that Approval would make. I recommend that Dave re-read the  
> article that he's criticizing.
>
> I told of the societal benefits that Approval would bring, and I  
> told why.
>
> Myerson & Weber have told why Approval will quickly home in on the  
> voter median (CW position) and then stay there.
>
> Yes, you'd like rank balloting. I'd like ICT (more for defection- 
> resistance, but also for rank-balloting too,to a lesser extent).
> But don't let your greed for more cause you to not get anything.  
> Isn't there an Aesop's fable about that?
>
> Let's argue Condorcet vs ICT when Approval has been in use for a  
> while, because that's when the public and the media
> will be suitable for enacting a rank method. But, even then, I  
> suggest that there's no point in a rank balloting method that
> isn't defection-resistant.
>
> Mike Ossipoff
> Dave Ketchum
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