[EM] Election thinking,
davek at clarityconnect.com
Sun Apr 22 20:02:56 PDT 2012
Mr. Ossipoff writes much about Approval, saying that is as far as we
I say elections are important and that readers should respond to the
importance. I go thru the series, hitting on the reasons for stepping
thru Plurality, Approval, and Condorcet, suggesting that Condorcet is
a target more should be working toward.
I was in a hurry, so did not go into detail about Condorcet. Since I
handed this out a couple hours ago there has been little time for
others to react.
On Apr 22, 2012, at 9:49 PM, Adrian Tawfik wrote:
> I think it is good to have the issue analysed from multiple
> perspectives. If someone want to write a different article than Mr.
> Ossipoff, than we can definitely incorporate it on the website. I'm
> not sure what you believe Mr. Ossipoff left out, can you clarify? I
> think the best thing is to print Mr. Ossipoff's article and also
> have different articles that look at other solutions. There a
> million articles lurking in the work that you all do. I would love
> to have any of you write about election method reform but also any
> aspect of democracy that you think is important. Democracy is a big
> subject and very complex but it is the foundation of modern life.
> What do you think?
> From: Dave Ketchum <davek at clarityconnect.com>
> To: election-methods Methods <election-methods at electorama.com>
> Cc: Adrian Tawfik <adriantawfik at yahoo.com>
> Sent: Sunday, April 22, 2012 8:41 PM
> Subject: Election thinking,
> Seemed to me Mike left out some important thoughts - can we do better?
> On Apr 21, 2012, at 3:41 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote, as:
> Article, with the added paragraph and some better wording
> > Adrian and EM:
> Elections are important to many organizations - and important that
> they help the voters express their desires effectively. Important
> enough that voters should see to it, whatever it takes, that they
> get the information they need and that their thoughts find their way
> correctly to whoever is responsible for responding.
> This article's topic is election methods.
> Normally candidates get nominated, and can campaign as needed. Even
> with these, write-in voting should almost always be permitted -
> there is almost always the possibility of a nominated candidate
> becoming unsuitable too late for formal replacement.
> > Our current voting system, of course, is the vote-for-1 method.
> Also called
> > "Plurality", or the "single mark method".
> > In our Plurality elections, we often hear people saying that
> they're going
> > to vote for someone they don't really like, because he/she is the
> > "lesser-of-2-evils". Note that they're voting for someone they
> don't like,
> > and not voting for the people they really do like, because the
> people they like are
> > perceived as unwinnable.
> A related possibility is voting for the unwinnable candidate and
> letting the "worst-of-2-evils" win.
> A possibility that helps, sometimes, is to be permitted to Approve
> as many candidates as the voter likes best - protecting against the
> "worst-of-2-evils" winning.
> This Approval method is a trivial expense and trivial improvement
> over Plurality voting.
> > The candidate with the most
> > "Approved" ratings wins. The result? Well, we'd be electing the most
> > approved candidate, wouldn't we. Who can criticize that?
> The voter who did not have equal liking for all Approved. There are
> many voting methods to choose from, so we will only mention a few
> . Condorcet - really a family of methods - variations on a design
> using ranking. One can use a single rank value for one candidate
> (same value as Plurality), or several (same value as Approval). A
> voter can also use different ranks, using higher ranks for those
> most preferred, and leaving unranked those least-liked.
> Here each pair of candidates is in a two-party race counting how
> many voters rank one, or rank one higher than the other. The
> candidate winning all of its races wins but, if none, the one coming
> closest wins.
> . IRV - a Condorcet method, though a voter can use each rank
> number only once and the counting is different.
> Considering only each voter's top rank, see if there is a winner.
> If not, discard the top rank for the least-liked candidate and move
> each such ballot to next candidate.
> The discarding sounds good, and usually discards truly least-liked.
> Trouble is. the truly best-liked may have been hidden behind lesser-
> liked by enough voters to have been discarded as least-liked.
> .. Score - voters rate each candidate and ratings are added to
> determine winner. Tricky because making a rating higher or lower
> can affect who wins.
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for
> list info
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