[EM] Declaration of Election-Method Experts and Enthusiasts: final stretch

[Jameson Quinn]

Toby:

You are welcome to shorten
it<https://docs.google.com/document/d/1oyJLxI9dciXBbowM5mougnbGHzkL3Ue1QkD8nnMwWLg/edit?hl=en_US>.
Of all the things you mention, the only one I'd miss is the mention of SODA.
And I'm willing to live with it if I'm outvoted on that one.

I don't want to be putting off your requests. If nobody else shortens it,
I'll make an attempt. But I suspect I'd be too cautious and leave too much
in; and, more importantly, the more people actually help write this sucker,
instead of just commenting on it, the better.

So: Toby, or anyone else, who wants to take a crack at it, go for it! Anyone
else can always revert your changes if they think that you've done more harm
than good. I myself will always try to find a compromise. I won't use any
dictatorial powers over the document unless two other people get into an
edit war that looks unresolvable otherwise; something that I think is
unlikely.

JQ

2011/9/5 Toby Pereira <tdp201b at yahoo.co.uk>

> I think it's probably too long, to be honest.
>
> When it comes to giving an example to clearly explain vote splitting I'm
> sure we can do better than:
>
> "A common strategy for altering the results of an election is for financial
> support to be offered to a candidate who is similar to a popular candidate.
> The resulting vote splitting, combined with lots of advertising for a
> different heavily funded candidate, can easily defeat the popular candidate
> and cause the heavily funded candidate to win. This weakens the influence of
> voters and strengthens the influence of special interests who give the
> largest campaign contributions."
>
> I don't think it reads well at all. So we're saying that, for example, a
> right wing candidate might defeat a popular left wing candiate by offering
> financial support to another left wing candidate? (left and right obviously
> interchangeable) I don't think it's very clear.
>
> I don't think it's necessary to point out that some Condorcet methods start
> off by looking for a winner and some don't. I still think it would be fine
> not to name any of them specifically, or just say "Condorcet methods such
> as..." and point people to somewhere like the Wikipedia where they can look
> them up.
>
> And although I'm sure SODA would get decent results, I see it really as a
> hobby for people on this mailing list at present and I'm not sure it really
> needs to be mentioned.
>
> Counting methods/election methods seem to be saying basically the same
> thing.
>
> Then there's a load of stuff about Robert's Rules of Order which I didn't
> know was there. Is it necessary? Also, the following paragraph seems overly
> specific, and there's a later section about rounds of voting anyway.
>
> "Our recommended election methods also can be used by any group of people
> to make single-choice decisions, such as choosing a new logo, choosing a
> time or date for an event, and choosing a restaurant for a gathering.
> However, if one of the choices is to not make a change (such as not changing
> the organization's logo), then two rounds of voting are needed, with the
> first round choosing the most popular change, and the second round choosing
> between that change and not making any change."
>
> There's probably more stuff as well, but this will do for now!
>
> Toby
>
>   *From:* Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>
> *To:* EM <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>;
> electionsciencefoundation <electionscience at googlegroups.com>
> *Sent:* Sunday, 4 September 2011, 19:05
> *Subject:* [EM] Declaration of Election-Method Experts and Enthusiasts:
> final stretch
>
> We've done a lot of work on the Declaration, and I think we're nearing the
> final stretch. As always, you can help edit this over on the google doc<https://docs.google.com/document/d/1oyJLxI9dciXBbowM5mougnbGHzkL3Ue1QkD8nnMwWLg/edit?hl=en_US>.
>
>
> I recognize that this version was largely written by only a few, and it
> is... well... significantly more than 10 words per person. If you think
> we're making a mistake and it should be radically shorter, please speak up.
> But personally I think that the section thesis statements, included in the
> table of contents, provide a good "cliff notes" version.
>
> If you want to sign on, please respond on the list. We only have four
> signers so far, but I'm sure we can get many times that many.
>
> Jameson Quinn
>
>  Declaration of Election-Method Experts and Enthusiasts
> Contents
> Introduction - It is time to change our voting system.
> Unfairness of plurality voting - Plurality voting is a bad system that is
> used in far too many cases.
> Better ballots - With better information from the voters, we can find
> better winners.
> Fairer counting methods - Together we endorse four voting systems which
> would give more-democratic results.
> Additional considerations
> Proportional representation - Legislatures should represent all the
> people, not just a bare majority.
> Using the fairer methods in organizations - Private organizations are a
> great place to start voting reform.
> Multiple rounds of voting - Good voting systems can reduce the need for
> primaries and runoffs, or give even-better results when combined with such
> extra rounds.
> Separate reforms - Reforming the voting system helps with other democratic
> reforms.
> Benefits for all - Voting reform is truly a win/win solution which can
> help all political groups.
> Taking action - Here’s what you can do to help voting reform.
> Introduction
> It is time to change our voting system.
>
> We, the undersigned election-method experts and enthusiasts from around the
> world, unanimously denounce the use of plurality voting in elections in
> which there are more than two candidates. In this declaration we offer
> several ready-to-adopt replacement election methods that we agree will
> reliably produce much fairer results.
>
> We agree that there are no significant political or economic risks
> associated with adopting the election methods recommended here. In fact, we
> believe that improving the fairness of election results will produce
> substantial political and economic benefits.
>
> We are confident that any of the systems we propose will bring at least the
> following direct benefits:
>
>    - Dramatically increased voter turnout because voters will have
>    meaningful choices
>    - Reduced voter frustration
>    - Improved voice for significant minorities (although they still cannot
>    out-vote the majority)
>    - Improved understanding of what the majority of voters really want
>
>
>
> We expect these additional direct benefits, although the degree of benefit
> depends on additional factors:
>
>    - Reduced dependence on campaign money in politics
>    - Healthier political dialogue, with less focus on personal attacks and
>    negative advertising
>    - Greater accountability, which means that disliked incumbents can be
>    replaced, without having to elect someone from a different party
>    - Reduced influence of lobbyists, and increased influence of voters
>
>
>
> We also believe that electing more-representative government leaders and
> making them more accountable could lead to some or all of these broader,
> indirect benefits:
>
>    - Freer cooperation between groups which share common interests, with
>    less infighting within coalitions
>    - Increased legitimacy of government and more political stability
>    because of truer “majority rule”
>    - Smaller gap between what voters want and politicians do
>    - Reduced social conflict
>    - Less corruption
>    - Reduced government costs
>    - Wiser use of tax dollars and natural resources
>    - Increases in widespread economic prosperity arising from increased
>    fairness
>
>
>
> Unfairness of plurality voting
> Plurality voting is a bad system that is used in far too many cases.
>
> We use the term "plurality" voting to refer to the commonly used counting
> method in which each voter marks only a single choice on the ballot, the
> number of marks for each candidate are counted, and the candidate with the
> most marks is regarded as the winner. In some nations this method is called
> "First Past The Post" (and abbreviated FPTP or FPP).
>
> Although plurality voting produces fair results when there are only two
> candidates, the results are often dramatically unfair when this method is
> used in elections with three or more candidates.
>
> "Vote splitting" is a key weakness of plurality voting, so it is worth
> understanding. Vote splitting refers to similar candidates each receiving
> fewer votes compared to a single opposition candidate. It accounts for why,
> in most democracies, each political party elects a single candidate for each
> election. If a political party offers two candidates, both of those
> candidates are likely to lose to a party that offers only one candidate.
> This happens because that party's voters split their votes between the two
> candidates, while the winning party concentrates all of their voters' votes
> on a single candidate. In other words, plurality-based elections often
> result in the wrong candidate winning.
>
> A common strategy for altering the results of an election is for financial
> support to be offered to a candidate who is similar to a popular candidate.
> The resulting vote splitting, combined with lots of advertising for a
> different heavily funded candidate, can easily defeat the popular candidate
> and cause the heavily funded candidate to win. This weakens the influence of
> voters and strengthens the influence of special interests who give the
> largest campaign contributions.
>
> If voters try to compensate by only voting between the two clearly popular
> choices, the typical result is a two-party system. This narrows the scope of
> debate and reduces voter choice. With fewer choices it becomes easier for
> incumbents to become complacent and even corrupt. Additional political
> parties only arise if other election methods, such as ones explained below,
> accommodate additional parties.
>
> In spite of its well-known weaknesses, plurality voting is far too widely
> used, especially in the English-speaking world. It is also the preferred
> election method in nations that pretend to be democracies, yet lack the
> freedoms and economic benefits of democracy.
>
> Better ballots
> With better information from the voters, we can find better winners.
> Unanimously we agree that the kind of ballot used in plurality voting —
> which in this declaration is called a "single-mark” ballot — is not
> appropriate in governmental elections. Its deficiency is that it does not
> collect enough preference information from the voters in order to always
> correctly identify the most popular candidate when there are more than two
> candidates.
>
> There are three kinds of ballots that collect enough preference information
> to always, or almost always, correctly identify the most popular candidate.
> The names and descriptions of these ballot types are, in alphabetical order:
>
>    - Approval ballot, on which a voter marks each candidate who the voter
>    approves as an acceptable choice, and leaves unmarked the candidates who are
>    not acceptable
>
>
>
>    - Ranked ballots (or “1-2-3 ballots”), on which a voter indicates a
>    first choice, and optionally indicates a second choice, and optionally
>    indicates additional choices at lower preference levels
>
>
>
>    - Score ballots, on which a voter assigns a number or grade for each
>    candidate. The most familiar versions of such voting are to rate something
>    with 1 to 5 stars, or rate a choice with a number from 1 to 10, or to rate
>    each choice at a named grade (such as "excellent", "good", "fair", "poor",
>    or "reject"), but any range of numbers or grades can be used.
>
>
>
> Why don’t more people understand the unfairness of plurality voting?
> Single-mark ballots do not collect enough information to reveal the actual
> preferences of voters in elections that have three or more reasonably
> popular candidates. This lack of full preference information makes it
> difficult for anyone to produce clear proof, or even evidence, of unfair
> election results.
>
> Adopting any of the three better ballot types would provide the information
> that is needed for fair results. In addition, a comparison of the fair
> results in contrast to who would have won if plurality voting had been used
> will quickly reveal the dramatic unfairness of plurality voting.
>
> Fairer counting methods
> Together we endorse four voting systems which would give more-democratic
> results.
>
> These three better ballot types can be counted in different ways to produce
> different results. We, the undersigned election-method experts, have both
> developed and analyzed many counting methods, and we now agree there are
> several counting methods that are worth adopting in governmental elections.
>
> Four of the counting methods that we agree would produce significantly
> better results compared to plurality voting are, in alphabetical order:
>
>    - Approval voting, which uses approval ballots and identifies the
>    candidate with the most approval marks as the winner.
>
>
>
>    - Any of the Condorcet methods, which use ranked ballots, and which use
>    "pairwise counting" to count how many voters prefer each candidate compared
>    to each other candidate, and which identify as the "Condorcet winner" the
>    candidate who is pairwise preferred over each and every other candidate. In
>    some elections there is no Condorcet winner, and different Condorcet methods
>    described below resolve these cases. (The word Condorcet is a French name
>    that is pronounced "kon-dor-say".)
>
>
>
>    - Majority judgment, which uses score ballots, and elects a candidate
>    who gets the best score from half or more of the voters. More specifically,
>    the best median score wins, which means that the winning candidate deserves
>    to win if half the voters rate the winning candidate as good or better, and
>    no other candidate has any half of the voters rating those candidates at
>    more than fair or better.
>
>
>
>    - Range voting (also known as score voting), which uses score ballots,
>    and adds together the scores assigned to each candidate, and identifies the
>    winner as the candidate who receives the highest total score.
>
>
>
> There are three Condorcet methods that identify the Condorcet winner (when
> there is one) without explicitly looking for the Condorcet winner, and they
> are, in alphabetical order:
>
>    - Condorcet-Kemeny method (or "VoteFair popularity ranking")
>    - Condorcet-Schulze (or "beatpath") method
>    - Condorcet-Tideman (or "ranked pairs") method
>
>
>
> We also support the Condorcet-Approval and Condorcet-IRV methods, which
> first look for a Condorcet winner and then use a different method to
> identify a winner if there is none. In most cases allthe different Condorcet
> methods identify the same winner, yet each of these Condorcet methods has
> slight advantages and disadvantages compared to one another.
>
> There is another counting method that is supported by some, but not most,
> of the undersigned election-method experts. It is called "instant-runoff
> voting" (or "IRV" or "the alternative vote"), and it uses ranked ballots.
> The counting method begins by considering each voter's highest-ranked
> choice, and eliminating the candidate with the fewest votes, and then
> shifting the affected ballots to the next-most preferred candidate, and
> repeating this process until a candidate receives a majority of votes.
>
> Instant-runoff voting is used in some governmental elections throughout the
> world, and most of us agree that usually the results are an improvement over
> plurality voting. However, many of us either regard the degree of
> improvement as not being significant enough to justify adopting this method,
> or are concerned that its not-always-fair results will be associated with
> ranked ballots rather than with the instant-runoff counting method.
>
> Significantly some of the places that have adopted instant-runoff voting
> have later rejected the method and returned to plurality voting. In the
> United States, these places include Aspen, Colorado and Burlington, Vermont.
> The rejections occurred because the official IRV winner was not the same as
> the Condorcet winner.
>
> One final counting method that deserves to be mentioned is Simple
> Optionally-Delegated Approval (SODA) voting. This method combines approval
> voting with vote delegation to make the voter’s task as simple as possible.
> This method is too new to merit official support in this declaration, but
> many of us agree that it shows promise and deserves further study.
>
> The choice of counting method determines which kind of ballot is needed.
> Each of the ballot types can be implemented on paper ballots, and these
> ballots can be scanned optically and counted by computer. All the ballot
> types also can be counted manually if needed, which is significant because
> most of us also support making government elections trustworthy through the
> use of voter-verifiable paper ballots.
>
> To appreciate the importance of the few election methods we support,
> consider that there are many other election methods and voting methods, plus
> combinations of them, that we do not endorse. In fact, for some of them we
> unanimously agree to oppose their use in governmental elections.
>
> Why do we not support a single "best" election method? Each of our
> supported election methods has advantages and disadvantages compared to each
> another, and different election-method experts place different degrees of
> importance on each of these advantages and disadvantages. It bears
> repeating, though, that despite our disagreements, we would not hesitate to
> support any of these methods over plurality.
>
> Many of us – although not everyone signing this declaration – associates
> the following method-specific advantages with each of our four supported
> election methods:
>
>    - Approval voting is the simplest election method to collect
>    preferences (either on ballots or with a show of hands) and the simplest
>    method (besides plurality) to count and explain.
>
>
>
>    - Condorcet methods provide what most people see as the fairest results
>    in the many cases in which one candidate – the Condorcet winner – is
>    pairwise preferred over every other candidate.
>
>
>
>    - Majority judgment uses score ballots, which collect the fullest
>    preference information, and counts them in a way that reduces the incentives
>    for strategic voting; so it is the best system for finding out how the
>    voters feel about each candidate on an absolute scale, not just as better or
>    worse than other candidates.
>
>
>
>    - Score voting comes closest to the mathematically defined "best"
>    overall results for voter satisfaction if voters vote sincerely; and gives
>    the same reasonable results as Approval voting if every voter votes
>    strategically.
>
>
>
> The following Wikipedia articles about these methods provide detailed
> descriptions and characteristics of these methods:
>
>    - Approval voting
>    - Condorcet method
>    - Majority Judgement
>    - Range voting
>
>
>
> Some of us signing this statement edit these Wikipedia articles to keep
> them accurate and unbiased. Also, many of us participate in the
> "Election-Methods" forum at www.electorama.com/em, and we would be happy
> to answer your questions about any of these methods.
>
> In the list of signatures some of us indicate which voting method we
> most-strongly prefer. Yet we also agree that we will support the adoption of
> any of these methods. We agree that staying with plurality voting is the
> "wrong" choice and that choosing any of our supported methods is the “right”
> choice, so we will support whichever method has the best chance of adoption.
> Additional considerations
> Proportional representation
> Legislatures should represent all the people, not just a bare majority.
>
> So far, all of the above recommendations apply to identifying a single
> winner, so they are known as "single-winner" election methods. These
> single-winner methods are ideally suited for electing mayors and governors.
> When used in non-governmental organizations, these single-winner methods are
> ideally suited for electing a president, treasurer, and secretary.
>
> Different considerations apply if an election fills a legislative seat,
> such as a seat in a legislature, congress, or parliament. In Canada, the
> United Kingdom, and the United States, the typical method for filling a
> legislative seat is to define a district or riding in which plurality voting
> is used to elect one person who is expected to represent the citizens in
> that district or riding.
>
> All of us signing this declaration agree that plurality voting is not
> acceptable as an election method for filling a single district-based or
> riding-based legislative seat. All of us would support using any of the
> single-winner methods endorsed above, as an improvement over using plurality
> voting to fill a district-based or riding-based legislative seat.
>
> Most of us agree that an even better choice would be to adopt an election
> method in which the choice of who wins one legislative seat interacts with
> who wins another equivalent seat in ways that give at least somewhat
> proportional representation to most voters.
>
> The best-known approach, which is used in most European nations (but not
> the United Kingdom), is party-based proportional representation. It asks
> voters to indicate their favorite political party, and then the method makes
> adjustments to ensure that the percentage of legislative seats filled by
> members of each party roughly matches the percentage of voters who support
> each party. In other words, if 15% of the voters mark the Silver Party as
> their favorite, then approximately 15% of the parliamentary seats are filled
> by Silver Party politicians.
>
> Almost all of us agree that where proportional representation (PR) is used,
> the "open-list" versions or the “candidate-centric” versions, not the
> "closed-list" versions, should be used. We oppose the closed-list versions
> because they disregard candidate-specific voter preferences, and transfer
> power to people who are not elected, and who cannot easily be removed from
> their position of power.
>
> An additional advantage of increased proportional representation is that it
> reduces the effects of "gerrymandering," which is a political manipulation
> of district or riding boundaries for the purpose of favoring a specific
> political party in each district or riding. Increased proportional
> representation also increases voter turnout because a voter can influence
> the overall, party-based, legislative balance even if they reside in a
> district that never elects someone from that voter's preferred political
> party.
>
> Although we unanimously agree that increased proportional representation
> would provide many benefits, and greatly increase fairness in filling
> legislative seats, we are not yet ready to express support for any specific
> versions of proportional representation. Some newly developed methods show
> promise, but they are not yet fully developed, analyzed, and ready for use.
>
> Using the fairer methods in organizations
> Private organizations are a great place to start voting reform.
>
> These better election methods are useful not just for public elections, but
> also within private organizations and political parties. Private
> organizations could use these methods to elect an organization's officers,
> to elect corporate board members, and to make voting-based group decisions.
> In addition to increasing the fairness of such elections and decisions,
> these uses will increase the number of people who realize that plurality
> voting is very unfair, and help them learn how to achieve much fairer
> results.
>
> Keep in mind that all four of our recommended election methods already have
> been used to elect officers in non-governmental organizations, and the
> fairer results have been widely appreciated (except by some incumbents who
> were not reelected).
>
> If an organization uses rules that require plurality voting, or follows
> Roberts Rules of Order, we encourage the organization to amend its rules to
> accommodate one or more of our supported election methods. If the
> organization cannot decide which method to adopt, the revised rules can
> allow the presiding organization's officers to choose which of our supported
> methods will be used in the next election.
>
> Even if amending the rules is not an option, using our supported methods
> informally prior to the formal vote can help improve Roberts Rules of Order.
> Here’s why. Robert’s Rules are different from all the election methods we
> have discussed so far in that they assume that all voters are physically
> present and able to vote again as many times as necessary until a conclusion
> is reached. Thus these rules use a system where single-mark balloting is
> repeated until one option gets an absolute majority. It is important to note
> that this repeated balloting is not equivalent to plurality or
> instant-runoff. Not only are voters free to change their preferences,
> honestly or strategically; but also, unlike instant-runoff, Roberts Rules
> specify that the person with the fewest votes must not be forced to
> withdraw.
>
> The Roberts Rules system is superior to plurality; in fact, if followed
> faithfully, it will often lead to the same result as our endorsed systems.
> The problem is that it can be very slow, as it takes many rounds of
> balloting to reach a compromise. By first voting informally with one of our
> supported methods (or indeed, with IRV, which may be easier to hand-count
> with few voters than some of our endorsed systems), the Roberts Rules vote
> will reach a faster, and sometimes a better, result than by simply voting
> repeatedly. That is because the supported methods give evidence of which
> candidate or candidates should withdraw, or should receive fewer votes,
> based on a lack of popularity. In this case the supported election method is
> being used to identify the least-popular candidates instead of the
> most-popular candidate, so all the available counts and calculated rankings
> produced by the supported method — not just the identity of the winner —
> need to be shared.
>
> Our recommended election methods also can be used by any group of people to
> make single-choice decisions, such as choosing a new logo, choosing a time
> or date for an event, and choosing a restaurant for a gathering. However, if
> one of the choices is to not make a change (such as not changing the
> organization's logo), then two rounds of voting are needed, with the first
> round choosing the most popular change, and the second round choosing
> between that change and not making any change.
>
> One particularly relevant example of a “private” election is the nomination
> process of a political party. It is true that our supported methods make
> this process less important, because, unlike plurality, they do not break
> down when more than one candidate from a party is running. Still, we expect
> that many parties would still want to have a formal nomination (“primary
> election”) process so as to focus their efforts on one or two candidates per
> office. We believe that any party using a superior voting system internally
> will see immediate benefits. A primary process with increased turnout, with
> fewer negative attacks, and with a more-democratic result will result in a
> stronger nominee who is better-prepared to win in the general election.
> Multiple rounds of voting
> Good voting systems can reduce the need for primaries and runoffs, or give
> even-better results when combined with such extra rounds.
>
> Current elections commonly use multiple rounds of voting. This includes
> both “primary elections” to narrow the field before the main vote, and
> second-round “runoff elections” to ensure a majority if one is not obtained
> in the main first round.
>
> These extra rounds can serve several purposes, but they are especially
> necessary with the plurality system, because that system only really works
> when everyone knows that there are just two main candidates who matter.
>
> Some of us believe that improved voting methods mean that only one round of
> voting is needed. Others of us still believe that multiple rounds can still
> usefully serve to focus attention. Where we all agree, though, is that
> plurality should never be used in any round with more than two candidates.
>
> As mentioned above, we also believe that any party which decides to use a
> supported election method in its primaries, will tend to elect stronger
> candidates and win more often.
>
> When choosing which candidates deserve to progress to a runoff election, we
> do not offer specific recommendations for interpreting results – beyond
> obviously including the most popular candidate. There are various
> possibilities for how to choose the second, third, and additional
> candidates, and the best approach would depend on which of our supported
> methods is used (in the earlier round), and other details. This is similar
> to the question of how to increase proportional representation.
>
> Regardless of whether our supported election methods are used with or
> without runoff elections, the results will be much fairer than can be
> achieved using plurality voting with multiple voting rounds.
>
> Separate reforms
>
> Reforming the voting system helps with other democratic reforms.
>
> Nothing in this statement should be construed to say that we believe that
> voting systems are the only thing that needs fixing in current-day political
> systems. In fact, most of us would support reforms including broader
> campaign finance reporting rules, increased use of other decision-making
> aids such as deliberative polling, clearer ethics rules for officeholders of
> all varieties, and others. We believe that the voting reforms suggested here
> would be synergistic with such other reforms, both easing their passage and
> multiplying their effects.
> Benefits for all
> Voting reform is truly a win/win solution which can help all political
> groups.
>
> We, as election-method experts, have spent the last decade developing
> online resources about election methods, developing software for the
> election methods we support, and now we have reached agreement as to which
> election methods are worth adopting as replacements for plurality voting.
> Through this declaration we are sharing our recommendations. We also offer
> to share our deep understanding of election methods with policymakers and
> politically active citizens of any nation, state, province, municipality, or
> political party.
>
> Those of us signing this declaration proudly stand at widely separate
> points on the political spectrum. When we vote, we know that many of us will
> be strongly supporting opposite sides. And even in discussing voting
> systems, we have our disagreements. Yet we respect each other’s common
> interests in desiring to move beyond plurality voting in search of a
> healthier democracy. In signing this statement, and in supporting a variety
> of different methods, we are looking beyond narrow, partisan interests. We
> seek to support the common good. In fact we are unanimous in sincerely
> believing there are no good reasons to oppose election-method reform.
>
> Politics is often viewed as a “zero-sum game” in which one side can gain
> only if another side loses. In contrast, we view election-method reform as
> taking the next step up the ladder of democracy; just as democracy has
> proven to be much better than dictatorships, higher levels of democracy will
> help us reach even higher standards of living for almost everyone. We do not
> pretend to offer a utopia, where conflicts of interest disappear and
> everyone is a winner. We simply believe that even a political group that
> loses an election can benefit from healthier dialogue and elected officials
> who better represent the voters.
>
> Thus, we believe that better election methods will help all political
> groups: both left and right, both business and labor, both incumbents and
> upstart campaigners, both centrists and extremists. Even special interests
> who currently donate large campaign contributions will benefit from a more
> robust and sustainable economy. We believe that every one of these political
> groups could benefit in very concrete and specific ways, and we are
> available to discuss how and why for each case.
>
> Taking action
>
> Here’s what you can do to help voting reform.
>
> We address this statement to all citizens, and especially to those who are
> aware of any of the many benefits that election-method reforms will bring.
> To people in specific situations we offer the following words of
> encouragement:
>
>    - If you are a policymaker, we strongly urge you to introduce
>    legislation that would adopt one of the election methods we support.
>    - If you are active in a political party that uses plurality voting, we
>    strongly urge you to encourage the use of a better voting method to choose
>    your party's candidates and your party's internally elected delegates.
>    - If you are politically active, we strongly urge you to tell others
>    about the unfairness of plurality voting, and to bring attention to the
>    fairer election methods supported in this declaration.
>    - If you are a frustrated voter, we strongly urge you to learn about
>    one or more of the election methods we support, and then tell others what
>    you have learned.
>    - If you are a member of an organization that elects officers using
>    plurality voting, we strongly urge you to advocate using one of the
>    recommended election methods when an election involves more than two
>    candidates.
>
>
>
> At the very least, please help the world by eliminating the primitive
> voting method known as plurality voting.
> The highest priority of this declaration is to stop the use of plurality
> voting in governmental elections, which should always accommodate more than
> two candidates. The widespread availability of computers now makes it easy
> to adopt any of the better election methods we support.
>
> More specifically, please educate others that if voters can only indicate a
> single, first choice on their ballot, then the choice with the most
> plurality votes is not necessarily the most popular, and the choice with the
> fewest plurality votes is not necessarily the least popular.
>
> We, the following election-method experts, agree with the statements made
> in this declaration.
>
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>
>
>
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