[EM] Election-Methods Digest, Vol 87, Issue 54

[Ralph Suter]

To James Gilmour:

1. Despite your own certainty about how "the real world of partisan 
politics" functions, your opinion is entirely speculative with no basis 
in historical events, since no Condorcet elections have ever been held 
in any major public elections (or even any minor ones I am aware of).

2. In arriving at your conclusions, you have neglected two critically 
important considerations.

   a. A so-called "weak Condorcet winner" could, immediately following 
an election, make strong and possibly widely persuasive arguments that 
she/he not only deserves to have won but is the strongest possible 
winner, one who in separate contests with every other candidate would 
defeat every one - or, in the event there was a cycle that had to be 
resolved, would still have credible claim to be stronger overall than 
any other candidate. She/he could then quickly move beyond such 
arguments to act in ways that demonstrate her or his actual political 
strength beyond any reasonable doubt. The early carpers about the 
candidate being a weak winner would soon be forced to shift focus to 
other more important issues. If you want to seriously address practical 
politics, you need to address this highly credible post-election scenario.

   b. Your arguments, weak though they are, are even less applicable (if 
at all) to  elections of legislators than to elections of officials in 
executive offices (president, mayor, etc). In fact, in a sharply divided 
electorate (whether divided on ideological, religious, ethnic, or other 
grounds), most people would likely prefer a middle-ground compromise 
winner (even one from a small minority party or group) than one from the 
major opposing party or group they strongly disliked, since the 
middle-ground winner would, though far from ideal to most voters, also 
make far less objectionable legislative decisions overall than a 
"stronger" but widely disliked major party winner.

-Ralph Suter

On 9/23/2011 7:32 PM, James Gilmour wrote:

> But you are completely missing the point of what I wrote.  It is the political consequences of the second result that are important.
>
> In the real world of partisan politics, such a weak Condorcet winner (and their policies) would likely be torn to shreds by the
> party politicians and their party members, to such an extent that s/he would be ineffectual in office.  And based on my experience
> of UK electors, with their majoritarian views of elections, the weak Condorcet winner would get little support from those whose
> votes had voted him or her into office.  It must be for others to judge whether the electors in their countries (USA, Canada) would
> react in a similar way, but I have seen nothing in the US or Canadian press to suggest otherwise.
>
> It is dirty practical politics that is the problem here, not the fact that voters could rank their choices honestly.  In my view,
> such a result would be less acceptable to the electors than the plurality result, despite all the obvious defects in the plurality
> voting.  That's just how it is  -  and if you want to achieve real, practical reform, you have to understand that.
>
> James Gilmour
>
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: election-methods-bounces at lists.electorama.com
>> [mailto:election-methods-bounces at lists.electorama.com] On
>> Behalf Of Kathy Dopp
>> Sent: Friday, September 23, 2011 8:48 PM
>> To: election-methods at lists.electorama.com
>> Subject: Re: [EM] Election-Methods Digest, Vol 87, Issue 54
>>
>>
>> In both the following cases, candidate C, the Condorcet
>> winner, is a GREAT choice because a majority of voters, in
>> both cases, would prefer C over A or B.  This system allows
>> voters to honestly rank their choices, without worrying about
>> helping their least favorite candidate to win - far better
>> than methods like IRV or plurality.
>>
>>>             35 A>C
>>>             34 B>C
>>>             31 C
>>
>>
>>>             48 A>C
>>>             47 B>C
>>>              5 C
>> ----
>> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em
>> for list info
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 4
> Date: Fri, 23 Sep 2011 18:22:42 -0400
> From: Kathy Dopp<kathy.dopp at gmail.com>
> To: election-methods at lists.electorama.com
> Subject: Re: [EM] Election-Methods Digest, Vol 87, Issue 54
> Message-ID:
> 	<CANqewJT-qK=CrgFKC=Q=cudNY0hnRkzkE_HR4=Q5q0kgN6KBGw at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
>
> James,
>
> My point is, that the two examples you gave IMO are very *strong*
> Condorcet winners in the sense that the vast majority of voters would
> prefer the Condorcet winner over one or the other of the other two
> candidates which are far less popularly approved.
>
> I think the IRV fanatics oppose centrist compromise winners who are
> supported by a majority of voters whenever IRV would elect a less
> popular winner. IRV proponents support a more extremist winner,
> supported by far fewer voters as long as the candidate, enough to
> fabricate hypothetical political consequences, claiming that a
> majority people would oppose the Condorcet winner.  Sure, of course at
> least a few persons who had supported the 1st round plurality winner
> would complain, but that is probably all.  I.e. IRV proponents seem to
> be deeply emotionally attached to the method, regardless of how much
> unhappiness the outcome would cause in how large a proportion of
> voters by eliminating the Condorcet winner, as it did in Burlington,
> VT.
>
> Burlington, VT is a real life counterexample to your counterfactual,
> where people would have preferred the Condorcet winner and so got rid
> of IRV.
>
> On Fri, Sep 23, 2011 at 6:02 PM, James Gilmour<jgilmour at globalnet.co.uk>  wrote:
>> But you are completely missing the point of what I wrote. ?It is the political consequences of the second result that are important.
>>
>> In the real world of partisan politics, such a weak Condorcet winner (and their policies) would likely be torn to shreds by the
>> party politicians and their party members, to such an extent that s/he would be ineffectual in office. ?And based on my experience
>> of UK electors, with their majoritarian views of elections, the weak Condorcet winner would get little support from those whose
>> votes had voted him or her into office. ?It must be for others to judge whether the electors in their countries (USA, Canada) would
>> react in a similar way, but I have seen nothing in the US or Canadian press to suggest otherwise.
>>
>> It is dirty practical politics that is the problem here, not the fact that voters could rank their choices honestly. ?In my view,
>> such a result would be less acceptable to the electors than the plurality result, despite all the obvious defects in the plurality
>> voting. ?That's just how it is ?- ?and if you want to achieve real, practical reform, you have to understand that.
>>
>> James Gilmour
>>
>
>>>> ? ? ? ? ? ?35 A>C
>>>> ? ? ? ? ? ?34 B>C
>>>> ? ? ? ? ? ?31 C
>>>
>>>
>>>> ? ? ? ? ? ?48 A>C
>>>> ? ? ? ? ? ?47 B>C
>>>> ? ? ? ? ? ? 5 C
>>> ----
>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em
>>> for list info
>>
>>
>
>
>