[EM] IRV3/AV3

[Jameson Quinn]

2011/10/31 David L Wetzell <wetzelld at gmail.com>

>
>
> On Mon, Oct 31, 2011 at 5:59 PM, Andy Jennings <
> elections at jenningsstory.com> wrote:
>
>> David,
>>
>> My strongest feeling about your recently proposed system is that the
>> "three" is so arbitrary.
>>
>> What if there are eight candidates running, and I really like five of
>> them?  Then approving three might not be enough.
>>
>
> Most people aren't as politically keen as you are.  We need to design
> rules for the typical voter, not ourselves.  I think the number of
> contested seats plus two is a good rule of thumb...
>
>
>> I know you said that real elections only seem to have four strong
>> candidates, but the current republican primary seems to have at least seven
>> totally legitimate candidates in the race.
>>
>
> define totally legit?  From a wonk perspective or a hack perspective?
>  There's three realistic candidates right now, and a bunch of me
> threes/fours/what-nots
> .
>
>> Both 2008 primaries were the same way.  Sure, the press is constantly
>> trying to whittle it down to about four.  But why should we let the press
>> do the whittling?  Shouldn't that be done by the voting system in some way?
>>  Should we use a different system for these larger elections?
>>
>
> dlw:  It's not just a media thing, it's also a matter of cost-benefit
> analysis.  When there's only one winner, it just isn't cost-effective for
> there to be lots and lots of candidates.
>
> My point is based on reality as it is, not as I'd like it to be.  We need
> to gear our reforms to reality, not our wishful thinking about how
> elections ought to be...
>
>>
>> If there are only three candidates running, then the AV step does
>> nothing.  If there are four candidates running, then the AV step is really
>> anti-plurality.
>>
>
> dlw: I'm saying that there can be more than three or four candidates on
> the ballot, but there tends to be 3 or 4 serious candidates by virtue of
> economics of elections.  ..
>
>>
>> And as Kathy pointed out, you'd still better tell people that it's not
>> safe to put their favorite first.
>>
>
> dlw: That'd be silly.  If you do the math, while it's possible that there
> could be a non-monotonicity problem in the unlikely event of a close three
> way election, it's still less likely than the more typical outcome where it
> makes sense to vote your preferences.  And so long as the odds favor the
> typical outcome, the possibility of a sour grapes situation are not
> consequential.  It does not rationally change voter behavior.
>

In nonpartisan/monopartisan elections, including party primaries, there is
unlikely to be a nonmonotonicity problem. In partisan elections where
more-or-less one-dimensional spectra are the norm, nonmonotonicity is a
very real threat.

JQ
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