[EM] "Meaning" of a vote (or lack thereof)

Toby Pereira tdp201b at yahoo.co.uk
Thu Sep 8 11:25:54 PDT 2011


I think part of the problem then is that as far as I can see there is no clear and easily understandable description of Double range voting in existence.
 
Also, it's not intuitively obvious to everyone what the different scores should mean. Voting A>B>C in a ranked list is clear. I know there are strategic considerations that mean you don't necessarily vote in order of favourite, but you are essentially telling the ballot that that is your preference order, even if it isn't strictly true. That's essentially what it means.
 
I understand about utility and score votes but it wouldn't be clear to everyone, and also people wouldn't know in reality what level of utility to expect from each candidate. It would be very difficult for someone to calculate/guess. As had been stated, giving scores of 10, 5, and 0 out of 10 means that your middle candidate would have the same utility to you as a coin toss between your favourite and least favourite but it wouldn't always be obvious to a voter which has higher utility for them. They are, however, far more likely to be able to order the candidates.
 
I'm not saying that ranked ballots are better than range ballots, but while they both might have a meaning, the ranked ballot's meaning would be far clearer to most voters.

From: Warren Smith <warren.wds at gmail.com>
To: election-methods <election-methods at electorama.com>
Sent: Thursday, 8 September 2011, 0:31
Subject: [EM] "Meaning" of a vote (or lack thereof)

>Lundell:
>    How does it keep me honest in that scenario? Presumably I'd vote 1-0-0; what's my motivation to do otherwise?
>
>Quinn:
> Because there's a small chance that your (first "honest" range) vote actually will decide between a lottery of some chance of A or C and a certainty of B. If you haven't voted honestly, then that could make the wrong decision. And such decisions are all your "honest" ballot is ever used for, so there is no motivation to strategize with it.

>Lundell:
That's always the case with strategic voting when we don't have
perfect knowledge of the other votes. There's a larger chance (in this
example) that a sincere vote will cause B to defeat A. The more I know
about the state of other voters, the more motivation I have to vote
insincerely.
This is true, of course, of any manipulable voting rule.

--wrong.  There is NOT a "larger chance" that a sincere (double range
voting) vote
will cause B to defeat A.  There is in this example ZERO chance of that,

Also double range voting is NOT a "manipulable voting rule" (or more
precisely, it cannot be advantageously manipulated by altering the
"please be honest" range-style sub-ballot,
and indeed any such manipulation whatsoever will be strictly disadvantageous)

As far as I can tell, Lundell has either never read, or has not
comprehended, what "double range voting" is.

That's a pity because it is a major theoretical advance with
considerable philosophical implications, which was sort of the whole
point of this whole thread.

-- 
Warren D. Smith
http://RangeVoting.org
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