[EM] condorcet & range voting -- which one yields more condorcet winners?

[Kevin Venzke]

Hi,

--- En date de : Mar 11.10.11, Warren Smith <warren.wds at gmail.com> a écrit :
> I've done sim experiments indicating that range voting
> finds
> honest-voter Condorcet winners
> more often than Condorcet methods do, if the voters are
> strategic.

Though you have to be careful what you mean by "strategic."

My own recent sims use an apples-to-apples method to determine strategic
voting under each method (with all voters being strategic). I don't find
Range/Approval/MCA/whatever to be relatively strong at sincere Condorcet
efficiency most of the time.

It's not that I don't find strategic voting to varying degrees under
rank methods. (Although I see extremely few disaster scenarios, as 
voters, observing polls, seem to have no qualms about compromising to
avert them.) It is probably due to this difference:

In a left/right/center scenario it is completely possible that on 
election day, any one of those three candidates could be the sincere 
Condorcet Winner and be correctly elected under Condorcet or some other
methods. But Approval, at least experimentally, can't handle three
frontrunners on a spectrum. Either left or right is likely to lose
their "exclusive" supporters, so that only two of the three candidates
can actually win on election day.

Kevin Venzke