[EM] Single-winner method with strong winners (was: Poll for favorite single winner voting system with OpaVote)

[Kevin Venzke]

Hi Juho,
 
Sorry in advance if I didn't read your message carefully enough, but I think I probably
did:

--- En date de : Dim 16.10.11, Juho Laatu <juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk> a écrit :






Use a Condorcet method to elect the winner among the most approved candidate pair and those who are at least as approved as the less approved of those two.
- a pair of candidates is approved by a voter if she approves at least one of those candidates


This method is summable. One should sum up information about pairwise comparisons, pair approvals and individual approvals.


20: A1 > A2 >>
15: A2 > A1 >>
33: B >> C
32: C >> B



In this example we have three major parties, A, B and C. Or alternatively we have four parties. In that case parties A1 and A2 are ideologically close to each others.


This method elects B since pair A1, B (or A2, B) is the most approved pair (approved by 68 voters), A2 is more approved than B, and B beats both A1 and A2 in pairwise comparison.


 
 


Use of approvals typically requires a (sincere) strategy. In this method the voters should try to impact on which two candidates will be at least as approved as the most approved pair of candidates. That means that it would make sense to approve at least one candidate with reasonable chances to be among the most approved candidates (and not to approve too many of the candidates).


Does this method work well enough? Are this kind of methods useful methods in general?
 
 
 
I think that your method is similar to my single contest method. I believe you determine
the critical pair of candidates in exactly the same way. However, while my method just
has an instant runoff between those two candidates, you are possibly letting in some 
other candidates.
 
I don't think there is a big problem on paper... It's quite likely that I tested in my sim
some methods very similar to your proposal, and didn't report on them just because I
found them to be less than the best.
 
What I found to be of interest, of course, is that very little strategy remained on the
ranking side of the method, since its main purpose was to resolve a two-way race.
Your method will compromise on that a bit...
 

Do you have majority favorite covered...?
 
Kevin
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