[EM] Dave: Condorcet

robert bristow-johnson rbj at audioimagination.com
Sun Apr 1 18:57:03 PDT 2012

On 4/1/12 2:23 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
> On Mar 28, 2012, at 10:42 AM, MIKE OSSIPOFF (whom i've plonked) wrote:
>> Dave:
>> You wrote:
>> Which leaves me promoting Condorcet.  It allows ranking but, unlike
>> ABucklin or IRV, all that a voter ranks gets counted.  Further, any
>> voter able to match their desires to Plurality or Approval for a
>> particular election, can vote by those rules and have them counted
>> with the same power by Condorcet rules.
> Why bother?  I see Fine and Soso as best so would consider approving 
> both.  Trouble is that this would imply equal liking, perhaps getting 
> Soso elected while I like Fine much better.
> With Condorcet I can rank Fine above Soso, so that my ranking can 
> improve the chance of Fine getting elected, while Soso has a chance if 
> Fine fails.

the question the Approval guys never seem to answer is: "Do I or do I 
not approve my 2nd choice?"  (It is a similar question to the 
counterpart in Range/Score: "How high do I rate my 2nd choice?")   
Approval applies a burden of tactical voting to the voter right from the 
start.  perhaps someone will want to bury a candidate they sorta like 
but who is not their favorite, to help their favorite win.  if they 
don't Approve, then how much Bayesian regret will result when they find 
out their favorite was not in the running at all and their 2nd choice 
lost narrowly to someone they hated?  if they do Approve, how much 
regret will result when their favorite lost narrowly to their 2nd choice?

so with me, the Score and Approval advocates do not get past square 1 
because of that.


r b-j                  rbj at audioimagination.com

"Imagination is more important than knowledge."

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