[EM] Last call for edits to consensus statement (Jameson Quinn)

[Peter Zbornik]

Hi all,

I saw that the last paragraph in the multiple rounds part of the declaration
was proposed for deletion.
I guess to save space.
I included the relevant information from that paragrph to the previous one,
to keep the text short and not lose information.

Specifically:
I changed the following sentence:
Others of us believe that multiple rounds can still usefully serve to focus
attention on the most popular candidates and might improve the outcome of
the election.

To:
"Others of us believe that multiple rounds can improve election outcomes by
focusing attention on the most popular candidates, for instance by
introducing a final election round between the winner determined by the old
election system and the winner determined by an election system we endorse."

The reason for adding the text:
1) it is sometimes difficult to imagine what could be the benefits of a
second round from the text before the propsed change, so an example might be
appropriate.
2) the specific example used is relevant, as it might provide a bridge
between the endorsed election system and the old one in gathering political
support from people who would not support the new election system if it
would mean abandoning the old system. The votes of these people might be
crucial when gathering the required support for election reform.
3) the text is shorter than before

Best regards
Peter Zborník

On Sun, Sep 11, 2011 at 9:41 PM, Kathy Dopp <kathy.dopp at gmail.com> wrote:

> I would probably sign it if the section Instant-runoff voting, under
> "Additional considerations" were entirely deleted.  The mention of IRV
> above that point seems fair.  The section on IRV under additional
> considerations does not remotely give a balanced view of all the flaws
> of IRV, which would need to be listed -- including its
> nonmonotonicity, its not solving the spoiler problem, its requiring
> centralized vote counting after all ballots are ready to count (not
> precinct summable), and the fact that IRV counts the 2nd and later
> choices of only some voters when their first choice is eliminated
> (fundamentally unfair)...
>
> If we're not recommending IRV, then why try to get into it in depth in
> this statement?
>
> Also, I suggest to either leave off all discussion of SODA for now,
> since it is not one of the basic agreed-upon reforms, or then at least
> describe how it works like you've done with the methods being
> recommended.
>
> > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
> > than "Re: Contents of Election-Methods digest..."
> >
> >
> > Today's Topics:
> >
> >   1. Last call for edits to consensus statement (Jameson Quinn)
> >
> >
> > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> >
> > Message: 1
> > Date: Sat, 10 Sep 2011 18:33:14 -0600
> > From: Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>
> > To: EM <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>,
> >        electionsciencefoundation <electionscience at googlegroups.com>
> > Subject: [EM] Last call for edits to consensus statement
> > Message-ID:
> >        <CAO82iZwsAvnjP6ZEJmD-zMNw30-Sq8SyRK=
> 1mLV2Mn_SfqTQfw at mail.gmail.com>
> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="windows-1252"
> >
> > We have now edited the whole statement from over 4000 words to under
> 3000;
> > and the executive summary from over 400 to under 300. (The table of
> > contents/section headers constitute just over 200 words, and are only
> > counted once as section headers.) Recent edits include:
> >
> >   - Separating out material on "additional references" (ie, wikipedia and
> >   the EM list) and on IRV into their own sections
> >   - Including a pledge to focus more attention on opposing plurality than
> >   IRV, and a call for IRV supporters to do the same.
> >   - General pruning down to size
> >
> > Here's the latest proposal: first the "executive summary" (located near
> the
> > bottom of the google
> > doc<
> https://docs.google.com/document/d/1oyJLxI9dciXBbowM5mougnbGHzkL3Ue1QkD8nnMwWLg/edit?hl=en_US&pli=1
> >)
> > and then the body of the statement. We currently have 10 (pre)signatures,
> > and I hope to make it to at least 30.
> >
> > Jameson Quinn
> >
> > -----------
> >
> > [suggested] Executive Summary
> > This declaration, which has been signed by election-method experts from
> > around the world, publicly denounces the use of plurality voting (also
> known
> > as First Past the Post, FPTP), especially in governmental elections.
> Among
> > other major flaws, plurality voting suffers from vote splitting, which is
> > what impels voters to focus on only two nominees in each election,
> ignoring
> > even other candidates they prefer.
> >
> > As replacements for plurality voting, this declaration recommends four
> > significantly fairer election methods, namely: Approval voting, any
> > Condorcet method, Majority Judgment, and Range voting.  These methods all
> > replace plurality's primitive single-mark ballot with improved ballots
> that
> > collect more information. All endorsed methods support the principle that
> a
> > majority of voters, not just a plurality of voters, should approve or
> prefer
> > the winning candidate.
> >
> > The signers take no common position the use of instant-runoff voting
> (IRV),
> > which is also known as the alternative vote. Opinions differ on whether
> this
> > system?s disadvantages outweigh its advantages.
> >
> > As a consequence of adopting fairer election methods, this declaration's
> > signers expect many direct benefits in government. They also expect
> indirect
> > society-wide and/or economic benefits, just as replacing monarchies and
> > dictatorships with plurality voting has produced dramatic and widespread
> > benefits. The signers of this declaration vary in political orientation,
> and
> > are confident that the recommended election reforms will be fair to all,
> not
> > biasing results towards any particular political parties or groups.
> >
> > The signers urge broader discussion of the flaws of plurality voting and
> the
> > reforms which would fix them. We also urge immediate adoption of the
> > supported voting methods in any governmental or private-organization
> > elections which currently, yet inappropriately, use plurality voting.
> >
> > Note: The statement is divided into 12 short sections, each of which
> begins
> > with a one-sentence summary also included in the table of contents.
> >
> > Contents
> > Introduction - It is time to change our voting system.
> > Unfairness of plurality voting - Plurality voting is a bad method that is
> > used far too often.
> > Better ballots - With better information from the voters, we can elect
> > better winners.
> > Fairer counting methods - Signers agree that any of these four voting
> > methods would give more-democratic results: (1) approval voting, (2)
> > Condorcet voting, (3) majority judgment, and (4) range voting.
> > Additional considerations:
> >
> > Instant-runoff voting - We have differing opinions on a system that has
> both
> > advantages and disadvantages.
> >
> > Proportional representation - Legislatures should represent all the
> voters,
> > not just a bare majority.
> >
> > Using the fairer methods in organizations - Private organizations are a
> > great place to start voting reform.
> >
> > Rounds of voting - Good voting methods can reduce the need for extra
> rounds
> > (primaries and runoffs), or give even-better results when combined with
> such
> > extra rounds.
> >
> > Separate reforms - Reforming the voting system helps with other
> democratic
> > reforms.
> > Benefits for all - Voting reform is truly a win/win solution that will
> help
> > all political groups.
> > Further resources
> > Taking action - We urge you to help promote better voting methods
> wherever
> > you are active, both by spreading awareness and by doing what you can to
> > implement them.
> >
> > Introduction
> > It is time to change our voting system.
> >
> > We, the undersigned election-method experts and enthusiasts from around
> the
> > world, unanimously denounce the use of plurality voting in governmental
> > elections. In this declaration we offer several ready-to-adopt
> replacement
> > election methods that we agree will reliably produce much fairer results.
> >
> > We are confident that adopting any of our recommended methods will reduce
> > the gap between what voters want and politicians do. This increase in
> > government accountability will arise from increasing the influence of
> > voters, and decreasing the currently excessive influence of campaign
> > contributions. In other words, adopting any of our supported election
> > methods will increase the fairness of election results.
> >
> > We agree that there are no significant political or economic risks
> > associated with adopting the election methods recommended here. In fact,
> we
> > believe that the indirect benefits of better government will be
> substantial.
> > Just as democracies tend to be more prosperous than monarchies, we expect
> > that higher levels of democracy will lead to higher standards of living,
> > reduced conflicts, and widespread increases in prosperity.
> >
> > Unfairness of plurality voting
> > Plurality voting is a bad method that is used far too often.
> >
> > We use the term "plurality" voting to refer to the commonly used counting
> > method in which each voter marks only a single choice on the ballot, the
> > number of marks for each candidate are counted, and the candidate with
> the
> > most marks is regarded as the winner. In some nations this method is
> called
> > "First Past The Post" (and abbreviated FPTP or FPP).
> >
> > Although plurality voting produces fair results when there are only two
> > candidates, the results are often dramatically unfair when this method is
> > used in elections with three or more candidates.
> >
> > "Vote splitting" is a key weakness of plurality voting, so it is worth
> > understanding.  Vote splitting refers to similar candidates each
> receiving
> > fewer votes than a single opposition candidate when either similar
> candidate
> > alone could defeat that opposition candidate. Voters who like both
> similar
> > candidates split their vote between the two candidates, while the
> opposition
> > concentrates all of their voters' votes on a single candidate. Vote
> > splitting also happens in primary elections and nominating conventions.
> >
> > In many countries which use plurality, vote splitting in general
> elections
> > is relatively rare, because almost everyone votes for the nominee of one
> of
> > the two ?major? parties. To avoid splitting their votes, voters must
> choose
> > which of these two they like best, and ignore other possibly-better
> > candidates. Like vote-splitting, this two-party monopoly has serious
> > problems; it discourages serious opposition, narrows the debate, and
> reduces
> > accountability. In the end it can lead politicians and parties to grow
> > complacent or even corrupt.
> >
> > In spite of its well-understood weaknesses, plurality voting is far too
> > widely used, especially in the English-speaking world.
> >
> > Better ballots
> > With better information from the voters, we can elect better winners.
> > Unanimously we agree that the kind of ballot used in plurality voting ?
> > which in this declaration is called a "single-mark? ballot ? is not
> > appropriate in governmental elections. Its deficiency is that it does not
> > collect enough preference information from the voters in order to always
> > correctly identify the most popular candidate when there are more than
> two
> > candidates. This lack of information helps to conceal the unfairness of
> > plurality voting.
> >
> > There are three kinds of ballots that collect enough preference
> information
> > to always, or almost always, correctly identify the most popular
> candidate.
> > The names and descriptions of these ballot types are, in alphabetical
> order:
> >
> >   - Approval ballot, on which a voter marks each candidate who the voter
> >   approves as an acceptable choice, and leaves unmarked the candidates
> who are
> >   not acceptable
> >
> >
> >
> >   - Ranked ballot (or ?1-2-3 ballot?), on which a voter indicates a first
> >   choice, and optionally indicates a second choice, and optionally
> indicates
> >   additional choices at lower preference levels
> >
> >
> >
> >   - Score ballot, on which a voter assigns a number or grade for each
> >   candidate. The most familiar versions of such voting are to rate
> something
> >   with 1 to 5 stars, or rate a choice with a number from 1 to 10, or to
> rate
> >   each choice at a named grade (such as "excellent", "good", "fair",
> "poor",
> >   or "reject"), but any range of numbers or grades can be used.
> >
> >
> >
> > Adopting any of the three better ballot types would provide the
> information
> > that is needed for fair results. The additional information will also
> help
> > illustrate how unfair of plurality voting is and has been.
> >
> > Fairer counting methods
> > Together we endorse four voting methods that would give more-democratic
> > results.
> >
> > These three better ballot types can be counted in different ways to
> produce
> > different results. We, the undersigned election-method experts and
> > enthusiasts, have developed and analyzed many counting methods, and we
> now
> > agree on several that are worth adopting in governmental elections.
> >
> > Here, in alphabetical order, are four counting methods that we agree will
> > produce significantly better results compared to plurality voting. Each
> > counting method is followed by the principal advantage claimed by those
> of
> > us who favor that method.
> >
> >   - Approval voting, which uses approval ballots and identifies the
> >   candidate with the most approval marks as the winner.
> >
> >
> > Advantage: It is the simplest election method to collect preferences
> (either
> > on ballots or with a show of hands) and the simplest method (besides
> > plurality) to count and explain. Its simplicity makes it a good first
> step
> > toward any of the other methods.
> >
> >   - Any of the Condorcet methods, which use ranked ballots, and elects a
> >   ?Condorcet winner? who would defeat every other candidate in one-on-one
> >   comparisons. Occasionally there is no Condorcet winner, and different
> >   Condorcet methods use different rules to resolve such cases, although
> these
> >   rules still often agree on the best winner. The most-used Condorcet
> methods
> >   are Condorcet-Schulze and Condorcet-Kemeny. (The word Condorcet is a
> French
> >   name that is pronounced "kon-dor-say".)
> >
> >
> > Advantage: Condorcet methods provide what many see as the fairest result
> in
> > the common cases where there is a Condorcet winner.
> >
> >   - Majority judgment, which uses score ballots to collect the fullest
> >   preference information, and elects the candidate who gets the best
> score
> >   from half or more of the voters (the best median score). This method is
> a
> >   form of Bucklin voting, which is a general class of methods that has
> been
> >   used for city elections in both late 18th-century Switzerland and early
> >   20th-century United States.
> >
> >
> > Advantage: Majority Judgment counts ballots in a way that reduces the
> > incentives to exaggerate or change your preferences, so it is arguably
> the
> > best system for finding out how the voters truly feel about each
> candidate
> > on an absolute scale.
> >
> >   - Range voting (also known as score voting), which also uses score
> >   ballots, and adds together the scores assigned to each candidate, and
> >   identifies the winner as the candidate who receives the highest total
> score.
> >
> >
> > Advantage: Simulations have shown that Range leads to the best voter
> > satisfaction if voters vote sincerely. And even every voter votes
> > strategically, exaggerating their vote, it still gives the same
> reasonable
> > results as Approval voting.
> >
> > This list of supported methods may expand in the future, as we fully
> analyze
> > and test newly-developed methods. One such new method that some of us
> favor
> > today is Simple Optionally-Delegated Approval (SODA) voting, which
> combines
> > approval voting with vote delegation to simplify the voter?s task.
> >
> > All of these methods are "single-winner" election methods, which means
> they
> > elect a single winner, such as a mayor or governor. All four of them have
> > been used to elect officers such as presidents, treasurers, and
> secretaries
> > in non-governmental organizations, and the fairer results have been
> widely
> > appreciated (except by some incumbents who were not reelected).
> >
> > Why do we not support a single "best" election method? Different
> > election-method experts place different degrees of importance on the
> > relative advantages and disadvantages of each method. In the list of
> > signatures some of us indicate which voting method we most-strongly
> prefer.
> > It bears repeating, though, that despite our disagreements, we would not
> > hesitate to support any of these methods over plurality voting. In
> signing
> > this statement, we are uniting against plurality, not ?splitting the
> vote?
> > by each supporting only our favorite method.
> >
> > Additional considerations
> > Instant-runoff voting
> > We have differing opinions on a system that has both advantages and
> > disadvantages.
> > There is another counting method that is supported by some, but not most,
> of
> > the undersigned election-method experts. It is called "instant-runoff
> > voting" (or "IRV" or "the alternative vote"), and it uses ranked ballots.
> > The counting method begins by considering each voter's highest-ranked
> > choice, and eliminating the candidate with the fewest votes, and then
> > shifting the affected ballots to the next-most preferred candidate, and
> > repeating this process until a candidate receives a majority of votes.
> >
> > The main advantage of instant-runoff counting is that it is easy for many
> > people to understand, especially because the counting process is similar
> to
> > the familiar process of runoff elections. However, this method can yield
> > unfair results because it is based on the mistaken belief that the
> candidate
> > who gets the fewest plurality votes is the least popular and should be
> > eliminated.
> >
> > IRV has another possible advantage, called ?Later-No-Harm?: under IRV, it
> > can never hurt you to rank an extra candidate. However, a few of us doubt
> > this is even a desirable characteristic, and we all agree the evidence
> shows
> > that Later-No-Harm is not a critical necessity for a good voting method.
> >
> > Instant-runoff voting is used in some governmental elections throughout
> the
> > world, and most of us agree that usually the results are an improvement
> over
> > plurality voting. Yet when IRV has been used, it has sometimes eliminated
> > the candidate preferred by the majority, leading to a winner most voters
> see
> > as wrong. This problem, which is unlikely or impossible with the four
> > methods we endorse, has led voters to repeal IRV and, tragically, return
> to
> > plurality voting in several cases.
> >
> > Most of us agree that the two advantages of IRV (its simplicity of
> counting
> > and its resistance to a specific kind of strategic voting) do not
> outweigh
> > its major disadvantage compared to the methods we support, which is that
> it
> > fails to correctly identify the most popular candidate in many elections.
> >
> > Those of us who do feel that IRV is an improvement over plurality will
> > support it, even if we favor other methods more. Even those of us who
> feel
> > that IRV?s disadvantages are serious will try focus more attention on the
> > more-commonly-suffered disadvantages of plurality. We believe that this
> > common focus makes us more effective advocates, and we call on those who
> > principally favor IRV to extend the same courtesies to the methods we
> > endorse.
> >
> > Proportional representation
> > Legislatures should represent all the voters, not just a bare majority.
> >
> > Complications arise when an election fills a legislative seat, such as a
> > seat in a legislature, congress, or parliament. For this purpose many
> > nations use "proportional representation" because it matches the
> proportion
> > of legislators from each political party with the proportion of voters
> who,
> > on their ballot, associate themselves with each political party.
> Unanimously
> > we support the continued use of proportional representation in
> governments
> > that already use it.
> >
> > If a government uses the "closed-list" version of proportional
> > representation, we unanimously support switching to either a
> > "candidate-centric" or "open-list" version. We oppose closed-list methods
> > because they disregard voters preferences for specific candidates,
> transfer
> > power to party insiders who are not elected, and reduce transparency.
> >
> > Unlike the four voting methods we endorse, which are clearly better than
> > plurality in all significant ways, proportional representation can have
> > disadvantages as well as advantages. Many, though not all, of us believe
> > that the benefits outweigh the potential downsides, and thus support
> > adopting proportional representation in nations that do not yet use it.
> > Still, the decision of whether to adopt proportional representation, and
> > which specific method to adopt, is one that depends on the values of the
> > voters, and we cannot offer a blanket recommendation here.
> >
> > Regardless of how legislative seats are filled, we unanimously oppose the
> > use of plurality voting in any aspect of filling legislative seats, and
> we
> > unanimously support replacing those uses of plurality voting with any of
> our
> > four supported election methods.
> >
> > Using the fairer methods in organizations
> > Private organizations are a great place to start voting reform.
> >
> > These better voting methods are not just useful for public elections.
> They
> > also can be used to elect a private organization's officers, to elect
> > corporate board members, to make voting-based group decisions, and to
> elect
> > delegates to political-party conventions. In addition to increasing the
> > fairness of such elections and decisions, these uses will increase the
> > number of people who realize that plurality voting is very unfair, and
> help
> > them learn how to achieve much fairer results.
> >
> >
> > Multiple rounds of voting
> > Good voting systems can reduce the need for primaries and runoffs, or
> give
> > even-better results when combined with such extra rounds.
> >
> > Current elections commonly use multiple rounds of voting. This includes
> both
> > ?primary elections? to narrow the field before the main vote, and
> > second-round ?runoff elections? to ensure a majority if one is not
> obtained
> > in the main first round.
> >
> > Some of us believe that improved voting methods mean that only one round
> of
> > voting is needed. Others of us believe that multiple rounds can still
> > usefully serve to focus attention on the most popular candidates and
> might
> > improve the outcome of the election. Like proportional representation,
> this
> > is a decision that should be taken by the voters.
> >
> > Separate reforms
> >
> > Reforming the voting system helps with other democratic reforms.
> >
> > Most of us regard the adoption of our supported methods as merely one
> step
> > toward increasing the fairness of electing governmental representatives,
> and
> > believe that further steps, such as improved campaign-finance reporting
> > rules, are also needed.  Similarly, many of us believe that the
> governmental
> > process of making wise decisions can be improved, such as by using
> > decision-making aids such as deliberative polling.  The election-method
> > reforms we advocate here would be complementary with those other reforms,
> > both easing their adoption and multiplying their beneficial effects.
> >
> > Benefits for all
> > Voting reform is truly a win/win solution that will help all political
> > groups.
> >
> > Those of us signing this declaration have very different political views,
> > but in this statement we are looking beyond narrow, partisan interests.
> In
> > fact, we see no good reason to oppose election-method reform. Better
> > election methods can help all political groups: both conservatives and
> > liberals, both business and labor, both incumbents and upstart
> campaigners,
> > both centrists and extremists, both larger and smaller parties. We
> believe
> > that each of these groups can benefit in very concrete and specific ways,
> > and we are available (see below) to discuss how and why for each case.
> >
> > Politics is often viewed as a ?zero-sum game? in which one side can gain
> > only if another side loses. In contrast, we view election-method reform
> as
> > taking the next step up the ladder of democracy. Just as democracy has
> > proven to be much better than dictatorships, higher levels of democracy
> will
> > help us reach even higher standards of living across society. We do not
> > pretend to offer a utopia, where conflicts of interest disappear;
> elections
> > will always have winners and losers. But our proposals will help ensure
> that
> > the winners are a majority. And more importantly, we believe that current
> > political systems are often so dysfunctional that they serve no one well,
> > and therefore a healthier system will benefit all groups.
> > Further resources
> >
> > The following Wikipedia articles provide detailed descriptions and
> > characteristics of our supported methods:
> >
> >   - Approval voting
> >   - Condorcet method
> >   - Majority Judgment
> >   - Range voting
> >
> >
> >
> > Some of us signing this statement edit these Wikipedia articles to keep
> them
> > accurate and unbiased. Also, many of us participate in the
> > "Election-Methods" forum at www.electorama.com/em, and we would be happy
> to
> > answer your questions about any of these methods.
> > Taking action
> >
> > We urge you to help promote better voting methods wherever you are
> active,
> > both by spreading awareness and by doing what you can to implement them.
> >
> > We address this statement to all citizens. Whatever your political
> leanings,
> > we urge you to help educate yourself, your friends, and your
> representatives
> > about the advantages of better voting methods, and to organize with other
> > like-minded citizens to multiply your effect. To people in specific
> > situations we offer these recommendations:
> >
> >   - If you are a policymaker, you can better represent your constituents
> >   and reduce your need to constantly fundraise by introducing legislation
> that
> >   would adopt one of the election methods we support.
> >   - If you are active in a political party that uses plurality voting,
> you
> >   can increase your party?s chances of winning in the main election by
> using
> >   better voting methods to choose your party's candidates and your
> party's
> >   internally elected delegates.
> >   - If you feel that ?your? political party wants your vote and your
> money,
> >   but doesn?t care about your priorities, you can move towards having a
> real
> >   voice by pledging to only donate to, or work for, candidates who
> support
> >   election-method reform.
> >   - If you do not identify with any political party, you can favor
> >   candidates who express support for election reform.
> >   - If you are involved in a small political party, you can urge the
> >   adoption of one of the methods here as part of your party platform and
> an
> >   important strategy for growing your party.
> >   - If you are a member of an organization that elects officers using
> >   plurality voting, you can help your organization increase election
> fairness,
> >   and run more smoothly, by requesting the use of better election methods
> when
> >   an election involves more than two candidates.
> >
> >
> >
> > The unfairness of plurality voting has been known for centuries, but too
> > little has been done about it. That may be because plurality hides
> evidence
> > of the unfairness, because before computers other methods can be
> cumbersome
> > to count, or because election-method experts have not not united to speak
> > against plurality voting. Now it is time to begin putting this primitive
> > method where it belongs, namely in historical records as an early step in
> > the progress of democracy.
> >
> > Signatures
> >
> > We, the following election-method experts and enthusiasts, agree with the
> > statements made in this declaration.
> > ....
> > -------------- next part --------------
> > An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
> > URL: <
> http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20110910/2c7c0794/attachment.htm
> >
> >
> > ------------------------------
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Election-Methods mailing list
> > Election-Methods at lists.electorama.com
> > http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com
> >
> >
> > End of Election-Methods Digest, Vol 87, Issue 27
> > ************************************************
> >
>
>
>
> --
>
> Kathy Dopp
> http://electionmathematics.org
> Town of Colonie, NY 12304
> "One of the best ways to keep any conversation civil is to support the
> discussion with true facts."
> "Renewable energy is homeland security."
>
> Fundamentals of Verifiable Elections
> http://kathydopp.com/wordpress/?p=174
>
> View some of my research on my SSRN Author page:
> http://ssrn.com/author=1451051
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20110911/7a2edb21/attachment-0004.htm>